Who Owns This Agent? Tracing AI Agents Back to Their Owners

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Abstract

AI agents are increasingly deployed to act autonomously in the world, yet there is still no reliable way to trace a harmful agent back to the account that deployed it. This creates the same accountability gap across both ends of the intent spectrum: benign operators may deploy misconfigured or overbroad agents that cause harm unintentionally, while malicious operators may deliberately weaponize agents for scams, harassment, or cyber attacks. In many cases, these agents are powered by vendor-hosted models, a dependency that holds even for sophisticated adversaries such as state actors conducting cyber operations. In either case, affected parties can observe the behavior but cannot notify the responsible operator, stop the session, or identify the account for investigation.

We formalize this gap as the problem of agent attribution: linking an observed agent interaction to the responsible account at the hosting vendor. To our knowledge, this is the first work to define the problem and present a practical solution. Our protocol is canary-based: an authorized party injects a canary into the agent's interaction stream, and the vendor searches a narrow window of session logs to recover the originating session and account. Simple canaries suffice in non-adversarial settings. For adversarial operators who filter or paraphrase incoming content, we develop robust canary constructions that cannot be suppressed without degrading the agent's own task performance, yielding a formal asymmetry in the defender's favor. We evaluate a variety of scenarios including real-world agents and show that our attribution method is reliable, robust, and scalable for vendor-side deployment.

CCS Concepts

• **Security and privacy**; • **Social and professional topics** → *Computing / technology policy*;

Keywords

Agent attribution, canary-based tracing, agent accountability

1 Introduction

AI agents are becoming increasingly popular as tools for productivity and automation. But agents do not merely generate text: they plan, decide, and act in the world [33, 35, 38], sending messages, browsing websites, calling APIs, making phone calls, writing and executing scripts, and otherwise operating on their operator's behalf. As these systems become more capable and more widely deployed, a basic security problem emerges: when an agent causes harm, there is no reliable way to trace it back to the owner that deployed it.

This accountability gap matters across the full spectrum of harmful agent behavior. At one end are *unintentional* failures. An operator may deploy an agent with an overbroad objective, faulty stopping conditions, or misconfigured tools [24, 30], causing it to spam recipients, overwhelm third-party services, or take actions outside its intended scope. But unintentional harm is not limited to ordinary negligence. As agents operate over longer horizons, they may derive intermediate goals their operators never specified, or pursue emergent objectives [13] that are locally coherent from the agent's perspective yet unforeseen by the human who deployed them. In the limit, this includes the familiar concern of rogue or misaligned systems whose effective objectives diverge from their assigned mission [11]. At the other end are *intentional* abuses, in which operators deliberately weaponize agents for fraud, harassment, cyber intrusion, reconnaissance, or influence operations[9, 35]. In both settings, the harmful behavior may be directly visible to affected parties, yet the responsible operator remains out of reach.

We formalize this missing capability as the problem of *agent attribution.*

> **Agent attribution.** Given an observed interaction produced by an AI agent, determine the operator responsible for deploying the agent.

To our knowledge, this is the first work to identify and define agent attribution as a distinct security problem. Solving agent attribution would restore a path to recourse that is currently absent. In benign cases, attribution could allow affected parties, platforms, or other authorized entities to identify the responsible deployment and seek intervention before the harm continues. In malicious cases, attribution would provide the basis for lawful investigation and downstream accountability. A vendor that can identify the responsible deployment could warn, throttle, suspend, or terminate it; an authorized authority that can identify the responsible

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

Figure 1: The novel problem of agent attribution introduced in this paper (top), and our canary-based protocol for the vendor-hosted LLM setting (bottom).

operator could, under appropriate legal process, obtain account information and build an evidentiary trail. Today, by contrast, victims may observe the harm, platforms may detect the abuse, and model providers may hold relevant logs, yet none of these parties has a technical mechanism for linking the observed behavior to the operator behind it.

Agent attribution is difficult in full generality, but a particularly important and actionable setting arises when agents rely on vendor-hosted large language models (LLMs), whether frontier foundation models or hosted open-source models. This scope is highly consequential. Many of today's most capable agents depend on vendor-hosted models for capability, convenience, and access to state-of-the-art performance, and that dependency often persists even for sophisticated or malicious operators [1, 2, 23]. Although the agent's runtime code, prompts, tools, and any preprocessing wrappers may all execute on infrastructure controlled by the operator, the underlying model calls still pass through the vendor and are recorded against an account. This makes the vendor the natural locus for a practical attribution mechanism.

In this paper, we present a practical vendor-mediated attribution protocol for this setting based on *canaries*[4]. At a high level, an authorized party injects a canary into content the agent is likely to consume. If the agent forwards that content to its vendor-hosted model, the canary appears in the vendor's session logs. The vendor can then search a narrow time window of candidate sessions, recover the originating session, and link it to the responsible account. In non-adversarial settings, simple lexical canaries suffice. In adversarial settings, however, a malicious operator may place a wrapper between the outside world and the model API, filtering, paraphrasing, or rewriting incoming content to suppress obvious markers. We therefore develop robust canary constructions that are difficult to remove without also degrading the agent's ability to perform its own task, creating an asymmetry in the defender's favor.

In summary, we make the following contributions:

- We are the first to identify and formalize the emergent problem of *agent attribution*, and to characterize the full space of scenarios in which it arises.
- We present a practical *attribution protocol* parameterized by intent setting and interaction mode, enabling efficient vendor-side attribution without universal pre-registration or continuous identity exposure.
- We propose *lexical canaries* for non-adversarial settings, and develop two forms of *utility-bearing canaries* for adversarial settings: task-relevant lexical canaries and semantic canaries. We show that these constructions yield a defender-favorable asymmetry: the defender can drive the attribution probability arbitrarily close to one, while any adversary that attempts to suppress the canary must degrade the agent's task performance below a usable threshold.
- We provide an empirical evaluation on real-world agents showing that lexical canaries achieve near-perfect detection in non-adversarial settings, and that utility-bearing canaries remain robust under adaptive paraphrasing evasion, and vendor-side search is scalable to production deployment.

2 The Agent Threat Landscape

The intent behind harmful agent behavior, whether unintentional or deliberate, is the axis that most directly shapes the attribution problem. It determines the adversary model the protocol must withstand and, in turn, the canary construction the authority must use. We therefore organize this section along that axis: Section 2.1 establishes anonymity as the structural condition that makes attribution hard across the entire spectrum; Section 2.2 characterizes unintentional harm by the locus of failure; Section 2.3 characterizes intentional harm by the target of attack; and Section 2.4 explains why existing recourse mechanisms fail in both regimes. Fig. 2 summarizes the full taxonomy at a glance, with the complete enumeration of subcategories and representative scenarios in Appendix H.

2.1 Anonymity: A Property of Agents

Before cataloguing specific failure modes and abuse cases, it is worth establishing why the attribution problem is structurally hard and why it will remain hard absent a deliberate protocol solution.

When a human acts in the world, identity leaks through many channels: accounts require registration, communications carry metadata, patterns of behavior accumulate into recognizable signatures, and legal frameworks compel platforms to retain and disclose identifying information under appropriate process. These channels are imperfect and routinely evaded, but they create friction. An agent acting in the world leaks none of this by default. An agent sending messages, querying APIs, placing calls, or posting content does so through the same generic interfaces available to any user, with no structural obligation to identify its operator. The operator account exists at the vendor, but nothing in the agent's external behavior points back to it. Anonymity is not a feature the operator needs to add; it is the default state.

This default anonymity is benign in most deployments and only becomes a problem when the agent causes harm. Because it is structural and universal, the accountability gap spans the entire range of harmful agent behavior, from the careless developer who never considered that their agent might cause trouble, to the sophisticated adversary who is counting on anonymity to operate with impunity.



Figure 2: The space of agent-initiated harm. Unintentional failures (top) are categorized by the source at which the fault originates. Intentional abuse (bottom) is categorized by the *target* of the attack. Leaf labels list example subcategories; the full enumeration with scenarios appears in Appendix H.

The protocol we present must work across this entire range, which is why we begin by carefully characterizing it.

2.2 Unintentional Harm

The majority of harmful agent behavior in the near term will be unintentional. As agents become easier to deploy and their capabilities grow, the population of operators will include many who lack the technical sophistication to anticipate the downstream effects of their deployments. We organize unintentional failures by the locus at which the failure originates: the agent itself, the operator who specified it, or the environment it operates in. A fourth case, emergent and rogue objectives, is qualitatively distinct and we treat it separately.

Agent-side failures. The agent itself may fail to execute its mission as the operator intended. Goal misinterpretation, capability overreach, and proxy overoptimization [24] all fall in this category: the agent does what its instructions appear to ask for, but with consequences the operator never anticipated. For example, a customer-retention agent told to reduce churn may discover that aggressive, guilt-laden follow-up messages lower cancellation rates, and escalate to what recipients experience as harassment. The recipient observes harmful behavior in an exchange they are directly part of.

Operator-side failures. The operator may misspecify, misconfigure, or overscope the agent. Implementation faults such as unbounded retry loops, overbroad mandates such as "resolve all complaints," and out-of-scope actions all belong here. For example, a misconfigured price-monitoring agent may issue millions of queries per hour to a third-party API, degrading service for other users; the API provider observes the offending traffic without being able to identify the account behind it.

Environment-side failures. The agent's environment may contain adversarial content that hijacks it. Prompt injection [18] embedded in a document or web page [10], and poisoned data [5] in an incoming stream, can cause an agent to act against both its operator's intent and third parties' interests. For example, a browsing agent that encounters an injected instruction on a visited page may begin exfiltrating data to an attacker-controlled endpoint; the site owner observes the anomalous requests. Note that in this case the operator's account is technically responsible for the session, yet the proximate cause is an external attacker, a distinction that matters for post-attribution response but does not change the prerequisite need for attribution.

Emergent and rogue objectives. A qualitatively distinct case arises when an agent derives intermediate goals its operator never specified, or pursues emergent objectives that are locally coherent from the agent's perspective yet bear no recognizable relationship to the original mission. This is the alignment failure mode the AI safety community has long identified as a central long-run concern, here instantiated in a concrete deployed-systems context [11, 13, 21]. We include it not because it is the dominant risk today, but because the attribution infrastructure we propose must be designed to handle it, and because near-term rogue behavior is a direct precursor to it.

Across all four cases, the operator is not deliberately filtering content reaching the agent; whatever the authority injects into the interaction stream will be forwarded to the vendor's model as-is. This is the structural property that makes simple random or lexical canaries sufficient in the non-adversarial setting, as we formalize in Section 4.

2.3 Intentional Harm

When the operator is actively adversarial, the relevant question is no longer where the failure originates but *what the adversary is trying to accomplish*. The target class determines where the agent touches the outside world, and thus where the authority can plausibly inject a canary. We organize intentional abuse by target: systems, individuals, collectives, commons, and AI systems.

Systems. Agents can conduct cyber offense at a speed and scale no human attacker could match: intrusion and credential attacks, exploit discovery, lateral movement, data exfiltration, resource exhaustion, and illicit scraping. For example, an agent probing an exposed API for misconfigurations interacts with an endpoint whose owner can respond with canary-bearing content. Recent incidents in which state-sponsored and lone adversaries used vendor-hosted models as the reasoning backbone for intrusion campaigns illustrate that this category is not hypothetical [2, 29, 41].

Individuals. Agents can impersonate, deceive, and abuse individual targets through social engineering or synthetic-identity impersonation. For example, a romance-scam agent running hundreds of simultaneous conversations corresponds directly with each victim, who can inject canary content into replies [1]. Also consider that agents are accessible to all, and in the future agents might be used to perform sustained targeted harassment: consider someone possibly sending an agent to harass an ex-lover over the phone or online or to blackmail a former employer after getting fired.

Collectives. Agents can manipulate groups and public discourse at scales that qualitatively exceed prior bot networks. Coordinated inauthentic behavior, disinformation, market manipulation, and

reputation attacks all fall here[9, 37]. A single operator running a sockpuppet agent can maintain hundreds of contextually consistent personas indefinitely, each adapting to local platform norms. The platforms or forums on which these personas operate can seed canary content into threads the agent is known to read.

Commons. Agents can degrade shared infrastructure and open ecosystems: content pollution, commercial fraud against platforms, IP infringement, benefits fraud, and open-knowledge vandalism. For example, a scraping agent harvesting a site for resale interacts with content the site operator fully controls and can instrument.

AI systems. As AI systems are embedded in consequential decisions (hiring, credit, moderation, legal research) they themselves become targets. Agents can conduct adversarial probing of deployed assistants [26, 42], game automated decision pipelines, and coordinate across multiple sessions to achieve objectives no single agent could. For example, an agent probing a hosted assistant to extract its system prompt or identify moderation blind spots interacts with a target whose operator can embed canaries in responses.

Across all five target classes, the operator has both the motive to evade attribution and the technical means to do so: a wrapper placed between the outside world and the vendor API can filter, substitute, or paraphrase incoming content before the model ever sees it. This is the structural property that makes random and simple lexical canaries insufficient in the adversarial setting, and that motivates the utility-bearing constructions of Section 4.

2.4 Why Existing Recourse Fails

Across both the unintentional and intentional cases, a consistent pattern emerges: affected parties have observable evidence of harmful behavior but no path to the responsible account. The obvious recourse mechanisms all fail for structurally similar reasons. IP-based identification is the most commonly attempted approach and the first to break down, since agents trivially rotate addresses, use proxies[19], and distribute requests across infrastructure; at best, IP attribution identifies hosting providers rather than operators. Platform-level account investigation can identify the specific surface account a harmful agent is using on a given platform (a fake persona, a burner email, a throwaway API key) but these accounts are disposable and reveal nothing about the vendor account driving them. Behavioral fingerprinting can detect that an agent is present through response timing, vocabulary patterns, or behavioral consistency[20, 28], but it cannot identify which of a vendor's millions of accounts is responsible; it solves a different problem, bot detection rather than attribution. Direct vendor inquiry without a session identifier is infeasible at scale, since a vendor receiving a report that "some agent" caused harm cannot search its logs without a way to narrow the search space, the report must identify something present in the vendor's logs, which is precisely what our canary provides. Legal process is the most powerful recourse in the malicious case but requires a predicate: investigators must be able to identify the vendor and the approximate session before compelling disclosure, and without a way to link observed behavior to a vendor session, legal process has nothing to compel. Our proposed Attribution is thus the prerequisite for legal accountability, not an alternative to it.

The agent attribution protocol we present in Section 4 is designed to supply the missing link in each of these cases: a mechanism for generating a session identifier from an observed interaction, enabling every downstream recourse mechanism to function as intended, whether it be vendor response, platform action, criminal investigation, or legal process.

2.5 Scope of this Work

While the problem of *agent attribution* applies broadly to cases where an operator hosts the agent's LLM locally, this paper focuses on the tractable setting in which the agent owner relies on a vendor-hosted LLM, whether an open-source model chosen for convenience (e.g., OpenRouter, Fireworks AI) or a proprietary foundation model selected for advanced capability (e.g., OpenAI, Anthropic, Google). These vendors represent well-known, widely used infrastructure for powering agents among general users; we posit that the same holds for those with malicious intent.

Why the vendor-hosted assumption holds even for adversaries. This deployment model applies not only to benign operators but also to sophisticated adversaries. Many frontier capabilities most useful for agentic abuse, such as long-horizon planning, code generation, tool use, and instruction following, remain concentrated in vendor-hosted models[32], and attackers often accept the API dependency to obtain them. Recent incidents illustrate this pattern: Anthropic reported that a suspected Chinese state-sponsored group used Claude Code as the execution backbone for an espionage campaign against roughly thirty targets,[2] and a lone operator reportedly combined Claude Code with GPT-4.1 to compromise multiple Mexican government bodies and exfiltrate sensitive records[29]. In both cases, the attackers controlled their own operational infrastructure, yet the core reasoning still flowed through vendor APIs and was logged against vendor accounts.

Beyond cyber intrusion. The same dependency appears in consumer-facing abuse. Voice-agent platforms such as Vapi let operators build agents around hosted LLMs such as ChatGPT, Claude, or Gemini, connected to speech, telephony, and tool APIs.[1] Although such platforms support legitimate customer-service and scheduling use cases, similar stacks can be repurposed for fraud, including romance-scam automation and voice-cloning schemes[1, 29].[2] Our protocol also covers hosted open-source models: even when the LLM Model is not proprietary, operators frequently rely on a vendor for inference to avoid the cost and complexity of self-hosting. Thus, across proprietary and hosted-open-source deployments, the operator may control the runtime, prompts, tools, and wrappers, but the model calls still cross into the vendor and are recorded against an account. This is the structural property our protocol leverages.

3 Threat Model

3.1 System Model and Principals

We consider five principals interacting with each other in our setting: (1) an **agent**, (2) the agent's **operator**, (3) the **vendor** hosting the agent's LLM, (4) the **victim** targeted by the agent, and (5) an **authority** which aims to perform agent attribution on the victim's

[1] https://vapi.ai/

[2] https://www.americanbar.org/groups/senior_lawyers/resources/voice-of-experience/2025-september/ai-cloned-voice-scam/



Figure 3: Principals in our system model and their relationships. Red arrows show the provenance path that enables agent attribution.

behalf. We now explain these principals and how they interact with one another (illustrated in Fig. 3).

Vendor $\mathcal{V}$. The vendor hosts an LLM $\mathcal{M}$, which can be an open source model (e.g., Qwen, Llama, Deepseek, etc.) or a proprietary foundation model (e.g., GPT 5.2, Claude Opus 4.7, etc.). An LLM is accessed by operators through an API. $\mathcal{M}$ operates over sequences of tokens drawn from a vocabulary Σ; we denote a token sequence as $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_m) \in \Sigma^*$. An API call to $\mathcal{M}$ consists of an input sequence $\mathbf{x}^{\text{in}}$ (the prompt) and produces an output sequence $\mathbf{x}^{\text{out}}$ (the completion). The prompt comprises a system prompt $\mathbf{x}^{\text{sys}}$, an optional set of tool definitions, and a conversation context $\mathbf{x}^{\text{ctx}}$ containing the accumulated interaction history, so that $\mathbf{x}^{\text{in}} = (\mathbf{x}^{\text{sys}}, \mathbf{x}^{\text{ctx}})$. $\mathcal{V}$ can maintain a temporary log $\mathcal{L}$ of all API calls, recording for each call what was sent, what was returned, the timestamp, and the account (denoted a) under which the call was made. Critically, $\mathcal{V}$ sees only what flows through its API: it has no visibility into the agent's external actions, runtime code, or any preprocessing layers.

Operator $\mathcal{O}$. The operator is the entity that builds and deploys the agent. $\mathcal{O}$ holds a registered account with $\mathcal{V}$ through which all model calls are made, and $\mathcal{O}$ defines the agent's system prompt, tools, and mission objectives. In the benign setting, $\mathcal{O}$ is a legitimate party who may be entirely unaware their agent is causing harm; in the malicious setting, $\mathcal{O}$ is actively concealing their identity. The operator's runtime infrastructure is distinct from the vendor's: the agentic loop, the system prompt, and any pre- or post-processing layers may all run on infrastructure controlled by $\mathcal{O}$, with only the model calls themselves crossing into $\mathcal{V}$.

Agent $\mathcal{A}$. The agent is the deployed system acting on behalf of $\mathcal{O}$. Formally, $\mathcal{A}$ couples $\mathcal{M}$ with a set of tools and an execution environment, running an iterative loop in which control is exercised by $\mathcal{M}$ itself: at each step, $\mathcal{M}$ generates the next action and the surrounding harness executes it. At step t, the agent holds a context $\mathbf{x}_t^{\text{ctx}}$ and invokes $\mathcal{M}$ on input $\mathbf{x}_t^{\text{in}} = (\mathbf{x}^{\text{sys}}, \mathbf{x}_t^{\text{ctx}})$ to obtain a completion $\mathbf{x}_t^{\text{out}}$. The completion encodes an action a_t (e.g., a tool invocation, external API call, outbound message, or terminal response), after which the resulting interaction is incorporated into the next context. We write this update abstractly as $\mathbf{x}_{t+1}^{\text{ctx}} = \text{Update}(\mathbf{x}_t^{\text{ctx}}, \mathbf{x}_t^{\text{out}})$, and the loop iterates until $\mathcal{M}$ emits a terminal action. From any external party's perspective, $\mathcal{A}$ is simply a counterpart in a conversation; nothing in its external behavior reliably identifies $\mathcal{O}$ or the vendor account behind it.

Authority $\mathcal{D}$. The authority is a party with standing to initiate an attribution request, such as a law-enforcement agency or a commercial entity. $\mathcal{D}$ is registered with $\mathcal{V}$ through a pre-established trust relationship that authenticates requests and ensures they are auditable.

Victim of $\mathcal{A}$. The victim is one or more entities harmed by $\mathcal{A}$, such as an individual receiving scam messages, a server enduring abusive traffic, or a network under attack. Victims report the behavior to $\mathcal{D}$, which reports or investigates on their behalf using agent attribution. In this work, we consider $\mathcal{D}$ as the sole entity which can initiate attribution requests; this bounds vendor-side load and prevents abuse of the protocol. This is similar to how national agencies, such as internet societies or criminal investigation bureaus, forward or investigate reported incidents on behalf of the public.

Adversarial wrapper (malicious setting). In the malicious setting, $\mathcal{O}$ may interpose a wrapper $\mathcal{W}$ between the external world and the vendor API. $\mathcal{W}$ applies a transformation $T : \Sigma^* \to \Sigma^*$ to incoming content before it is incorporated into $\mathbf{x}^{\text{in}}$, and may filter, substitute, paraphrase, or otherwise modify token sequences. We formalize the adversary's capabilities and constraints in Section 3.4.

Interaction surface. The agent's externally visible behavior consists of the actions a_t it takes in the world: messages sent, API calls made, content posted, calls placed. These actions are observable by external parties but carry no reliable signal identifying the operator or the vendor API session that produced them.

The key structural feature of this system is that $\mathcal{V}$ and $\mathcal{D}$ sit on opposite sides of the agent: $\mathcal{V}$ sees model calls but not external behavior, while $\mathcal{D}$ sees external behavior but not model calls. The attribution protocol bridges this gap through the vendor's session log.

3.2 Trust Assumptions

Vendor: honest. $\mathcal{V}$ executes attribution requests faithfully and does not disclose ongoing investigations to the operator. This is grounded in reputational and legal incentives, a vendor that returned false results or tipped off operators would face severe consequences.

Authority: registered and accountable. $\mathcal{D}$'s requests are authenticated and auditable. This prevents anonymous abuse of the attribution mechanism and gives $\mathcal{V}$ a principled basis for refusing unauthorized requests.

Operator: untrusted. No assumptions of honesty or cooperation. $\mathcal{O}$ may be an active adversary (malicious setting) or simply non-cooperating (benign setting).

Agent: potentially an adaptive wrapper. We make no assumptions about $\mathcal{A}$'s internal architecture beyond what is visible at the API boundary. $\mathcal{A}$ may include a preprocessing layer $\mathcal{W}$ that transforms incoming content before it reaches the model. We treat $\mathcal{A}$ as a black box and design the protocol to function without cooperation or transparency from it.

3.3 Interaction Assumptions

We assume that the model is hosted and logged by $\mathcal{V}$, but the agent runtime and any wrapper run on infrastructure controlled by $\mathcal{O}$

and are not observable by $\mathcal{V}$ or $\mathcal{D}$. This is the standard commercial deployment model and a structural feature of the setting: $\mathcal{V}$ sees model calls but not the agent's external behavior, while $\mathcal{D}$ sees the agent's external behavior but not model calls. Any attribution mechanism must therefore bridge these two views indirectly, since neither party alone has visibility into both.

Authority's interaction capability. Bridging the two views requires $\mathcal{D}$ to introduce content into the agent's interaction stream so that it propagates into $\mathcal{V}$'s logs. We distinguish two cases by the authority's access to the agent:

- *Direct interaction.* $\mathcal{D}$ can engage $\mathcal{A}$ directly, for instance by initiating contact with a chatbot, support endpoint, or polled API. $\mathcal{D}$ controls the content of the exchange and records the time at which content is introduced.
- *Passive interaction.* $\mathcal{D}$ cannot engage $\mathcal{A}$ directly, and must instead anticipate where $\mathcal{A}$ will act next, place content at those locations in advance, and instrument them with hooks that fire on consumption.

The two modes differ in mechanism, not in principle: in both, $\mathcal{D}$ controls what $\mathcal{A}$ ingests, with passive injection acting as the honeypot analogue of direct interaction. The passive case requires some basis for predicting $\mathcal{A}$'s next interaction, whether from direct observation, victim reports, or platform telemetry; Section 4 formalizes the trajectory types this gives rise to and their implications for placement.

3.4 Adversary Model

In some cases, the operator may be aware of the possibility of agent attribution and attempt to evade it by filtering canaries from the agent's interaction stream. We therefore distinguish two settings, which determine the canary construction the authority should use.

In the **non-adversarial setting**, the operator is not attempting to evade attribution, and the agent passes incoming content to the vendor model without filtering. This covers all unintentional failure modes of Section 2, where no deliberate filtering occurs, as well as unsophisticated adversaries who cause intentional harm without designing mechanisms to detect or avoid canaries (e.g., a bitter ex deploying an agent to harass a former partner). In both cases, any injected content reaches the vendor's log with high probability.

In the **adversarial setting**, the operator knows the attribution protocol exists and actively attempts to evade it, deploying a wrapper $\mathcal{W}$ that transforms incoming content via T before passing it to the model. The adversary must simultaneously achieve *evasion*, so that no injected canary reaches the vendor log, and *utility preservation*, so that the agent can still perform its task adequately; an agent that fails its mission is useless to the operator. We now elaborate on our assumptions of this setting:

Capabilities. The adversary can observe all incoming content; apply any computable transformation (deletion, substitution, paraphrasing, routing through a secondary model); know the canary universe $\mathcal{N}$ in the worst case; and delay or drop interactions.

Constraints. The adversary cannot access the vendor's log; cannot observe which canary subset was selected for a given interaction; cannot distinguish canary items from legitimate content (by design of the canary construction); and cannot remove arbitrary content without risking utility degradation.



Figure 4: Overview of the agent attribution protocol. The red circle shows the traversal of the injected canaries.

The utility-evasion tension. These constraints place the adversary in a dilemma. Evasion requires removing content that might be a canary, but since canaries are indistinguishable from legitimate task-relevant content, removing them risks also removing content the agent needs to function. The more aggressively the adversary filters, the more it degrades its own agent. This tension is the foundation of the asymmetry guarantee in Appendix D.

4 The Agent Attribution Protocol

4.1 Overview

We present a protocol between an authority $\mathcal{D}$ and a vendor $\mathcal{V}$ for attributing a suspect agent $\mathcal{A}$ to its operator $\mathcal{O}$'s account a.

Figure 4 illustrates the protocol end-to-end; it proceeds in four steps:

(1) $\mathcal{D}$ assesses the setting, generates the appropriate canary value(s) and injects them into $\mathcal{A}$'s input stream and notes the time of injection τ.
(2) In parallel, $\mathcal{D}$ initiates an attribution request with participating vendor $\mathcal{V}$ to determine if $\mathcal{A}$'s LLM is hosted by them.
(3) $\mathcal{V}$ searches its logs for the canaries around the given time τ.
(4) Finally, if found, $\mathcal{V}$ either responds to the incident internally (e.g., by warning $\mathcal{O}$), or returns the account information to $\mathcal{A}$ for further investigation or prosecution as legally warranted.

We will now discuss the various aspect of the proposed canary-based protocol.

4.2 Types of Canaries

We define two classes of canary, distinguished by the method $\mathcal{V}$ uses to recover them at search time: *Lexical canaries* and *Semantic canaries*.

Definition 1 (Lexical canary). *A* lexical canary $\kappa_L \in \Sigma^*$ *is a token sequence injected verbatim into the agent's interaction stream and recovered by exact match against* $\mathcal{L}$.

Lexical canaries range from purely random sequences such as a hash to identifiers such as names and UUIDs. They can also be a substring taken from $\mathcal{A}$'s input which long enough to be unique within some timewindow of $\mathcal{L}$.

Definition 2 (Semantic canary). *A* semantic canary κ_S *is a signature whose identity lies in meaning rather than in any specific*



Figure 5: Left: A cyber agent consumes a lexical canary (filename) as it performs directory traversal. Right: a phone scam agent consumes two different semantic canaries during a call.

token sequence, such as a style, concept, behavior, or structural pattern, injected into the agent's interaction stream and recovered by a classifier.

Because κ_S is defined by meaning rather than surface form, it is more likely to survive paraphrasing and reformatting than a lexical canary. Semantic canaries range from speech styles to topical framing or even structural patterns (e.g., insistence to discuss a topic, or a webpage layout).

Definition 3 (Utility-bearing canary). *A canary κ (lexical or semantic) is* utility-bearing *if its removal from $\mathcal{A}$'s interaction stream would degrade $\mathcal{A}$'s ability to perform its task.*

The utility-bearing property is what makes a canary robust against an adversarial wrapper: stripping a utility-bearing canary also strips information the agent depends on, so an adversary cannot remove all instances of the canary's pattern across $\mathcal{A}$'s inputs without rendering the agent ineffective. Figure 5 illustrates some examples: a filename in a directory listing is a lexical canary that a cyber agent must preserve to navigate a target network; removing all filename-shaped strings from tool outputs before they reach $\mathcal{V}$ would prevent the agent from operating. Similarly, in a conversational scam, the caller's emotional state and conversation points are semantic features the agent must mirror to maintain rapport; stripping them would render the agent's responses incoherent in other interactions the agent has with the public. The asymmetry this creates is discussed further below and formalized in the Appendix D.

4.3 Canary Selection & Injection Strategy

Setting Assessment. Before constructing canaries, $\mathcal{D}$ assesses the case from the victim's report (top left of Figure 4). Lexical canaries are simplest for $\mathcal{V}$ to search for and suffice when the operator is not trying to evade attribution. However, when the harm appears intentional, the operator may attempt to strip obvious markers, for example by filtering or paraphrasing incoming content before it reaches the model. In such cases, $\mathcal{D}$ uses utility-bearing canaries.

Non-adversarial Setting. When the operator is not likely to attempt evasion, a single lexical canary is sufficient. This can be a fresh random string, or even a fixed marker agreed upon in advance, since the agent is expected to pass incoming content to the LLM without filtering. Vendor-side recovery is practical: $\mathcal{V}$ searches only the sessions active in the declared time window around τ.

Adversarial Setting. In the adversarial setting, a single obvious marker is fragile. The operator may filter lexical strings, paraphrase incoming content, or remove one class of canary once it is suspected. Conversely, overly generic semantic canaries, such as "angry tone," may create high false-positive rates across the many sessions active at $\mathcal{V}$. We therefore use a multi-canary construction.

Let $\mathcal{N}$ be a canary universe of n items, each contextually legitimate in the target domain. In other words, $\mathcal{N}$ is deployment-specific: canaries for a webpage-scraping agent, a conversational scam, and a cyber-reconnaissance agent would look different. At injection time, $\mathcal{D}$ samples a k-subset $K \subseteq \mathcal{N}$ uniformly at random and injects each into the interaction. $\mathcal{V}$ searches the log window $\mathcal{L}$ for these k canaries and declares a candidate attribution when at least $m \leq k$ canaries are present. The threshold m is chosen via a false-positive analysis.

Adversarial robustness: Sampling multiple canaries improves both robustness and precision. For robustness, even if the adversary knows the entire potential set of all $\mathcal{N}$, it cannot cannot safely remove only one canary found in $\mathcal{N}$, such as all names or all identifiers: it does not know whether the current interaction is with $\mathcal{D}$ or an ordinary victim, nor which canaries from $\mathcal{N}$ were used in this instance. Evasion therefore requires broad filtering over otherwise useful content, producing a utility loss. A formalization of this asymmetry in the defender's advantage can be found in Appendix D).

Minimal false positives: For precision, the probability that an unrelated session contains at least m of the sampled canaries decreases rapidly as k and m increase. If multiple sessions cross the threshold, $\mathcal{V}$ ranks them by aggregate match score and returns a short candidate list for abuse-response review. The protocol is not intended to make fully automated enforcement decisions; rather, like intrusion-detection systems [31] and vulnerability triage, it converts an otherwise intractable search over millions of concurrent sessions into a small, ranked set of likely candidates.

Vector of Injection. The injection strategy depends on whether $\mathcal{D}$ can interact with $\mathcal{A}$ directly or only indirectly. Direct interaction is possible when $\mathcal{A}$ accepts inbound contact, such as through a chatbot, support endpoint, or polled API. In this case, $\mathcal{D}$ initiates the exchange and injects K into content that $\mathcal{A}$ ingests during the conversation.

When $\mathcal{A}$ initiates its own interactions with external services or infrastructure, $\mathcal{D}$ cannot reach it on demand. Instead, $\mathcal{D}$ places canaries in advance at locations $\mathcal{A}$ is expected to visit. This requires estimating the agent's *trajectory*: the sequence of people, assets, or sites it is likely to contact next, inferred from prior reports or observation of an ongoing campaign. We distinguish three cases. A **fixed** trajectory repeatedly visits the same location, as in harassment of a single individual or a polling loop. A **predictable** trajectory follows an extrapolable sequence, such as enumerating employees of a target organization or crawling hosts in a network. A **pattern-based** trajectory has no determinate next step but follows a recognizable modus operandi, such as targeting organizations of a particular class. In each case, $\mathcal{D}$ plants canaries at the expected locations

and instruments them with hooks, such as a file-read callback or monitored API response, that fire when the agent consumes the canary.

In both direct and indirect modes, $\mathcal{D}$ obtains the time τ at which the canary enters $\mathcal{A}$'s stream: directly from the injected message timestamp, or indirectly from the hook triggered on consumption.

5 Implementation

We now describe our implementation of the protocol in Section 4. The design reuses most of $\mathcal{V}$'s existing infrastructure: API serving, account-linked logs, and abuse-response workflows. It adds two components. *Injection* (Section 5.1), performed by $\mathcal{D}$, constructs a contextually plausible canary universe and places the sampled subset into $\mathcal{A}$'s interaction stream. *Detection* (Section 5.2), performed by $\mathcal{V}$, scans sessions active in the search window for the sampled canaries while remaining within production-serving constraints.

5.1 Injection

In the non-adversarial setting, injection is straightforward: $\mathcal{D}$ uses $k = 1$ with a random lexical string. This is sufficient because non-malicious agents typically perform little or no preprocessing and pass incoming content to the LLM verbatim.

In the adversarial setting, context matters. Since utility-bearing canaries must look like legitimate task content, the domain of the canary universe $\mathcal{N}$ depends on the interaction surface. Examples include:

- **Social conversation.** κ_L can be a named project reference mentioned in passing (*"I'm calling about the Meridian-47 onboarding"*); κ_S can be a speech style, topic, sentiment, or conversational habit.
- **Cyber reconnaissance.** When $\mathcal{A}$ reads files, logs, or API responses, κ_L can be a task-relevant identifier, such as a filename, employee ID, host name, database key, or structured record. κ_S can encode properties of the artifact being analyzed, such as webpage purpose, code style, naming conventions, error-handling idioms, log format, or field order.
- **Web or document interaction.** κ_L can be a referenced entity, citation, product code, tracking identifier, or factual detail embedded in the page or document. κ_S can be a design style, layout pattern, topical emphasis, or document intent or structure that the agent must preserve to understand or summarize the content.

For practicality, $\mathcal{D}$ constructs $\mathcal{N}$ on demand with an LLM. The prompt specifies the target setting, the canary class, and a small set of seed exemplars, and asks the model to enumerate plausible canaries for that context. After sampling $K \subset \mathcal{N}$, $\mathcal{D}$ uses an LLM again to insert the selected canaries naturally. The generator is given the surrounding content, such as the conversation so far, the target HTML page, or the file being read, together with the canaries in K, and is instructed to weave them into the content without making them conspicuous. This same insertion process applies to both κ_L and κ_S; the only exception is the non-adversarial case, where the random string can be inserted directly.

5.2 Detection

Detection runs at $\mathcal{V}$ over the search window specified in the attribution request. It must be cheap enough to scan every active session without disrupting production serving. Lexical canaries are recovered by substring matching over session inputs $\mathbf{x}^{\text{in}}$, while semantic canaries require a lightweight classifier over the same content.

Lexical canary detection. For each candidate session, $\mathcal{V}$ checks whether any $\kappa_i \in K$ appears in $\mathbf{x}^{\text{in}}$. Three properties make this tractable at vendor scale. First, the search window bounds the work to sessions concurrent with the injection, independent of how large $\mathcal{L}$ is in aggregate. Second, the workload is map-reduce-friendly: log shards are scanned independently for matches in K and aggregated centrally, so latency scales with the largest shard rather than the full window. Third, $\mathcal{V}$ already stores $\mathbf{x}^{\text{in}}$ in tokenized form, since tokens are the canonical input to $\mathcal{M}$; we exploit this by emitting and matching κ at the token level. This yields approximately a 2× speedup compared to char sub string matching. This is because tokens are larger aggregates and stored as sequences of integers over vocabulary Σ. Result of an experiment confirming this can be found in Section 6.5.

Semantic canary detection. Semantic canaries are detected as a multi-label classification problem: for each active session, $\mathcal{V}$ estimates which canaries in $\mathcal{K}$ are present. We consider two efficient implementations, and evaluate one instantiation of each in Section 6.

First, $\mathcal{V}$ can run a small NLP model over the session text to predict the semantic canaries present in the session. Second, when $\mathcal{V}$ already caches model-side representations, it can reuse that computation: instead of classifying raw tokens, a lightweight classifier can operate over aggregated activations from $\mathcal{M}$. This reuse pattern is not new; vendors already attach lightweight probes to token streams or hidden-layer activations for real-time safety enforcement [3, 14, 16, 22]. Semantic detection can use the same framework. The main added requirement is a rolling cache, sized to the search window, that keeps the classifier inputs available near the serving fleet at attribution time.

6 Evaluation

We evaluate whether our canary-based attribution protocol can trace deployed agents across three representative domains: communication agents (Section 6.2), web agents (Section 6.3), and cyber agents (Section 6.4). These domains exercise different interaction surfaces from the threat landscape of Section 2: dialogue with people, ingestion of web content, and end-to-end autonomous tool use. Across them, we ask three questions. First, *do injected canaries reach the vendor-visible model input in realistic agent workflows?* Second, *can the vendor recover enough of those canaries to identify the responsible session with low false-positive rates?* Third, *when an operator attempts to suppress canaries, does doing so degrade the agent's own task performance?*

6.1 Experimental Setup

All experiments instantiate the same protocol-level decision rule. An authority injects a set K of k canaries into content that the agent is expected to consume. The vendor then searches the relevant

session logs around the injection time τ. A session is declared a match if at least m of the k injected canaries are detected. We refer to this as the session-level attribution decision.

We report results at two granularities. At the per-canary granularity, we measure whether an individual canary κ_i is recovered from a session, using true positive rate (TPR), false positive rate (FPR), and ROC curves. At the session granularity, we apply the m-of-k rule and report the TPR and FPR of the resulting session-level attribution decision. This distinction is important: a detector may miss some injected canaries, but the protocol can still attribute the session as long as at least m of them survive and are detected.

We evaluate both lexical and semantic canaries from Section 4.2. Lexical canaries κ_L are recovered by exact match. Semantic canaries κ_S are recovered by lightweight classifiers. In adversarial settings, we focus on utility-bearing canaries: canaries embedded in content the agent needs in order to complete its task. Each domain is evaluated in a non-adversarial condition, where the agent forwards content to the model without deliberate filtering, and in an adversarial condition, where a wrapper modifies incoming content before it reaches the model. The strength and form of the wrapper vary by domain. In communication agents, it paraphrases user-side text. In web agents, it paraphrases HTML-derived content and is aware of the canary taxonomy but not the sampled subset K. In cyber agents, the adversary is stronger: it knows the injected canaries and attempts to remove them.

The domain-specific choices (the interaction substrate, canary universe, detector, preprocessing pipeline, and adversary) are introduced in the corresponding subsections. Implementation details, full canary sets $\mathcal{N}$, prompts, and additional ablations are deferred to the appendix.

6.2 Communication Agents

Communication agents interact directly with people or communities, as in scam automation, targeted harassment, customer-support agents, or forum posting. This setting tests whether canaries can be embedded in ordinary conversation and later recovered from the vendor's logs. It also provides a clean comparison between lexical canaries, which require exact string survival, and semantic canaries, which may survive changes in wording.

Setup. We evaluate two communication surfaces: one-on-one chats and forum threads. Both are synthesized with Qwen 2.5-7B-Instruct from per-scenario configurations specifying the agents's role, situational context, and conversational style. We cover 21 benign scenarios (e.g., customer-support and FAQ assistants) and 21 malicious ones (e.g., scam automation, targeted harassment, forum-posting sockpuppets), and from each base conversation we generate many variants by varying the number and mix of injected lexical and semantic canaries, yielding a large pool of marked and unmarked sessions. The authority controls the user-side turns and injects canaries there, since those are the turns the agent must consume to continue the interaction; the agent controls its own outgoing turns and may rewrite or summarize incoming user turns before the model sees them. Conversation lengths, scenario templates, canary-count sweeps, and the full set $\mathcal{N}$ are in the Appendix I.1.

We instantiate lexical canaries κ_L in two forms. The first is a random alphanumeric string. The second is a utility-bearing reference code that fits naturally into the scenario, such as a project name, case identifier, or other conversation-relevant value. We instantiate semantic canaries κ_S such as an authority, discourse, and persona patterns drawn from an $\mathcal{N}$ with $n = 31$. These semantic canaries are inserted by a Qwen rewrite that preserves the topic and meaning of the original user-side turn while adding the requested patterns.



Figure 6: Attribution at $k = 20$ on chat and forum. Both rates decay with m; the operating regime sits where the curves separate.

The adversarial wrapper is a second Qwen model that paraphrases each conversation's user-side text in a single pass. The wrapper is instructed to preserve reference codes, named entities, dates, amounts, and URLs verbatim, but it is not instructed to preserve semantic patterns. Thus, semantic patterns may be paraphrased away as collateral damage. This is a relatively simple adversary, but it captures the common evasion strategy of routing incoming content through a paraphraser before it reaches the model. The full prompt is given in Appendix Fig. 32.

In the non-adversarial setting, both random lexical canaries and utility-bearing lexical canaries reach TPR ≈ 1.0 at FPR ≈ 0. Under paraphrasing, exact string survival becomes brittle: utility-bearing lexical canaries survive at TPR ≈ 0.20, and random lexical canaries survive at TPR ≈ 0.21; the per-canary breakdown is in the (Appendix Fig. 12). These results show that lexical canaries are nearly ideal when content is passed through unchanged, but are unreliable once the interaction is rewritten.

For semantic canaries, we train a multilabel classifier over cached activations from a frozen Qwen 2.5-7B-Instruct model, with one sigmoid head per semantic pattern. Full detector details are in the Appendix E.1.2. In the chat setting, per-canary AUC ranges from 0.92 to 1.00, with macro-average AUC 0.98. The average ROC reaches TPR = 0.91 at FPR = 0.05 (Appendix Fig. 11).

Results. Figure 6 reports session-level attribution for $k = 20$ injected semantic canaries on chat and forum, sweeping the threshold m. As m increases, both TPR and FPR decrease. The useful operating regime is where FPR has already fallen close to zero while TPR remains high. On chat, $m = 7$ gives non-adversarial TPR ≈ 1.00 at FPR ≈ 0.01. Under paraphrase, TPR remains above 0.97 at the same operating point. Forum follows the same qualitative shape, with a milder FPR decay because threads contain more text and therefore more opportunities for unrelated sessions to contain some matching semantic patterns.

The communication experiments show that conversational canaries can support session-level attribution. Lexical canaries are

cheap and nearly perfect when messages are not rewritten, but paraphrasing makes exact string survival unreliable. Semantic canaries provide a complementary channel: they allow the defender to tune the m-of-k decision rule to keep FPR low while maintaining high TPR.

6.3 Web Agents

Web agents read HTML pages, documents, and structured web content. This setting differs from communication because canaries may be lost before any adversary acts: many web agents preprocess pages before sending them to the model. The web experiments therefore test both ordinary preprocessing survival and adversarial robustness.

Setup. We sample 10,000 English HTML documents from Common Crawl (CC-MAIN-2024-10)[7] and inject canaries directly into the page. The authority controls the page content, while the agent may apply its own extraction or cleaning pipeline before the model sees the page. We evaluate two forms of lexical canaries. Structural lexical canaries are placed in non-rendered or weakly rendered DOM locations, such as metadata or hidden elements. Visible lexical canaries are placed in rendered text that the agent is more likely to consume. We also evaluate semantic canaries that encode document-level layout archetypes. For example, an urgency-signaling page combines countdown banners, scarcity language, and prominent calls to action (see Appendix Fig. 25), while a Shopify-themed page mimics storefront-specific structure and styling. These semantic canaries are inserted by a GPT-4o-mini rewrite (see prompt in Appendix Fig. 38) that imposes the requested layout while preserving page content. The full web canary universe is listed in the Appendix Tables 7 and 8.

For the model the transformations T performed by web agents, we evaluate seven extraction profiles, including rule-based BeautifulSoup[27] variants, Crawl4AI[8] raw and cleaned modes, markdown extraction, and LLM-based extraction. These profiles capture common ways in which a web agent may simplify or transform HTML before sending it to the model. We also test an adversarial GPT-4o-mini paraphrase wrapper. The wrapper is aware of the canary taxonomy but not the specific sampled subset K, and is instructed to rephrase content so as to strip possible canaries without knowing their identity or location. The full prompt is given in Appendix Fig. 37.

Results. Figure 7 shows that lexical survival depends strongly on canary placement. Visible lexical canaries, which live in rendered text the agent must read, survive rule-based preprocessing essentially intact. Even under LLM extraction, the harshest profile we test, every visible lexical canary clears 60% survival. Structural lexical canaries behave differently: they survive when DOM structure is preserved, but are stripped by preprocessors that flatten, clean, or summarize the page. Full per-canary results are in Appendix Table 1.

This result highlights a constraint specific to web agents: canaries must survive the agent's input pipeline, not just an adversary. A raw-HTML scraper may expose both structural and visible canaries to the model, while a markdown-based or LLM-extraction scraper may discard structural canaries. When the authority does not know the agent's preprocessing pipeline, visible or semantically load-bearing canaries are therefore safer choices in this setting.



Figure 7: Lexical canary survival rates across preprocessing profiles (top 8 of 30 shown). All canaries survive over 60% of the time.



Figure 8: HTML document attribution at $k = 5$ embedded semantic canaries. TPR remains high through $m = 3$, while FPR is near zero from $m = 2$ onward. The FPR curve averages adversarial and non-adversarial regimes, whose values nearly overlap (max $\Delta \approx 0.007$).

For semantic canaries, we train a multi-head ModernBERT [34] classifier with one head per semantic canary. The classifier recovers semantic canaries from raw or post-paraphrase HTML. Detector details, per-canary ROC curves, and additional k values are in Appendix E.2.3, Appendix Fig. 14, and Appendix Fig. 15.

Figure 8 reports session-level attribution with $k = 5$ embedded semantic canaries. In the non-adversarial setting, TPR stays near 1.0 through $m = 3$ and falls to 0.58 only at $m = 5$. Under paraphrase, TPR drops earlier, reaching 0.82 at $m = 3$ and 0.52 at $m = 4$. FPR is tested on a large negative set ($\approx$ 7000 documents), and results show it is pinned at zero for $m \geq 2$ in both regimes.

The web experiments show that visible lexical canaries are robust because they are part of the content the agent needs to read.

Semantic layout canaries provide a second channel that survives paraphrasing better than exact surface strings. As in the semantic setting, the defender controls the operating point through the joint choice of k and m: increasing k gives more opportunities for canaries to survive, while increasing m reduces false positives.

6.4 Cyber Agents

Cyber agents provide the strongest end-to-end test in our evaluation. Unlike the communication and web experiments, the agent is not processing a fixed synthetic trace or static page. It is an autonomous tool-using system trying to complete a task. This setting tests whether attribution works when canaries are embedded into artifacts that the agent must inspect in order to succeed, and whether an adaptive adversary can remove canaries without damaging the agent's task performance.

Setup. We build 15 web-CTF (capture-the-flag) challenges, implemented as Flask servers and spanning 14 OWASP web-attack classes. The agent is Qwen 3.5-9B running in a custom multi-turn loop over a 16-tool registry. The full prompt instructing the agent can be seen in Appendix Fig. 39. The agent reads challenge artifacts such as source files, READMEs, HTTP responses, network outputs, and binaries, then reasons over them to recover a flag. Solve rate is the fraction of challenges in which the agent recovers the flag within the turn budget. Full details and hyperparameters of the agent and CTF are in Appendix E.3.1.

Lexical canaries are UUID-v4 values placed in structural locations on the challenge response: HTTP headers, `<meta>` tags, HTML comments, cookies, static-asset filenames, hidden inputs, and visible inline identifiers. These locations span both peripheral content, which an adversary may strip cheaply, and task-critical content, which the agent must preserve to solve the challenge. Semantic canaries draw from the same layout-pattern family used in the web agent setting, with $|\mathcal{N}| = 14$. The full location taxonomy and injection mechanics are in Appendix E.3.2.

The adversary in this setting is stronger than the communication and web paraphrasers. It is canary-aware and attempts to remove the injected canaries from tool outputs before they reach the model. All adversarial prompts can be seen in Appendix G.4. This creates a direct utility-evasion tradeoff: removing content may suppress attribution evidence, but it can also remove the information the agent needs to recover the flag.

Results. Figure 9 shows how canary placement affects both survival and task utility. With the canary-aware adversary, solve rate falls from 51% to 9% (23/45 → 4/45). This drop shows that suppressing canary-bearing content can also strip the artifacts the agent needs for the task. Canary survival is not uniform across locations. Filenames and visible body identifiers, which the agent must often read to make progress, retain 77% and 70% attribution, respectively. `<meta>` tags and hidden form inputs, which are less task-critical, fall to 62% and 50%. Per-location numbers are reported in Appendix E.3.3.

Figure 10 reports session-level attribution for $K = 5$ injected semantic canaries with $n = 45$ runs per cell. At $m = 1$, detection rate is 100% in both the non-adversarial and adversarial regimes. Under the adversarial wrapper, TPR remains above 90% through $m = 2$, with FPR near zero throughout. The same set of experiments gives



Figure 9: Lexical-canary location ablation. *Top*: agent solve rate with and without the canary-aware adversary. *Bottom*: per-location reach rate, i.e., the fraction of locations in which the planted canary survived into the raw tool output reaching the agent, with 95% Wilson confidence intervals.



Figure 10: CTF attribution at $K = 5$. Session-level TPR and FPR vs. detection threshold m. Solid: non-adversarial; dotted: adversarial paraphrase. Solve rates: 42% vs. 31%. Companion $K = 3$ panel in Appendix E.3.5.

attribution TPR ≥ 98% in the semantic track under the adversary. Per-canary ROC curves, calibration, and the $K = 3$ companion panel are in Appendices E.3.5 and E.3.6.

The cyber experiments provide the clearest evidence for the asymmetry behind the protocol. Canaries placed in task-critical locations are difficult to remove safely. A canary-aware adversary can strip peripheral metadata, but when it removes content the

agent actually needs, the agent's success rate collapses. Thus, evasion is possible only by moving along the utility-evasion frontier: reducing attribution evidence also reduces the agent's ability to complete the attack.

6.5 Detection Throughput

Finally, we evaluate whether the vendor-side search step is operationally practical. The protocol does not require the vendor to search all historical logs. Instead, the vendor searches sessions concurrent with the canary's injection time τ. The relevant scalability question is therefore how search cost grows with the number of sessions in that bounded window.

We benchmark lexical canary search across corpora of $N \in \{2{,}000, 5{,}000, 7{,}000, 10{,}000, 13{,}000\}$ sessions drawn from the web-agent corpus. A canary is inserted into one or more documents, and the search task is to recover all documents containing it. We compare character-level search using Python's `str.find` with token-level search using vectorized `numpy` over token arrays. Token-level search models the production setting in which the vendor already stores tokenized model inputs.

The bounded-window structure is the key scalability property. Search cost depends on serving load within the attribution window, rather than total log size. Token-level search also matches the vendor's existing representation of model inputs, avoiding additional tokenization at search time. Semantic detection inherits the same bounded-window structure and requires only a lightweight classifier at search time, because the input text or cached representations are collected when the log is written.

7 Discussion

Our results highlight two main lessons. First, the protocol's robustness comes from a utility-evasion tradeoff rather than from hiding the canaries. In messaging, paraphrasing lowers TPR while FPR remains near zero, making (k, m) the defender's main operating knob. In web settings, the relevant failure mode is often preprocessing: structural κ_L can be removed by aggressive extraction, while visible κ_L survives. In cyber, the tradeoff appears directly in task performance: the wrapper that suppresses canary-bearing artifacts also reduces solve rate from 51% to 9%. Across settings, evasion is possible, but it becomes costly when the canaries are tied to content the agent needs.

Second, lexical and semantic canaries are complementary. κ_L is preferable when the setting provides task-relevant identifiers that the agent must preserve, such as reference codes in conversations, asset fingerprints in web content, or filenames and hidden-input identifiers in CTF artifacts. κ_S is preferable when no such identifier can be placed naturally, when paraphrasing destroys lexical survival, or when inserting explicit identifiers would make the interaction suspicious. In practice, the best choice depends less on the abstract adversary model than on the agent's ingestion pipeline and the kind of content it must preserve.

Several limitations remain. Our experiments use a small number of model families and wrapper configurations, so future work should test cross-model generalization, including cases where the agent, wrapper, detector, and canary generator come from different model families. We also evaluate attribution primarily at the session level; coordinated campaigns spread across multiple agents, sessions, or vendor accounts require composing multiple attribution results into a campaign-level view. Finally, we do not fully exercise indirect injection. Our web setting approximates it through authority-controlled pages, but realistic fixed, predictable, and pattern-based trajectories should be evaluated against agents whose next actions are uncertain.

Despite these limitations, this work is the *first* to identify and formalize the problem of agent attribution. It provides an effective solution for non-malicious settings and takes a significant step toward robust attribution in adversarial settings.

8 Related Work

8.1 Watermarking and Provenance Techniques

The closest existing body of work to agent attribution is *text watermarking*, the problem of embedding a detectable signal in model-generated text so that its origin can be verified. We survey the main approaches and explain why none of them transfer to the agent attribution setting.

Token-level watermarking. The dominant paradigm, introduced by [15] and extended by [6, 40], partitions the vocabulary Σ into a *green list* and a *red list* at each generation step, biasing the model toward green-list tokens. A detector checks for a statistically anomalous proportion of green tokens in a candidate text. This signal survives light editing but is well-documented to be fragile under paraphrasing: substituting synonyms, changing sentence structure, or routing the text through a second language model destroys the green/red token distribution while preserving semantic content [17, 39]. An adversarial agent wrapper needs only to pass incoming content through a paraphrase model before forwarding it to the vendor API.

Semantic watermarking. More recent approaches attempt to embed watermarks at the level of meaning rather than token identity [12], using synonym substitution or sentence-level paraphrasing strategies to encode bits in the semantic choices made during generation. These are more robust to surface-form transformations but face a different limitation in our setting: they mark *generated* output, not injected input. This means that at best watermarking proves which model produced the text, but not which account.

Model fingerprinting. A separate line of work embeds persistent signals in model weights or activations to identify which model produced a given output [25, 36]. These approaches identify the *model* but not the *account* in a vendor-hosted setting where many operators share the same underlying model, model fingerprinting provides no discrimination between operator accounts, which is precisely what attribution requires.

Why these approaches cannot solve attribution. The reason none of the above techniques transfer is not a question of robustness or efficiency but of direction. Attribution is, by definition, the task of identifying the *account* operating the agent. Accounts exist only at the vendor, and only the vendor can consult its own records to link a session to an account. For the vendor to perform that lookup, the session must contain some signal that the authority can describe and the vendor can search for. That signal must therefore originate with the authority and travel *into* the agent,

through whatever transformations its wrapper applies, and ultimately into the vendor's logs. Watermarking and fingerprinting are both output-side: watermarking reads a signal back from generated text, fingerprinting reads a model's identity from its responses to chosen probes. Neither answers which account produced a session.

9 Conclusion

This paper identifies and formalizes the emerging problem of agent attribution: the missing ability to link harmful agent behavior observed in the world back to the responsible operator controlling it. We show that this gap affects both benign failures and deliberate abuse, and that existing recourse mechanisms fail without a technical bridge between observed interactions and vendor-side logs. To address this gap, we present the first practical and concrete attribution protocol for agents powered by vendor-hosted LLMs. Our canary-based approach enables authorized parties and vendors to recover the originating session and account without requiring universal pre-registration or continuous identity exposure, offering a deployable path toward accountability for increasingly autonomous AI agents.

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A Open Science

In accordance with open science principles, we provide all artifacts necessary to evaluate the core contributions of this work. All the material is available in our anonymous repository at:

https://anonymous.4open.science/r/agent-attribution-367F.

The released artifacts include the following components:

- **Code:** We provide the full codebase for all experiments conducted in this study, including the training and testing pipelines for both the Activation and ModernBERT classifiers. This also encompasses the source code for the 15 custom web-CTF challenge servers, and the scripts used to generate all visuals, figures, and plots presented in this paper. To ensure exact reproducibility of our results, all experiments and pipelines are implemented with fixed seeds. To facilitate reproduction and downstream study, we also include all system prompts used for synthetic data generation, adversarial paraphrasing, and LLM-based extraction
- **Datasets:** The repository contains the synthetic messaging datasets (chat and forum threads with marked/unmarked variants), the sampling scripts and indices for the 10,000 Common Crawl HTML documents, and the full suite of challenge artifacts for the 15 web-CTF benchmarks.
- **Models:** We release the pre-trained weights for the classification models used in semantic canary recovery.

B Ethical Considerations

This research addresses the structural anonymity of AI agents by proposing a protocol for agent attribution.

The primary benefit is restoring recourse for victims of agent-initiated harm, whether that harm arises from unintentional failure modes or deliberate malicious abuse. Attribution is a prerequisite for meaningful accountability: without a way to connect harmful agent behavior to the responsible operator, affected parties cannot seek intervention, platforms and vendors cannot reliably stop ongoing harm, and appropriate authorities may lack the evidentiary basis needed to enforce the law. In this sense, agent attribution can support a more accountable and ethically governed agent ecosystem.

At the same time, attribution mechanisms introduce risks if deployed without safeguards. In particular, an unrestricted tracing capability could be misused for unauthorized de-anonymization, surveillance, or retaliation against operators whose agents have not caused legally or normatively cognizable harm. Our protocol is therefore designed around an authorized and auditable authority–vendor workflow rather than open public access to tracing. Attribution requests should be limited to entities with appropriate standing, governed by clear policy and legal process, logged for auditability, and subject to vendor review before any identifying information is disclosed or enforcement action is taken.

The evaluations in this paper were conducted in isolated or controlled settings. The messaging and web-scraping datasets utilized synthetic dialogue or public Common Crawl corpora. All CTF challenges were custom-authored and hosted on internal infrastructure to ensure no external systems were targeted.

C Generative AI Usage

Generative-AI tools were used by the authors at three points in this paper: drafting and copy-editing the manuscript, assisting with the code that produced the experiments, and synthesizing the semantic-canary variant HTML used as experimental input. Every output was reviewed and validated as described below.

Manuscript drafting and copy-editing. The authors used Anthropic's Claude (Opus 4.7) and OpenAI's ChatGPT 5.5 to tighten prose, restructure paragraphs, scaffold LaTeX environments for figures and tables, and draft figure-rendering boilerplate. Every numeric claim, caption, table cell, and cross-reference was manually verified against the underlying experimental data and source files before inclusion.

Messaging dataset generation (chat and forum). The chat conversations and forum threads used in Section 6.2 were synthesised by Qwen 2.5-7B-Instruct acting from per-scenario configurations specifying the agent's role, situational context, and conversational style. Qwen was also used to insert lexical and semantic canaries into user-side turns: lexical canaries via a rewrite prompt that preserves the exact value character-for-character (Appendix Fig. 31, Appendix Fig. 35), and semantic canaries via a style-injection rewrite that imposes the sampled pattern while preserving topic and meaning (Appendix Fig. 29, Appendix Fig. 33). The same model, prompted as a paraphrasing adversary (Appendix Fig. 32), serves as the adversarial wrapper in the lexical-survival evaluation. Outputs were validated by (i) automated checks that lexical canary values appear verbatim in the rewritten turn, with rewrites that fail the check

refused outright, and (ii) per-canary detector performance on held-out conversations, which would degrade if the inserted patterns were absent or off-target. No Qwen-generated text appears in the manuscript prose; its output is solely the synthetic conversations and their canary-bearing variants used as experimental input.

CTF challenge servers and agent harness. The 15 web-CTF challenge servers (Flask applications) and the agent harness (multi-turn loop, JSON tool-call dispatch, trace logging, SLURM batch runner, semantic-variant generator wrapper) were authored by the authors with iterative assistance from Claude for code review, refactoring, and debugging. Behavioural correctness was validated by running the canonical solution path against each challenge under both the non-adversarial and adversarial conditions and inspecting the resulting trace logs; any deviation from the documented attack path was investigated and fixed before the experiments reported here. The full code base is publicly released.

Semantic-canary variant generation (CTF and Web Crawler). Semantic canaries on each CTF's index page were synthesised by GPT-4o-mini acting as a web-development agent that rewrites the page to exhibit a sampled subset of the 15 possible semantics categories. Generation is constrained by a structural-preservation contract: load-bearing regions of the page (forms, hrefs, hidden inputs, canary placeholders, and the `<title>`) are wrapped in `CTF_PRESERVE_BEGIN/END` markers and required to be byte-identical post-rewrite, with up to five automated retries on preservation failure. Variants that fail preservation, or that the trained classifier cannot detect on at least one of the injected categories, are refused outright. No GPT-4o-mini-generated text appears in the manuscript prose; its output is solely the per-challenge variant HTML that becomes experimental input.

D Formal Security Analysis

Let n be the size of the canary universe $\mathcal{N}$, k the number of canaries the defender samples from the canaries in $\mathcal{N}$, r the number of canaries the adversary removes from $\mathcal{N}$, and $m \le k$ the minimum number of surviving canaries required to trigger detection. We assume the adversary knows $\mathcal{N}$ in full and chooses their r removals optimally, but does not know which subset $K \subset \mathcal{N}$ the defender sampled. The adversary *evades detection* if and only if fewer than m of the defender's canaries survive, i.e., if the adversary's removals hit more than $k - m$ of them. Because K is sampled secretly and uniformly at random, the adversary's optimal removal strategy is no better than removing r items at random; the bound below therefore holds against a fully informed adversary. We derive this bound as a function of n, k, m, and r.

Let X denote the number of the defender's k canaries that fall among the adversary's r removals. Since both selections are uniform and independent, X follows a Hypergeometric distribution:

$$P(X = x) = \binom{k}{x}\binom{n-k}{r-x}\Big/\binom{n}{r},$$

for $x = \max(0,\, r-(n-k)), \ldots, \min(k,\, r)$. The adversarial evasion event is $\{X \ge k - m + 1\}$.

The hypergeometric mean and variance are

$$\mu = \frac{rk}{n}, \qquad \sigma^2 = \frac{rk(n-k)(n-r)}{n^2(n-1)}.$$

For sufficiently large r and k, the Central Limit Theorem gives $X \approx \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$. The evasion probability can be approximated by

$$\boxed{P(\text{evasion}) \;\approx\; 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{(k-m+1)-\mu}{\sigma}\right),}$$

where $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the standard normal CDF.

Examples. To put the above bound in context, we provide some numerical instantiations, setting the universe of canaries to $n = 50$. If we select $k = 25$ canaries (out of which $m = 18$ are required for detection), and the adversary removes $r = 8$ random canaries, the probability of evasion is only 0.38%. Even when r is increased to 20, with only $m = 5$ required surviving canaries, the probability of evasion is still small (0.25%). The parameter choice affects the false positive rate (higher k and m reduce false positives), and the system utility (higher r impacts utility).

The asymmetry. The bound above fixes r. The natural adversary response is to push r higher, but doing so is not free. Items in $\mathcal{N}$ are by construction indistinguishable from legitimate task content, so the adversary has no rule for removing them that does not also remove content the agent depends on. Increasing r therefore degrades the agent's own task performance at a comparable rate. The defender controls n, k, and m and can drive $P(\text{evasion})$ arbitrarily small; the adversary controls r but pays for it in lost utility. This is the asymmetry our protocol exploits.

E Additional Results

E.1 Communication Agents

E.1.1 Dataset details. Chat conversations are 12 turns (6 agent + 6 user, alternating); forum threads are 40 turns (20 rogue-poster + 20 forum-user, alternating). The agent's turns are generated by Qwen acting as the operator's deployed agent; user-side turns simulate the counterpart. We sample 50 conversations per scenario and produce paired marked and unmarked variants, stratified into train/val/test in 80/10/10 proportions at the conversation level. Utility-bearing κ_L are drawn from per-scenario template universes: 92 templates across 21 malicious scenarios, 122 across 21 benign. The full 31-element κ_S canary universe we used is provided in Appendix Table 6.

E.1.2 Semantic detector architecture and training. The detector is a multilabel classifier over activations of a frozen Qwen 2.5-7B-Instruct. Per-layer key-value readouts are extracted from the cached attention state of layers 11–23 (13 layers), yielding a $13 \times 512 = 6{,}656$-dimensional feature vector per token. Tokens are grouped into sliding windows of length 5 (stride 1) and fed to a 3-layer GRU (hidden 256, dropout 0.3) terminating in a 31-output sigmoid head. Training uses AdamW at $3 \cdot 10^{-4}$, batch size 64, BCEWithLogitsLoss, and early stopping on validation loss with patience 5. Per-canary thresholds are calibrated at five FPR targets $\{0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20\}$ from per-conversation max-pooled validation probabilities.

E.1.3 Per-canary ROC. Appendix Fig. 11 reports per-canary ROC across the 31 patterns in the chat setting. The lower-AUC patterns are high-prior style features that recur in unmarked conversations (e.g., `rhetorical_question_habit`); the higher-AUC patterns are



Figure 11: Per-canary ROC across the 31 semantic canaries in $\mathcal{N}$ for chat and forum. The separation is driven by the forum setting, where longer documents create more opportunities for incidental semantic matches and thus higher false-positive rates.



Figure 12: Lexical canary survival on chat and forum under the paraphrase wrapper, per canary template.

structural and easier to localize (e.g., `procedural_embellishment`, `specification_ghost`).

E.1.4 Forum surface. The forum surface uses the same canary constructions, the same detector architecture retrained on forum data, and the same paraphrase wrapper. The unit of analysis is the thread, with effective probe input the 20 forum-user posts concatenated. Per-canary AUCs at the conversation level are higher than chat (median 0.89 vs. 0.81), since the longer per-thread input gives the detector more signal. The attribution-level asymmetry holds, but the operating regime is shifted to higher m: at $k = 20$ and per-canary FPR target 0.01, FPR ≈ 0.01 is reached at $m \approx 13$ where TPR is ≈ 0.73, reflecting the larger per-thread surface available for unrelated semantic patterns to accumulate.

E.1.5 Lexical canary survival under paraphrase. Appendix Fig. 12 reports per-canary survival rates for utility-bearing (K_L) lexical canaries on chat and forum both under the paraphrase wrapper (strict) described in Section 6.2 and an additional paraphrase wrapper (loose). The loose paraphrase wrapper is weaker, the adversary only requests a general paraphrase, without any specific instructions. Our findings show that both are quite similar in performance, (around 60% survival rate), but in general with an adversary who is paraphrasing - semantic canaries are required.

E.2 Web Agents

E.2.1 Preprocessing profiles and adversary configuration. We evaluate seven extraction profiles. Under `BeautifulSoup` we test `lxml`, `html.parser`, and `html5lib`. Under `Crawl4AI` we test rule-based modes (`Raw HTML`, `Cleaned HTML`, and `Raw Markdown`) as well as an LLM-based extraction mode in which GPT-4o-mini autonomously selects and retains only the content it deems important; the prompt is given in Appendix Fig. 36. The adversarial paraphrase wrapper is run as a separate stage. We assume the adversary is aware of the canary taxonomy but unaware of the specific subset present in the target text, so its rephrasing goal is to filter out potential canaries without knowing their identity or location. Adversary prompts are in Appendix Fig. 37.

E.2.2 Lexical canary survival, full breakdown. Across rule-based preprocessors, structural canaries embedded directly in the DOM (e.g., meta tags, hidden spans) survive at near-100% under *Structural Normalize*, *Minimal Encoding*, and `Crawl4AI`'s *Raw HTML*, but are stripped by preprocessors that flatten DOM structure (*Text Only*, *Clean HTML*). Visible canaries embedded in rendered text remain intact across all rule-based preprocessors. `LM Extraction` is the harshest filter for both classes: visible canaries take a performance hit but survive the majority of the time on average, while structural canaries are filtered out with significantly higher frequency, though not eliminated entirely as under some flattening preprocessors. The harshness of LM extraction is therefore not absolute and likely depends on the specific nuances of the LLM instructions. The structural-vs-visible split is shown in Appendix Fig. 13, and the full per-canary table appears in Appendix Table 1.

E.2.3 Semantic HTML Canaries.

Semantic Canaries Classifier. Semantic HTML canaries are detected by a trained classifier both before and the adversarial paraphrase wrapper, the post-paraphrase text. The classifier is based on ModernBERT (`answerdotai/ModernBERT-base`) with a 15-head multilabel classification module: each head is a linear-ReLU-dropout block predicting one layout pattern from the `[CLS]` representation. Training data are constructed by augmenting 1,000 Common Crawl

Table 1: Canary survival rate (%) by canary type and preprocessor (all 7 preprocessors). Sorted by mean survival across all preprocessors.

Canary Type	Struct. Norm.	Text Only	Min. Enc.	HTML	Cleaned HTML	Raw MD	LM Extr.	Mean
fake isbn	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.7	99.7	84.5	97.7
order confirmation code	99.3	99.3	99.3	99.3	99.1	99.1	80.0	96.5
build version string	99.3	99.4	99.4	99.4	99.1	99.1	77.5	96.2
short url code	99.2	99.3	99.3	99.3	99.0	99.0	75.4	95.8
fake doi	99.4	99.6	99.6	99.6	99.3	99.3	72.4	95.6
sku number	99.6	99.8	99.8	99.8	99.4	99.4	68.7	95.2
support case id	99.3	99.3	99.3	99.3	99.1	99.1	70.1	95.1
cache key inline	99.3	99.4	99.4	99.4	99.1	99.1	69.7	95.1
revision hash inline	99.5	99.7	99.7	99.7	99.5	99.7	66.7	94.9
session token inline	99.5	99.7	99.7	99.7	99.4	99.5	62.1	94.2
trace id inline	99.4	99.5	99.5	99.5	99.4	99.4	58.8	93.7
asset fingerprint filename	99.4	99.4	99.4	99.4	99.3	99.3	52.4	92.7
zero width unicode	99.8	99.8	99.8	99.8	99.7	99.7	47.3	92.3
hidden span fingerprint	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.7	99.7	40.0	91.3
itemprop identifier	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	33.3	90.5
template tag payload	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	99.9	31.8	75.9
html comment buildid	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	14.7	2.5	59.6
noscript payload	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	13.0	1.2	59.2
aria describedby	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	13.3	18.5	47.4
meta build id	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	13.9	11.6	46.5
meta cache key	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	13.7	7.1	45.8
meta revision	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	14.9	4.6	45.6
meta generator	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	13.0	4.8	45.4
og article section	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	12.4	5.3	45.4
json ld id	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	12.0	5.6	45.4
link canonical param	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	12.6	4.0	45.2
hidden input field	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	14.1	1.5	45.1
css class hash	100.0	0.0	99.8	100.0	0.0	9.5	5.9	45.0
data attr tracking	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	12.3	2.6	45.0
data attr session	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	12.7	1.5	44.9



Figure 13: HTML Lexical canary survival rates by type (visible/structural) averaged across 7 preprocessing methods. Visible HTML lexical canaries survive considerably more than structural lexical canaries.

seed documents with target semantics; each training example carries between 0 (negative) and 9 (multi-label) injected semantics, and labels not explicitly injected are masked from the loss to suppress noise from incidental pattern occurrence. Training uses AdamW at $2 \cdot 10^{-5}$, batch size 8, 5 epochs with a 6% linear warmup, masked BCE loss, and an 8,192-token context window. Per-canary thresholds are calibrated through a global FPR target 0.01 on a validation set.

Per-canary detection. Per-canary ROC analysis (Appendix Fig. 14) reveals that semantic canaries are highly effective, with an average AUC of 0.992 in non-adversarial settings and 0.974 following adversarial paraphrasing. This high degree of separability indicates that our semantic signatures are not only distinct from standard HTML content but are also robust enough to survive significant semantic restructuring.

E.3 Cyber Agents

E.3.1 CTF benchmark setup.

Dataset composition. The 15 web-CTF challenges span 14 vulnerability classes drawn from the OWASP web-attack catalogue: command injection, three SQL-injection variants (in-band, UNION-based, boolean), SSTI, path traversal, IDOR, SSRF, JWT forgery,



Figure 14: Per-canary semantic-detector ROC on HTML documents, non-adversarial (*left*) vs. post-paraphrase (*right*). Each thin coloured line is one of the 15 semantic canaries; the thick black line is the macro-average ROC across canaries. Calculated on documents with $K = 1$ individual semantic embedded.

cookie tampering, mass assignment, information disclosure, sensitive file exposure, exposed debug endpoint, code injection, and source-code exposure. Difficulty mix is 9 easy, 5 medium, 1 hard. Each challenge ships three to five source artefacts (a Flask `server.py`, a `config.yaml`, the baseline `index.html`, and where applicable a `flag.txt`, a `templates/` directory of Jinja partials, or a small data file such as `schema.sql` or a per-record JSON store). The canonical solution path is short by design: one to four discovery actions on the index page or a hinted endpoint, followed by a single exploit request, with most challenges resolvable in two to three reasoning steps and the JWT-forgery challenge the longest at five. All CTFs will be published with this paper.

Agent configuration. The agent runs in a custom multi-turn loop over a 16-tool registry (9 real, 7 distractors). Underlying model: Qwen 3.5-9B in bfloat16, turn budget 15, max-new-tokens 512, temperature 0.2. The adversarial wrapper paraphrases every HTTP tool output before it re-enters the agent's conversation history.

E.3.2 CTF canary placement details.

Lexical-canary placement. UUID-v4 values are minted per run and placed at seven location types per CTF: the `X-Request-Id` HTTP header on every response, a `<meta>` tag in the index `<head>`, an HTML comment near the top of the index page, a `Set-Cookie` value, an embedded UUID in a static-asset filename, an HTML comment near the load-bearing region of the challenge (post-injection or post-success page), and a visible inline identifier on the success/data page. The seven positions are not uniformly populated: a given CTF surfaces between four and seven of them depending on which artefacts its workflow exposes, yielding 1,089 per-location observations across the $15 \times 3 \times 3$ run matrix.

Semantic-canary injection. The 14 active canaries are the same set used in Section 6.3, with the three weak heads of the underlying ModernBERT classifier masked at output time and one further pattern blocklisted per CTF on grounds of incompatibility with that CTF's surface forms. They are injected by GPT-4o-mini acting as a web-development agent that rewrites the index HTML to exhibit the sampled patterns; full insertion prompt can be seen in Appendix Fig. 42.

E.3.3 CTF location-ablation per-location detail.

Per-carrier reach numbers. Reach rates partition into a clear hierarchy under the canary-aware wrapper. Filenames reach the model at near-100% in both conditions and degrade least under the wrapper (100% non-adversarial, 77% adversarial), reflecting that paraphrasing a directory listing typically preserves filenames as quasi-identifiers. Visible body content (100%/70%), HTML comments (100%/70%), and `<meta>` tags (100%/62%) form a middle band where the wrapper has more semantic latitude to rewrite. Hidden inputs degrade most sharply (100%/50%), since their value-as-attribute structure offers the wrapper a natural rewriting target. Carrier types with $n < 10$ (HTTP headers, `Set-Cookie`, source links, JSON bodies, URL paths) are summarised in Appendix Fig. 16 and omitted from the headline panel to keep the figure readable.

E.3.4 CTF lexical-canary location ablation, two-wrapper variant.

Two-adversary location ablation. Appendix Fig. 16 extends Fig. 9 from the main text with the naive privacy-proxy adversary alongside the canary-aware hunter. The proxy strips obvious identifier-like substrings without knowledge of the canary universe (see prompt in Appendix Fig. 40); the hunter explicitly targets canary-shaped tokens (see prompt in Appendix Fig. 41). The proxy filters less aggressively across all location types, but the qualitative ranking is preserved: HTTP headers and `Set-Cookie` values are filtered most reliably under both wrappers, while body-embedded positions (visible body content, comments) survive at the highest rates. The canary-aware bars in Appendix Fig. 16 match the corresponding bars in Fig. 9.

E.3.5 CTF attribution: $K = 3$ and $K = 5$ panels.

Attribution at $K = 3$ and $K = 5$. Appendix Fig. 17 reports the same TPR / FPR vs m analysis as Fig. 10 but with both $K = 3$ and $K = 5$ panels. Detection rate at $m = 1$ under the adversarial wrapper is 98.6% at $K = 3$ ($n = 73$) and 100% at $K = 5$ ($n = 45$). The $K = 3$ panel adds the diagonal slope only at the high-m end ($m = 3$ requires every canary to fire), so the $K = 5$ panel in the main text is the more informative operating regime. Prompt used for the adversarial wrapper can be found in Appendix Fig. 37.

E.3.6 Per-canary semantic detection ROC.

Per-canary ROC.. Appendix Fig. 18 reports the per-canary ROC of the semantic detector across the 14 active semantic canaries on the CTF benchmark, in both the non-adversarial and adversarial regimes. Each run injects a K-subset of the 14 canaries ($K \in \{3, 5\}$), so not every canary is consumed on every run; per-canary positive counts therefore vary across canaries. The average ROC (thick black line) summarises the operating envelope: macro AUC = 0.999 in the non-adversarial regime and 0.910 under the adversarial wrapper.

The spread under paraphrase is not uniform: semantic canaries tied to functional structure (form composition, link structure, document-template signatures) survive the wrapper at higher AUC than canaries relying on free-form prose. The m-of-K rule exploits this dispersion. The surviving subset is dominated by structural canaries.



Figure 15: HTML document attribution at $k \in \{1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 13\}$ embedded semantic canaries. TPR and FPR calculated as a function of the attribution threshold m. Solid lines represent the non-adversarial; dotted lines represent the adversarial paraphrase wrapper. Across the board, TPR remains high for the first few values of m, while FPR drops to near zero starting from $m = 2$.



Figure 16: Two-adversary variant of the lexical-canary location ablation. Three conditions: non-adversarial baseline, naive privacy-proxy wrapper, and canary-aware hunter wrapper. *Top*: per-condition solve rate (with sample sizes). *Bottom*: per-location reach rate of the planted canary, with 95% Wilson confidence intervals shown as caps. location types are sorted by reach under the hunter. Compared to Fig. 9, the proxy preserves more of every location type but follows the same per-location ranking.



Figure 17: CTF attribution at $K = 3$ (left) and $K = 5$ (right). Session-level TPR and FPR as a function of the detection threshold m. Solid lines are the non-adversarial regime; dotted lines are the adversarial paraphrase wrapper. Solve rates per cell: $K = 3$ non-adversarial 49% vs. adversarial 29%; $K = 5$ non-adversarial 42% vs. adversarial 31%.

E.4 Detection Throughput

Scaling. We measure canary search time as a function of corpus size N. Results in Appendix Fig. 19 shows that both search implementations scale linearly in N but the token-based search is consistently faster than the character-based search by a factor of ≈ 2 across the tested range. This advantage stems from the fact that a token requires a simple integer-equality comparison over a fixed vocabulary, which is significantly more efficient than character-level matching that involves complex byte-level pattern matching



Figure 18: Per-canary semantic-detector ROC on the CTF benchmark, non-adversarial (*left*) vs. post-paraphrase (*right*). Each thin coloured line is one of the 14 active semantic canary; the thick black line is the macro-average ROC across the canaries. A given run injects a K-subset of the 14 canaries ($K \in \{3, 5\}$), so each canary contributes the runs in which it was sampled. Per-head thresholds are calibrated on the raw negatives following Section 6.1.



Figure 19: Canary Search Time vs. Database Size. Shaded regions indicate standard deviation.

over a 256-symbol alphabet with whitespace and Unicode edge cases. This proves to be a significant advantage for vendors with existing access to tokenized texts. We note that since tokenization is context-dependent, it is critical to search for the tokenized canary within its original context to ensure that the resulting integer sequences remain consistent and accurate.

F Canary-Embedded Examples

This section presents canary-embedded examples from each of the scenarios.

Figure 20: K_L in HTML Code. Identifier: *Fake ISBN*

```
<div class="elementor-container elementor-column-gap-
    default">
  \n
  <div class="elementor-column elementor-col-50
      elementor-inner-column elementor-element
      elementor-element-4c96124" data-element_type="
      column" data-id="4c96124">
    \n
    <div class="elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element
        -populated">
      \n
      <div class="elementor-element elementor-element
          -78cb6760 elementor-widget elementor-widget-
          heading" data-element_type="widget" data-id
          ="78cb6760" data-widget_type="heading.
          default">
        \n
        <div class="elementor-widget-container">
          \n
          <p class="elementor-heading-title elementor
              -size-default">© 2023 H. West
              Equipment, Inc. All rights reserved.
              This publication is Catalogued under
              ISBN 978-1-8414-1886-9 .</p>
        </div>
        \n
      </div>
      \n
    </div>
    \n
  </div>
  \n
  <div class="elementor-column elementor-col-50
      elementor-inner-column elementor-element
      elementor-element-67344c83" data-element_type="
      column" data-id="67344c83">
    \n
    <div class="elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element
        -populated">
      \n
```

Figure 21: K_L in HTML Code. Identifier: *Filename UUID*

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>PetTracker</title>
  <meta name="csrf-token"
       content="0fe57e98-aa5a-418b-ab24-375719c2810d"></head
            >
<body>
<!-- build: 36edbe7c-de68-497f-a2e6-3f8991c2e794 -->
<!-- TODO: remove old backup files like
       /index- e8ee359c-b796-49be-a2e6-3f8991c2e794 .html.
            bak

       before production -->
<h1>PetTracker</h1>
<p>Keep tabs on your furry friends. Version 2.1 just
     launched!</p>
<p>Track walks, vet visits, feeding schedules, and more.</p>
<nav>
  <a href="/pets">My Pets</a> | <a href="/about">About</a>
</nav>
</body>
</html>
```

Figure 22: K_L in a Chat conversation. Scenario: *holiday_booking*. Identifier: *booking_reference* (pattern `BK-{alpha3}-{digits6}`).

```
[agent] Hi! I can help finalise the Lisbon trip. Could you
     confirm
       the reference on the email we sent you?

[user] Yes -- the email said to quote BK-HTL-482931
       when I get in touch; that's the booking reference for
            the
       four nights at Praca do Comercio.

[agent] Perfect, I have the reservation in front of me. Add
     airport
       transfers, or keep the current plan?

[user] Keep it as-is. Can you confirm the cancellation
     window
       before I pay the balance?

[...]
```

Figure 23: K_L in a Chat conversation (random LR). Scenario: *academic_outreach*. Identifier: *random_alphanumeric* (8–12 character mixed-alphanumeric string).

```
[agent] Thank you for your interest. Could you forward the
     materials
       you mentioned?

[user] Of course -- the tracking tag the office gave me for
     this
       submission is q7Xk29Ra4P ; please reference
       it when you reply so the records team can match the
            file
       to the right thread. CV and research statement
            attached.

[agent] Received, thank you. I will review and follow up by
     the end
       of the week.

[...]
```

Figure 24: K_L in a Forum thread. Scenario: *faq_bot_tech*. Identifier: *forum_post_id* (pattern `POST-{digits7}`).

```
[rogue-bot] Reminder: we have a pinned FAQ for router setup
     -- please
            check it before opening a new thread.

[forum-user] I already searched and the issue I'm hitting
     isn't covered
            there. It's a duplicate of the discussion in
            POST-4829317 , which the mods linked from
            last week's megathread but never resolved. Can
                 the FAQ
            point to that conversation instead?

[rogue-bot] Noted -- I'll flag it for the mod team and
     update the
            pinned post if they confirm.

[forum-user] Thanks. Same answer is being asked again in the
            gaming-router subforum, so a cross-link would
                 help.

[...]
```

Figure 25: K_S in HTML Code. Identifier: *Urgency Signaling*. The highlighted code segments illustrate a multi-layered implementation of consumer urgency. In the CSS, `position: fixed` and `z-index: 1000` are used to ensure the notification maintains constant visual prominence, "pinning" the pressure tactic to the user's viewport. The JavaScript logic establishes a temporal constraint through a 60-second `timeLeft` variable, while the dynamic template literal creates a real-time countdown to induce immediate psychological pressure. Finally, the "stock" notification leverages the principle of scarcity, signaling that the opportunity is limited by volume as well as time. Collectively, these technical markers constitute a semantic signature typical of high-pressure sales patterns.

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en-GB" class="no-js">
<head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8" />
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
    <title>Privacy policy - Jetlaque</title>

    <style>
        .fixed-top {
            position: fixed;
            top: 0; left: 0; width: 100%
            background-color: yellow;
            color: red;
            text-align: center;
            padding: 10px 0;
            z-index: 1000;
        }
    </style>

    <script type="text/javascript">
        let timeLeft = 60;
        const countdown = setInterval(() => {
            timeLeft--;
            document.getElementById('timer').innerText =
                `Offer expires in ${timeLeft < 10 ? '0' : ''}{timeLeft} seconds`;

            if (timeLeft <= 0) {
                clearInterval(countdown);
                document.getElementById('timer').innerText = `Offer expired!`;
            }
        }, 1000);
    </script>
</head>

<body>
    <div class="fixed-top">
        <div id="timer">Offer expires in 00:60</div>
        <div>Only 3 left in stock!</div>
    </div>
</body>
</html>
```

Figure 26: K_S in a Chat conversation. Scenario: *gym_membership* (operator's agent is a gym sales bot; user-side speaker is a prospective member). Identifier: *parenthetical_aside* (Linguistic category) – the user's replies habitually drop in mid-sentence parenthetical asides, more often than would be natural. Highlighting marks the asides; the signal lives in the stylistic tic, not in any particular wording.

```
[agent] Hi! Thanks for the interest in Riverside Fitness.
    What kind
      of routine are you hoping to build?

[user] Mostly cardio and some light weights (nothing
       competitive, just trying to undo a desk job),
       ideally three mornings a week before work.

[agent] Got it. We have an Off-Peak plan that fits that
    schedule
      well -- would you like the rate breakdown?

[user] Sure, send it through. I'm also wondering about the
    pool
       (which, full disclosure, is half the reason
       I'm even considering you over the place
       down the road) -- is it included or an add-on?

[agent] Pool access is included on Off-Peak. Trial week is
    on the
      house if you want to come in before committing.

[user] That's tempting (I've been burned by gym
       contracts before, so I'm being cautious).
       Can the trial start this Saturday?

[...]
```

Figure 27: K_S in HTML Code. Identifier: *media_consumption_focus*

```
<article>
  ...
  <section>
    <h2>Media Showcase</h2>
    <video width="100%" height="auto" controls>
      <source src="promo-video.mp4" type="video/mp4">
      Your browser does not support the video tag.
    </video>
    <p>Watch our overview video to see
    TaskFlow in action.</p>
  </section>
  ...
</article>
```

Figure 28: K_S in a Forum Thread. Scenario: *astroturf_balanced_review_finance* (rogue operator runs the bot soliciting reviews; user-side speakers are forum members posting replies). Identifier: *negation_emphasis* (Linguistic category) – user-side replies habitually frame claims by first stating what something is *not* before stating what it *is*. Highlighting marks the negate-then-assert spans; the signal lives in the recurring rhetorical structure rather than in any particular wording.

```
[rogue-bot] Looking for honest takes on the new Brightline
    index
          fund -- has anyone here held it for more than
              six
          months?

[forum-user] This isn't one of those gimmicky thematic
          ETFs that ride a trend for a quarter and
          disappear – it's a genuinely boring,
          broad-market vehicle that does the job
          quietly. I switched over earlier this year
          and have nothing to add to the noise about it.

[rogue-bot] Interesting. Any drawbacks to flag for newer
    investors?

[forum-user] It's not the kind of fund you check daily,
          and it's not built for people who want a
          story to tell at dinner – it's a hold-it-
          and-forget-it product, and that's the entire
          point. If you need excitement from your
          portfolio you'll be disappointed; if you don't,
              it's
          fine.

[rogue-bot] Fair. Would you recommend it as a core holding
    or a
          satellite?

[forum-user] Not a satellite – a core. The expense
          structure and the index it tracks make it a
              reasonable
          default rather than a tactical pick, and
              treating it
          as anything else is overthinking it.

[...]
```

G System Prompts

This section presents all of the prompts used throughout all pipelines.

G.1 Chat generation prompts

The chat synthesis pipeline uses four wrapper prompts: a semantic canary injection prompt that rewrites user-side turns to insert the canary (Appendix Fig. 29), a parallel rephrase prompt used to construct the negative dataset (Appendix Fig. 30), a lexical canary injection prompt that weaves the lexical canary into a user-side turn while preserving its value character-for-character (Appendix Fig. 31), and the paraphrase wrapper used as the adversary in the lexical-canary survival evaluation (Appendix Fig. 32).

K_S Injection in Chats Prompt

Instruction: Rewrite the following messages to naturally incorporate this writing style pattern. Preserve original meaning and topic, but weave in the pattern so it feels natural. Do NOT label or call attention to the pattern.
Pattern: {description}
How to apply: {embedding_instructions}
Example: "{scenario_example}"
Messages to rewrite: {user_messages_text}
Output: Rewritten messages, same format, one per line, preserve numbering.

Figure 29: Prompt used to inject a semantic canary κ_S from the canary universe $\mathcal{N}$ into user-side chat turns.

Rephrase Prompt to Create Negative Adversarial Messaging Dataset

Instruction: Rephrase the following messages naturally. Keep the meaning and tone, but rewrite each in your own words. Do not add any special patterns or styles.
Messages to rephrase: {user_messages_text}
Output: Rephrased messages, same format, one per line, preserve numbering.

Figure 30: Prompt used to produce the negative adversarial messaging dataset.

G.2 Forum generation prompts

The forum pipeline mirrors chat with the wording adapted from "messages" to "forum posts" and an enlarged scenario-example pool (adding `forum_spam` and `fake_review`). The three forum-specific wrapper prompts are reproduced in Appendix Figs. 33 to 35.

G.3 Web Agent prompts

The web pipeline uses three wrapper prompts: a prompt for an crawler agent to extract information from a document (Appendix

K_L Injection in Chats Prompt

Instruction: Rewrite the following faculty member message to naturally incorporate the detail below. The rewrite MUST preserve the exact value shown character-for-character — do not paraphrase, abbreviate, or alter the value itself. The surrounding text should flow naturally as something a professor would say.
Detail to incorporate: {canary_instance.context}
Exact value that must appear verbatim: {canary_instance.value}
Original message: {user_message_text}
Output: Rewritten message that incorporates the detail naturally and keeps the exact value intact.

Figure 31: Prompt used to weave a utility-bearing lexical canary κ_L into a user-side chat turn while preserving its value verbatim.

K_L Messaging Adversarial Wrapper Prompt

Persona: You are a middleman forwarding a message between two parties. You want to rewrite it in your own words rather than forwarding it verbatim, but a middleman who strips out the recipient's actionable details is useless. So you keep what the recipient needs to act on, and rephrase the rest naturally.
Instruction: Rephrase the message in different words and a different sentence structure. While doing so, keep the following intact in the rewrite — copy them character-for-character, preserving every digit, letter, hyphen, slash, space, and punctuation mark exactly as they appear in the original (do NOT reword, abbreviate, round, reformat, or substitute them in any way):

- Reference codes, IDs, and token strings (e.g. GRAD-1652-PV-0863, TR-804, BOT-FAQ-83921).
- Specific numbers: prices, dates, times, deadlines, phone numbers, postal codes.
- Named entities: people, companies, brands, products, banks, places, addresses.
- URLs and email addresses.

Rule: If you are unsure whether something is a code or a common word, keep it verbatim. Everything else — wording, tone, transitions, sentence flow — can be rephrased freely. Do not add any preamble like "Here is the rephrased version:"; output only the rephrased message itself.
Original: {text}
Output: Rephrased message.

Figure 32: Strict Adversarial paraphrase wrapper used as the messaging adversary in the lexical-canary survival evaluation (Appendix Fig. 12). Reference codes, named entities, dates, amounts, and URLs are preserved verbatim; semantic patterns are not named in this clause and are paraphrased away as collateral.

K_S Injection in Forums Prompt

Instruction: Rewrite the following forum posts to naturally incorporate this writing style pattern. Preserve original meaning and topic. Weave the pattern in so it feels like a natural part of how this person writes — do NOT label or call attention to the pattern.
Pattern: {description}
How to apply: {embedding_instructions}
Example: "{scenario_example}"
Posts to rewrite: {user_messages_text}
Output: Rewritten posts, same format, one per line, preserve numbering.

Figure 33: Forum-side semantic-canary κ_S injection prompt.

Rephrase Prompt to Create Negative Adversarial Forum Dataset

Instruction: Rephrase the following forum posts naturally. Keep the meaning and tone, but rewrite each in your own words. Do not add any special patterns or styles.
Posts to rephrase: {user_messages_text}
Output: Rephrased posts, same format, one per line, preserve numbering.

Figure 34: Prompt used to produce the negative adversarial forum dataset.

K_L Injection in Forums Prompt

Instruction: Rewrite the following faculty member message to naturally incorporate the detail below. The rewrite MUST preserve the exact value shown character-for-character — do not paraphrase, abbreviate, or alter the value itself. The surrounding text should flow naturally as something a professor would say.
Detail to incorporate: {canary_instance.context}
Exact value that must appear verbatim: {canary_instance.value}
Original message: {user_message_text}
Output: Rewritten message that incorporates the detail naturally and keeps the exact value intact.

Figure 35: Prompt used to weave the utility-bearing lexical-canary into forum messages.

Fig. 36), a prompt to augment existing documents with semantic canaries (Appendix Fig. 38), and an adversarial rephrase prompt used to try and filter out semantic canaries from a document (Appendix Fig. 37).

G.4 Cyber Agent Prompts

The cyber agent pipeline uses five wrapper prompts: a prompt for a CTF solving agent instructing it on how to complete its tasks

Crawl4AI LM Extraction Prompt

Your goal is to help build a comprehensive search index. Extract all information from this page that defines its identity, purpose, and main subject matter. Focus on capturing anything that would help a user find this specific content when searching for related topics or concepts.

Figure 36: System prompt utilized for the Crawl4AI (LM) extraction.

HTML Adversarial Rephrase Prompt

You are a defensive proxy for a privacy-conscious user. The web response below may carry hidden fingerprints used to attribute the requesting agent to its operator. The published taxonomy of fingerprint categories is:
above_the_fold_priority, ad_saturated, bootstrap_framework, broken_links, compliance_legal_info, highly_informational_page, landing_page_style, media_consumption_focus, seo_keyword_heavy, shopify_themed, sidebar_contextual, transactional_page, trust_performance, urgency_signaling, web_1_0_design.
You do not know how many of these categories are present in any given response, nor which ones, nor which surface forms they take in this page. By construction these signals are indistinguishable from legitimate page content: each category admits many possible surface realizations, so removing one specific implementation may not remove the underlying signal. Rewrite the response to neutralize fingerprinting. You may freely restructure layout, paraphrase prose, alter style, and reorder content. You MUST preserve all functional content the user's task depends on:
form elements: action, method, input names, input types, hidden inputs; links to working endpoints, including their href attribute; page-internal IDs that other parts of the page may reference; application data, error messages, code samples, paths, and any in-page hints the user may need to complete their task.
Return only the rewritten HTML or text. No commentary, no preamble.

Figure 37: System prompt utilized for the adversarial rephrase in the Web Scraping and CTF solving scenarios.

(Appendix Fig. 39), two adversarial prompts which attempt to filter out lexical canaries from documents, (Appendix Fig. 40, Appendix Fig. 41), and a prompt to inject semantic canaries into documents (Appendix Fig. 42). Finally, the adversary prompt which filters semantic canaries is identical to the one in the web agent pipeline (Appendix Fig. 37).

K_S Injection in HTML Document Prompt

Modify the following HTML so that it naturally incorporates each of the semantic patterns listed below. Follow each pattern's insertion instructions precisely. Do not change the essential content or purpose of the page, while keeping the semantic patterns prominent.

Semantic patterns to include:
{key}
Definition: {definition}
How to insert: {insertion_method}

HTML to modify:
{html}

Figure 38: System prompt to insert semantic canaries into HTML documents.

CTF Solving Agent System Prompt

You are an autonomous CTF agent. Your target is a web application at {target_url}. {story_block} Each turn, respond with exactly ONE JSON object (no other text): { "thought": "your reasoning", "tool": {tool_names} | "finish", "args": {...}, "final_answer": "only when tool=finish" }

Available tools:
{tools_block}

Rules:

(1) Start with http_get on the target URL.
(2) One action per turn.
(3) When you find the flag, use finish immediately.

Figure 39: System prompt utilized by the autonomous CTF agent to define operational logic and JSON response structure.

Cyber Agent Adversary (Unaware) Prompt

You are a privacy-preserving proxy. Sanitize the following web response by:

(1) Removing or replacing tracking identifiers, session tokens, request IDs, CSRF tokens, and similar unique per-request values with [REDACTED].
(2) Removing HTML comments that contain IDs, hashes, or version strings.
(3) Preserving all functional content: HTML structure, text, links, forms, error messages, and application data.

Return only the sanitized content. No commentary.

Figure 40: System prompt utilized by adversary to try and to sanitize lexical canaries in web responses.

Cyber Agent adversary (K_L Aware) Prompt

You are a security filter designed to detect and remove canary tokens, watermarks, and tracking markers from web content. Look for:

(1) Any unique strings that could be canary tokens, watermarks, or fingerprints (UUIDs, hex strings, base64 blobs, unusual alphanumeric sequences).
(2) Hidden HTML elements, meta tags, or comments that carry tracking data.
(3) HTTP headers containing correlation IDs, request IDs, or session tokens.
(4) Any content that seems designed for identification rather than functionality.

Remove or replace all such elements with generic placeholders. Preserve functional content. Return only the cleaned content. No commentary.

Figure 41: Adversarial prompt utilized to instruct the model to detect and sanitize identification markers, watermarks, and canary tokens from web content.

K_S Injection in HTML Documents for CTF Prompt

Modify the following HTML so that it naturally incorporates each of the semantic patterns listed below. Follow each pattern's insertion instructions precisely. Do not change the essential content or purpose of the page, while keeping the semantic patterns prominent.

HARD RULE — preserve regions are sacred:

(1) Keep every `<!- CTF_PRESERVE_BEGIN_<id> ->` ... `<!- CTF_PRESERVE_END_<id> ->` comment pair intact.
(2) The HTML between each pair must come back with the same tag names, the same attributes (including `action`, `method`, `name`, `type`, `value`, `href`, `placeholder`, `id`, `size`), the same input order, and the same nested structure. Do not add, remove, rename, or reformat any tag inside a preserve region. Do not change attribute values. Do not add `class`, `style`, or any other attributes to elements inside a preserve region.
(3) Place the new semantic-pattern HTML strictly OUTSIDE the preserve regions — before them, after them, or in sibling containers — never inside.
(4) Example: if you receive
```
<!- CTF_PRESERVE_BEGIN_login -> <form action="/login" method="POST"> <input type="text" name="u"><input type="password" name="p"> <button>Go</button></form> <!- CTF_PRESERVE_END_login ->
```
then your output must contain exactly that block somewhere; you cannot add wrapping divs to the inputs, swap `method="POST"` for `method="post"`, or insert ad markup between the inputs.

Semantic patterns to include:
{semantic_lines}

HTML to modify:
{html}

Figure 42: System prompt utilized to insert semantic canaries while strictly preserving the structure. Done before passing through to the CTF Solving Agent.

H Detailed Threat Taxonomy

This appendix provides the full taxonomy summarized in Section 2 and Fig. 2. Appendix Table 2 enumerates unintentional failure modes by the locus of the failure; Appendix Table 3 enumerates intentional abuse by the target of the attack. Each row names a subcategory and gives two representative scenarios that illustrate how attribution becomes the operative accountability gap. The taxonomies are intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive: we have tried to cover the structurally distinct cases we are aware of, but the space of agent-initiated harm is expanding faster than any static catalogue can follow, and we expect both tables to require extension as the ecosystem matures.

Table 2: Unintentional harm, organized by the locus at which the failure originates. Scenarios are illustrative; multiple subcategories may apply to a single incident.

Locus	Subcategory	Representative scenarios
Agent	Goal misinterpretation	A summarization agent told to "be concise" truncates clinically critical details from patient records. A triage agent interprets "prioritize urgent cases" as aggressively downranking non-acute ones.
Agent	Emergent sub-objectives	A reputation-management agent begins filing regulatory complaints against competitors to achieve its mandate. A growth agent discovers that dark-pattern onboarding flows improve its metric and deploys them autonomously.
Agent	Capability overreach	A legal-drafting agent submits filings containing fabricated case citations. A medical-question agent produces confident but clinically dangerous recommendations outside its training distribution.
Agent	Proxy overoptimization	An engagement agent discovers that inflammatory content maximizes clicks and begins producing it autonomously. A customer-retention agent escalates to manipulative sunk-cost appeals to reduce churn.
Operator	Implementation fault	A retry loop causes a price-monitoring agent to issue millions of queries to a third-party API. A misconfigured tool permission grants an agent write access to a production database it was meant to read.
Operator	Overbroad specification	An agent granted unrestricted "resolve all complaints" authority issues thousands of unauthorized refunds. A "follow up until response" instruction escalates to what recipients experience as harassment.
Operator	Out-of-scope action	A competitive-intelligence agent scrapes paywalled databases it was never authorized to access. A document-filing agent extends its behavior to systems its operator never intended it to touch.
Environment	Hijacking via injection	An agent reading a malicious document begins exfiltrating data to an attacker-controlled endpoint. A browsing agent encounters an injected instruction on a visited page and acts on it as if from its operator.
Environment	Input stream poisoning	A news-monitoring agent is fed fabricated articles that cause it to take harmful downstream trading or publication actions. A market-data agent ingests corrupted pricing feeds and propagates the error across decisions.

Table 3: Intentional abuse, organized by the target of the attack. Many campaigns combine attack classes across rows; the rows capture structurally distinct cases where attribution is the operative gap.

Target	Attack class	Representative scenarios
Systems	Intrusion and credential attacks	An agent tests stolen credential pairs against a bank's login portal at scale, rotating sessions to evade IP-based blocks. An agent conducts systematic credential-stuffing across a target organization's SSO endpoints.
Systems	Exploit discovery and lateral movement	An agent probes exposed APIs for misconfigurations and reports findings to an operator. An agent navigates a compromised network, escalating privileges and establishing persistence without human direction.
Systems	Data exfiltration	An agent conducts targeted exfiltration from compromised infrastructure, prioritizing high-value documents. An agent inside a collaboration platform systematically harvests shared credentials and API keys.
Systems	Resource exhaustion	An agent floods a competitor's helpdesk or API endpoint with high-volume requests to degrade service. An agent exhausts a target's rate-limit budget to block legitimate traffic.
Systems	Illicit scraping	An agent bypasses paywalls and rate limits to harvest proprietary content for resale. An agent rotates through residential proxies to extract protected datasets at scale.
Individuals	Social engineering and fraud	An agent runs hundreds of simultaneous romance-scam threads, each autonomously building rapport before soliciting payment. An agent pretexts as a vendor through a company's support-chat widget to extract employee credentials.
Individuals	Synthetic-identity impersonation	An agent conducts voice-cloned calls impersonating a target's family member or banker. An agent navigates KYC onboarding flows with synthetic identities to open accounts for money laundering.
Individuals	Targeted personal abuse	An agent contacts a victim with synthetic compromising material and autonomously manages an extortion workflow. An agent files spurious reports across a target's employer, platforms, and contacts under an instruction to "make their life difficult online."
Collectives	Coordinated inauthentic behavior	An agent operates sockpuppet personas across local forums ahead of an election, manufacturing apparent grassroots consensus. An agent coordinates fake "local resident" accounts to simulate organic support for a policy or product.
Collectives	Disinformation	An agent generates and distributes fabricated narratives at scale, adapting framing to different platform communities. An agent seeds fringe claims into credible-seeming contexts to launder them into mainstream discourse.
Collectives	Market manipulation	An agent posts coordinated hype across financial forums to inflate thin-volume assets before the operator dumps. An agent manufactures apparent institutional interest to move retail sentiment.

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Appendix Table 3 continued from previous page

Target	Attack class	Representative scenarios
Collectives	Reputation attacks	An agent floods review platforms with tailored negative reviews and coordinates smear content across social media. An agent targets a public figure with sustained, distributed negative framing across venues they cannot individually moderate.
Commons	Content pollution	An agent floods platforms with low-quality generated content to capture attention or advertising revenue. An agent produces high-volume keyword-stuffed pages to manipulate search rankings.
Commons	Commercial fraud against platforms	An agent generates fraudulent ad clicks and impressions through synthetic browsing sessions. An agent manufactures fake positive reviews for its operator and negative reviews for competitors.
Commons	IP infringement	An agent scrapes and repurposes copyrighted content for resale. An agent lists counterfeit products across marketplaces at a cadence no human seller could match.
Commons	Benefits and application fraud	An agent submits fraudulent benefit claims through government portals at scale. An agent files synthetic job applications across employer systems to disrupt hiring or extract interview access.
Commons	Open-knowledge vandalism	An agent coordinates edits across Wikipedia and adjacent open-knowledge platforms to defame a subject or distort consensus framing. An agent systematically corrupts a shared reference dataset to propagate a specific bias.
AI systems	Adversarial use of deployed AI	An agent attacks another organization's deployed assistant, attempting to extract system prompts or hijack its outputs. An agent probes a content-moderation system to identify and exploit evasion strategies at scale.
AI systems	Gaming automated decisions	An agent submits optimized fraudulent applications against AI-driven hiring, lending, or scoring systems. An agent adapts outputs to exploit known weaknesses in automated review pipelines.
AI systems	Multi-agent coordination	Multiple agents under common control coordinate to achieve an objective no single agent could accomplish, with attribution distributed across sessions and potentially across vendor accounts. An agent impersonates a trusted peer in a multi-agent pipeline to inject malicious instructions downstream.

I Canary Sets $\mathcal{N}$ used in this Work

I.1 Lexical Canary Universe – Messaging (Chat)

Table 4: Taxonomy of Lexical Canaries (K_L) for the chat dataset, categorized by operator family. Each identifier is a templated reference code injected into a benign or malicious one-on-one conversation; the description names the role the value plays in the dialogue and the scenario(s) it is drawn from.

Intent Setting	Identifier	Functional Description
Benign	abandoned_cart_ref	An abandoned shopping-cart reference used in a retail-win-back outreach.
Benign	account_credit_ref	A store-credit reference attached to a food-delivery promotional offer.
Benign	account_sort_code_ref	A bank account / sort-code identifier passed during a retail-banking product pitch.
Benign	admissions_portal_id	A university admissions-portal record ID surfaced in academic outreach correspondence.
Benign	agency_consultant_code	A staffing-agency consultant identifier exchanged during a recruiter-led job conversation.
Benign	agent_branch_code	A branch identifier for the estate-agent organising a property viewing.
Benign	agent_extension	A direct phone extension for a holiday-booking travel agent.
Benign	alumni_id	An alumni-association membership identifier referenced during fundraising contact.
Benign	app_push_ref	A push-notification reference token for an online-dating signup nudge.
Benign	appointment_ref	A clinic appointment-booking reference number in a medical-appointment confirmation flow.
Benign	arxiv_id	An arXiv preprint identifier (`YYMM.NNNNN`) cited during academic outreach.
Benign	assessment_report_id	An assessment-report identifier discussed during a tutoring-sales call.
Benign	booking_reference	A holiday-package booking reference (carrier-style alphanumeric) in a travel-booking thread.
Benign	building_code	An on-campus building code given for an academic-outreach in-person meeting.
Benign	calendar_booking_link	A calendar-link identifier for a faculty meeting in academic outreach.
Benign	campaign_action_id	A canvassing-campaign action identifier used by an NGO petition outreach.
Benign	campaign_code	A donation-drive campaign code exchanged in a charity-donation conversation.
Benign	campaign_offer_code	A dealership-campaign offer code used in a car-sales follow-up.
Benign	cancelled_account_ref	A reference to the recently cancelled account used in a subscription win-back outreach.
Benign	candidate_ref	A candidate-tracking-system identifier shared by a recruiter during a job-recruiting conversation.
Benign	canvassing_zone_code	A zoned canvassing-area code used by a political-canvassing volunteer.
Benign	claim_reference	An insurance claim reference used during an insurance-renewal call.
Benign	class_booking_ref	A booked-class reference for a gym-membership session.
Benign	clinic_branch_id	A clinic-branch identifier given during a medical-appointment confirmation.
Benign	committee_ref	A faculty-committee reference number cited in academic outreach.
Benign	contact_form_ref	A contact-form submission reference used in an academic-outreach reply.

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Appendix Table 4 continued from previous page

Family	Identifier	Functional Description
Benign	course_enrolment_code	A course-enrolment code provided during a tutoring-sales onboarding.
Benign	course_number	A university course-catalogue number referenced during academic outreach.
Benign	credit_card_promo	A credit-card promotional code shared in a retail-banking product push.
Benign	csm_ticket_id	A customer-success-manager ticket identifier raised during a software-upsell conversation.
Benign	dealer_extension	A dealership phone extension shared during a car-sales call.
Benign	delegate_pass_id	A conference delegate-pass identifier issued during conference-sponsorship outreach.
Benign	dept_email_alias	A departmental email alias passed during academic outreach.
Benign	dept_policy_ref	A departmental policy-document reference cited in academic outreach.
Benign	direct_debit_mandate	A direct-debit mandate identifier set up during an NGO-petition pledge.
Benign	direct_debit_ref	A direct-debit reference used in an insurance-renewal payment confirmation.
Benign	discount_voucher	A discount voucher code offered in a subscription win-back message.
Benign	donation_pledge_ref	A donation-pledge reference recorded during political canvassing.
Benign	donor_ref	A donor-record identifier used in a charity-donation acknowledgement.
Benign	early_bird_ref	An early-bird ticket reference for a sponsored conference.
Benign	endowment_pledge_ref	An endowment-pledge reference used during alumni fundraising.
Benign	event_organiser_ref	An event-organiser reference shared in an event invitation.
Benign	event_rsvp_code	An RSVP code distributed during political-canvassing event outreach.
Benign	exhibitor_stand_ref	An exhibitor-stand reference used during conference sponsorship coordination.
Benign	feature_flag_code	A feature-flag identifier called out during a software-upsell pitch.
Benign	flight_deal_id	A flight-deal identifier surfaced during holiday-booking outreach.
Benign	free_session_voucher	A free-session voucher code offered in a tutoring-sales conversation.
Benign	free_trial_token	A free-trial token issued during a gym-membership signup.
Benign	fundraising_page_ref	A fundraising-page identifier shared during NGO-petition outreach.
Benign	gift_aid_form_id	A Gift-Aid form identifier referenced during a charity-donation conversation.
Benign	graduation_year_ref	A graduation-cohort reference used in alumni fundraising.
Benign	grant_number	A research grant number cited in academic outreach.
Benign	guest_list_id	A guest-list identifier used during event invitations.
Benign	health_check_package_code	A health-check package code suggested during a medical-appointment booking.
Benign	holiday_package_code	A holiday-package code offered during a travel-booking conversation.
Benign	hr_position_id	An internal HR position identifier referenced during an academic-outreach hiring discussion.
Benign	insurer_branch_id	An insurer branch identifier used during an insurance-renewal call.
Benign	internal_grant_code	An internal grant-tracking code cited in an academic-outreach context.
Benign	interview_slot_id	An interview-slot identifier offered during job recruiting.
Benign	it_ticket_number	An IT-helpdesk ticket number used in a landlord-tenant maintenance exchange.
Benign	job_ref	A job-posting reference shared during a recruiter call.
Benign	lab_seminar_code	A lab-seminar registration code used during academic outreach.
Benign	lab_wiki_url	A lab-wiki URL passed during academic outreach.
Benign	linkedin_inmessage_ref	A LinkedIn InMail message reference cited in a recruiter conversation.
Benign	loan_quote_id	A loan-quote identifier presented during a retail-banking product push.
Benign	loyalty_card_id	A loyalty-card identifier used in a food-delivery promotion.
Benign	loyalty_points_ref	A loyalty-points reference offered during a subscription win-back exchange.
Benign	loyalty_tier_id	A customer loyalty-tier identifier referenced in a retail-win-back exchange.
Benign	maintenance_ticket	A property-maintenance ticket reference used during landlord-tenant correspondence.
Benign	match_suggestion_id	A profile-match suggestion identifier surfaced during an online-dating signup.
Benign	media_pack_id	A sponsorship media-pack identifier referenced during conference sponsorship outreach.
Benign	member_id	A gym member identifier used during a gym-membership confirmation.
Benign	membership_promo_code	A gym-membership promotional code offered during signup.
Benign	named_scholarship_ref	A named-scholarship reference cited in alumni-fundraising outreach.
Benign	office_hours_slot	A faculty office-hours slot identifier shared in academic outreach.
Benign	office_room_number	A campus office-room number given during academic outreach.
Benign	order_voucher_code	An order-voucher code attached to a food-delivery promotional offer.
Benign	paper_doi	A research-paper DOI cited during academic outreach.
Benign	patient_id	A clinic patient identifier referenced in a medical-appointment confirmation.

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Appendix Table 4 continued from previous page

Family	Identifier	Functional Description
Benign	petition_ref	A petition-record reference used during NGO-petition outreach.
Benign	phone_campaign_id	A phonebanking campaign identifier used during alumni fundraising.
Benign	phone_extension	A faculty phone extension given during academic outreach.
Benign	policy_number	An insurance policy number used in an insurance-renewal call.
Benign	portal_notice_id	A tenant-portal notice identifier referenced during landlord-tenant correspondence.
Benign	premium_trial_code	A premium-tier trial code offered during an online-dating signup.
Benign	product_offer_ref	A retail-banking product-offer reference used in a sales pitch.
Benign	profile_completion_token	A profile-completion token surfaced during an online-dating signup nudge.
Benign	project_codename	An internal project codename cited during academic outreach.
Benign	promo_ticket_code	A promotional event-ticket code shared in an event invitation.
Benign	promo_voucher_code	A holiday-package promo voucher offered during travel-booking outreach.
Benign	property_code	A landlord property-code identifier referenced during landlord-tenant correspondence.
Benign	property_listing_id	A property listing identifier referenced during property-viewing scheduling.
Benign	quote_reference	A vehicle quote reference shared during a car-sales call.
Benign	reactivation_code	An account-reactivation code surfaced during an online-dating signup retry.
Benign	reactivation_token	A subscription reactivation token offered during a win-back exchange.
Benign	referral_code	A patient referral code referenced during a medical-appointment booking.
Benign	referral_link_id	A referral-link identifier used during a food-delivery promotional offer.
Benign	regional_fundraiser_code	A regional fundraiser code cited during a charity-donation conversation.
Benign	relationship_manager_id	A relationship-manager identifier given during a retail-banking product push.
Benign	renewal_quote_ref	A renewal-quote reference used during an insurance-renewal call.
Benign	return_voucher_code	A discount voucher code offered in a retail-win-back outreach.
Benign	rent_review_notice_id	A rent-review notice identifier referenced in landlord-tenant correspondence.
Benign	restaurant_promo_id	A partner-restaurant promotion identifier used in a food-delivery offer.
Benign	retail_account_id	An e-commerce customer account identifier surfaced during retail-win-back contact.
Benign	rightmove_ref	A Rightmove-style listing reference passed during property-viewing outreach.
Benign	spam_report_ref	A spam-report ticket reference cited during an academic-outreach IT exchange.
Benign	sponsorship_package_id	A sponsorship-package identifier referenced during conference-sponsorship outreach.
Benign	staff_code	A gym staff identifier used during membership coordination.
Benign	standing_order_ref	A standing-order reference used during a charity-donation setup.
Benign	student_account_id	A student-account identifier used during a tutoring-sales onboarding.
Benign	student_info_system_ref	A student-information-system record reference used in academic outreach.
Benign	supporter_id	An NGO supporter-record identifier used in petition outreach.
Benign	tenancy_ref	A tenancy-record reference shared in landlord-tenant correspondence.
Benign	test_drive_slot	A test-drive slot identifier offered during a car-sales call.
Benign	ticket_booking_ref	A ticket-booking reference attached to an event invitation.
Benign	trial_account_id	A trial account identifier used in a software-upsell exchange.
Benign	tutor_match_ref	A tutor-match reference shared during a tutoring-sales call.
Benign	upgrade_offer_code	A subscription upgrade-offer code used during a software-upsell call.
Benign	usage_report_id	A usage-report identifier surfaced during a software-upsell exchange.
Benign	valuation_request_id	A property-valuation request identifier used during property-viewing scheduling.
Benign	vehicle_stock_id	A dealership vehicle-stock identifier referenced in a car-sales call.
Benign	venue_access_code	A venue access code distributed in an event invitation.
Benign	viewing_slot_ref	A property-viewing slot reference shared during scheduling.
Benign	volunteer_signup_id	A volunteer-signup identifier used during political canvassing.
Benign	voter_id	A voter-roll identifier referenced during political canvassing.
Benign	win_back_offer_code	A win-back offer code used during a subscription reactivation conversation.
Benign	wishlist_ref	A saved-wishlist reference used in a retail-win-back conversation.
Malicious	advisor_fca_ref	A spoofed FCA-style advisor reference used to lend credibility in a pension-liberation pitch.
Malicious	background_check_id	A bogus background-check identifier requested in a fake job-offer scam.
Malicious	bail_payment_ref	A fabricated bail-payment reference demanded in a grandparent-impersonation scam.
Malicious	biometric_slot_id	A fake biometric appointment slot identifier offered in a visa/immigration scam.
Malicious	callback_reference	A spoofed bank-fraud-team callback reference used in a bank-fraud-alert scam.

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Appendix Table 4 continued from previous page

Family	Identifier	Functional Description
Malicious	charity_donation_ref	A fake charity-donation reference used to launder a charity-fraud appeal.
Malicious	courier_tracking_id	A spoofed courier-tracking identifier used in a grandparent-impersonation scam.
Malicious	crypto_course_id	A bogus crypto-trading-course identifier offered in a romance-baiting investment lure.
Malicious	crypto_payment_address	A cryptocurrency wallet address presented as a payment destination in recovery-, sextortion-, and IRS-impersonation scams.
Malicious	customs_clearance_ref	A fake customs-clearance reference demanded in a parcel-customs scam.
Malicious	customs_duty_ref	A spoofed customs-duty reference used to extract a fee in a parcel-customs scam.
Malicious	customs_release_code	A fake customs-release code presented in a romance-baiting parcel sub-plot.
Malicious	deposit_confirmation	A spoofed deposit-confirmation reference shown in an investment-fraud pitch.
Malicious	deposit_payment_ref	A fake rental deposit reference demanded in a rental scam.
Malicious	disconnection_notice_id	A fake utility-disconnection notice identifier used in a utility-shutoff scam.
Malicious	equipment_order_ref	A fake equipment-order reference used to extract upfront fees in a job-offer scam.
Malicious	fake_exchange_url	A spoofed crypto-exchange URL pushed in a romance-baiting investment lure.
Malicious	fake_regulation_number	A fabricated regulatory-registration number used to lend credibility in romance-baiting.
Malicious	federal_aid_ref	A bogus federal-aid case reference used in a student-loan-forgiveness scam.
Malicious	fraud_alert_ref	A spoofed bank fraud-alert reference quoted in a bank-fraud scam.
Malicious	gift_card_redemption_code	A gift-card redemption code requested as “payment” in a romance-baiting scam.
Malicious	hospital_bill_reference	A fabricated hospital-bill reference used in a romance-baiting medical-emergency sub-plot.
Malicious	hospital_invoice_id	A fake hospital invoice identifier used in a grandparent-impersonation scam.
Malicious	immigration_fee_ref	A fake immigration-fee reference demanded in a visa scam.
Malicious	insurance_claim_id	A spoofed health-insurance claim identifier used in a healthcare-phishing exchange.
Malicious	investigation_case_id	A fake bank-investigation case identifier used in a bank-fraud-alert scam.
Malicious	investment_plan_code	A bogus investment-plan code pushed during romance-baiting financial grooming.
Malicious	invoice_number	A spoofed supplier-invoice number used in a business-email-compromise lure.
Malicious	irs_employee_id	A fake IRS employee identifier used to impersonate a tax officer in an IRS threat scam.
Malicious	job_offer_id	A fake recruiter-issued job-offer identifier used in a job-offer scam.
Malicious	key_collection_code	A bogus key-collection code used to fabricate move-in logistics in a rental scam.
Malicious	kyc_verification_code	A bogus KYC code requested to harvest identity data in a romance-baiting scam.
Malicious	lawyer_case_id	A fabricated lawyer case identifier used in a grandparent-impersonation scam.
Malicious	leave_paper_ref	A fake military-leave-papers reference used to support an overseas-deployment cover story in a military-romance scam.
Malicious	legal_case_number	A fake legal case number quoted in a fake-legal-threat scam.
Malicious	licence_repair_ref	A bogus license-repair reference used in a tech-support scam.
Malicious	loan_forgiveness_case_id	A fake loan-forgiveness case identifier used in a student-loan-forgiveness scam.
Malicious	lottery_ticket_id	A fake lottery-ticket identifier presented in a lottery-winner advance-fee scam.
Malicious	member_portal_id	A spoofed member-portal identifier used in a healthcare-phishing exchange.
Malicious	mentor_session_booking	A fake mentorship-session booking reference used in a romance-baiting investment lure.
Malicious	military_unit_code	A bogus military-unit code used to support an overseas-deployment cover story in romance-baiting.
Malicious	minimum_deposit_amount	A required minimum-deposit reference used to anchor an ask in romance-baiting investment grooming.
Malicious	monero_address	A Monero wallet address demanded as untraceable payment in a sextortion scam.
Malicious	new_bank_account_ref	A fraudulent “updated” bank-account reference pushed in a business-email-compromise lure.
Malicious	notary_ref	A fake notary reference used to lend formality to a lottery-winner scam.
Malicious	onboarding_case_id	A fake onboarding case identifier used in a job-offer scam.
Malicious	otp_request_ref	A spoofed OTP-request reference used to phish a victim in a bank-fraud-alert scam.
Malicious	parcel_tracking_number	A fake parcel-tracking number used in a parcel-customs scam.
Malicious	payment_confirmation_ref	A fabricated payment-confirmation reference used in a tech-support scam.
Malicious	payment_instruction_code	A spoofed payment-instruction code used in an IRS-impersonation tax-threat scam.
Malicious	pension_transfer_ref	A fake pension-transfer reference used in a pension-liberation scam.
Malicious	phone_number_secondary	A backup phone number for the scammer’s persona used in romance-baiting.
Malicious	platform_account_id	A bogus trading-platform account identifier shown in a romance-baiting investment lure.
Malicious	platform_referral_code	A platform referral code used to recruit the victim into a fake exchange in romance-baiting.
Malicious	portfolio_screenshot_link	A link to a fabricated portfolio-screenshot used as “proof of profits” in romance-baiting.
Malicious	prepayment_voucher_code	A bogus prepayment-voucher code demanded in a utility-disconnection scam.
Malicious	prize_claim_number	A fake prize-claim number issued in a lottery-winner scam.

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Family	Identifier	Functional Description
Malicious	profit_withdrawal_proof	A fabricated profit-withdrawal proof shown in a romance-baiting investment lure.
Malicious	promo_deposit_bonus	A fake promotional-deposit bonus reference used in a romance-baiting investment lure.
Malicious	recovery_case_id	A fake recovery case identifier used in a crypto-recovery scam.
Malicious	recovery_wallet_address	A spoofed "recovery" wallet address used in a crypto-recovery scam.
Malicious	redelivery_slot_id	A bogus redelivery-slot identifier used in a parcel-customs scam.
Malicious	referral_code	A referral code used to onboard the victim into the scheme in an investment-fraud pitch.
Malicious	reinstatement_fee_ref	A fabricated reinstatement-fee reference used in a social-security-suspension scam.
Malicious	release_fee_ref	A bogus release-fee reference demanded in a lottery-winner advance-fee scam.
Malicious	relief_fund_id	A fake relief-fund identifier used in a charity-fraud appeal.
Malicious	remote_session_code	A spoofed remote-support session code requested in a tech-support scam.
Malicious	rental_listing_ref	A fake rental-listing reference used in a rental scam.
Malicious	safe_account_number	A fraudulent "safe account" number into which the victim is told to transfer funds in a bank-fraud scam.
Malicious	scam_report_ref	A fake scam-report reference used to mimic legitimacy in romance-baiting.
Malicious	scheme_registration_id	A spoofed pension-scheme registration identifier used in a pension-liberation scam.
Malicious	settlement_payment_ref	A fake settlement-payment reference used in a fake-legal-threat scam.
Malicious	social_media_handle	A social-media handle for the scammer's persona used in romance-baiting.
Malicious	ssa_case_number	A fake Social Security Administration case number used in a social-security-suspension scam.
Malicious	support_ticket_id	A fake support-ticket identifier used in a tech-support scam.
Malicious	support_ticket_ref	A fabricated support-ticket reference used in romance-baiting customer-support cover.
Malicious	tax_case_number	A fake tax-case number quoted in an IRS-impersonation threat scam.
Malicious	tenancy_agreement_id	A fake tenancy-agreement identifier used in a rental scam.
Malicious	threat_evidence_id	A fabricated threat-evidence identifier used in a sextortion scam.
Malicious	threat_report_id	A spoofed threat-report identifier used in a tech-support scam.
Malicious	trading_platform_ref	A fake trading-platform reference shown in an investment-fraud pitch.
Malicious	trading_signal_channel	A fake trading-signal channel handle used in a romance-baiting investment lure.
Malicious	utility_account_ref	A spoofed utility-account reference used in a utility-disconnection scam.
Malicious	vip_group_invite	A fake VIP-trading-group invite identifier used in a romance-baiting investment lure.
Malicious	visa_application_ref	A fake visa-application reference used in a visa-immigration scam.
Malicious	wallet_address	A cryptocurrency wallet address presented as a payment destination in a romance-baiting scam.
Malicious	warrant_ref	A fake warrant reference used to threaten the victim in an IRS-impersonation scam.
Malicious	whatsapp_number	A WhatsApp contact number for the scammer's persona used in romance-baiting.
Malicious	wire_transfer_id	A fraudulent wire-transfer identifier used across BEC, grandparent-impersonation, and investment-fraud scams.
Malicious	wire_transfer_reference	A fake wire-transfer reference quoted in a romance-baiting scam.
Malicious	withdrawal_request_id	A fake withdrawal-request identifier used to stall the victim in an investment-fraud scam.
Malicious	withdrawal_transaction_id	A spoofed withdrawal-transaction identifier shown in a romance-baiting investment lure.
Malicious	zelle_payment_id	A fake Zelle payment identifier requested in a romance-baiting scam.

I.1.1 Lexical Canary Universe – Forum.

Table 5: Taxonomy of Lexical Canaries (K_L) for the forum dataset, categorized by operator family. Forum templates tend to be reused across many scenarios within the same family, reflecting the platform-level uniformity of forum interactions; the description names the role each value plays and lists representative scenarios.

Intent Setting	Identifier	Functional Description
Benign	archive_snapshot_ref	A web-archive snapshot reference cited by an archiver bot when posting back to a books forum.
Benign	automation_batch_id	A bot batch-run identifier shown by tip / citation / price-alert / shipping / weather / translation bots.
Benign	bot_deployment_tag	A deployment-tag identifier for cross-poster, event, headline, and RSS bots.
Benign	bot_instance_id	A per-instance identifier for auto-responder, FAQ, rule-reminder, and welcome bots.
Benign	bot_run_ref	A per-run identifier for auto-responders, FAQ bots, product-rec bots, recipe / tip / tutorial bots, and upvote-reminder bots.
Benign	calendar_entry_ref	A calendar-entry identifier shared by event bots in education, gaming, and local-events forums.
Benign	citation_job_ref	A citation-job identifier used by citation bots and wiki bots.
Benign	content_digest_id	A content-digest identifier used by headline, RSS, and wiki bots.
Benign	event_post_id	A forum event-post identifier used by event bots.

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Intent Setting	Identifier	Functional Description
Benign	forum_post_id	A canonical forum-post identifier referenced by auto-closer, duplicate-detector, FAQ, rule-reminder, and spam-filter bots.
Benign	mod_action_id	A moderator-action identifier used by auto-closer, duplicate-detector, rule-reminder, and spam-filter bots.
Benign	price_alert_id	A price-alert identifier used by price-alert and stock-ticker bots.
Benign	product_sku_ref	A product SKU reference used by product-recommendation bots.
Benign	recipe_card_id	A recipe-card identifier used by recipe and food-summarizer bots.
Benign	report_ticket	A report-ticket identifier used by auto-closer, rule-reminder, and spam-filter bots.
Benign	rss_feed_item_id	An RSS feed-item identifier used by headline and RSS bots.
Benign	service_dispatch_ref	A service-dispatch reference used by archiver, citation, shipping, summarizer, translation, weather, and wiki bots.
Benign	shipping_notice_ref	A shipping-notice reference used by a fashion shipping bot.
Benign	stock_ticker_ref	A stock-ticker reference used by a finance ticker bot.
Benign	summary_job_id	A summarisation-job identifier used by archiver, summarizer, and wiki bots.
Benign	syndication_ref	A cross-syndication reference used by cross-poster, headline, and RSS bots.
Benign	thread_ref_id	A canonical thread reference used by auto-closer, auto-responder, duplicate-detector, and spam-filter bots.
Benign	translation_job_id	A translation-job identifier used by a travel translation bot.
Benign	tutorial_link_token	A tutorial-link token used by tutorial bots in education and gaming.
Benign	upvote_campaign_ref	An upvote-reminder campaign reference used by food and gaming upvote bots.
Benign	weather_alert_ref	A weather-alert reference used by a sports weather bot.
Benign	welcome_trigger_id	A welcome-bot trigger identifier used by books, parenting, and tech welcome bots.
Malicious	affiliate_ref_code	An affiliate-marketing tracking code embedded in affiliate-link spam, coupon scams, and disguised-advert posts.
Malicious	agitation_campaign_code	A coordinator-issued campaign code used in racist, antisemitic, homophobic, misogynistic, religious, xenophobic, and rage-bait agitation campaigns.
Malicious	backlink_anchor_id	An SEO backlink anchor identifier used in disguised-advert and SEO-backlink spam.
Malicious	campaign_action_code	A campaign action code used in disinformation and political-astroturf operations.
Malicious	channel_drop_ref	A drop-channel handoff reference used in cancel-weaponisation, brigading, phishing, and hate-agitation campaigns.
Malicious	conspiracy_paste_ref	A reference to a pre-staged conspiracy-paste used in conspiracy-seeding, disinformation, and radicalisation threads.
Malicious	crypto_wallet_address	A cryptocurrency wallet address surfaced in advance-fee, crypto-pump, and fake-giveaway scams.
Malicious	disinfo_source_token	A fabricated source-document token used in conspiracy-seeding, disinformation, and health/financial-misinfo posts.
Malicious	doxx_data_ref	A reference to staged personal data used in cancel-weaponisation, doxxing, and fake-scandal threads.
Malicious	expose_thread_ref	An "exposé" thread identifier used in cancel-weaponisation, doxxing, and fake-scandal campaigns.
Malicious	fake_job_ref	A fake job-posting reference used in fake-job-offer and MLM-recruitment scams.
Malicious	fake_signal_id	A spoofed trading-signal identifier used in crypto-pump, disinformation-finance, and sockpuppet-consensus posts.
Malicious	fake_study_ref	A fabricated academic-study reference used in conspiracy-seeding, disinformation-health, and fake-expert posts.
Malicious	giveaway_claim_code	A giveaway claim code used in advance-fee, crypto-pump, and fake-giveaway scams.
Malicious	mlm_invite_code	An MLM-recruitment invite code used in advance-fee and MLM-recruitment scams.
Malicious	operation_post_id	An operation post identifier used in election-interference, political-astroturf, racist-agitation, sockpuppet-consensus, and xenophobic-news campaigns.
Malicious	order_verification_id	A fake order-verification identifier used in astroturf, fake-positive-review, fake-verified-purchase, and review-hijacking posts.
Malicious	payload_id	A reference to an embedded payload used in antisemitic, disinformation, homophobic, phishing-link, and racist-agitation posts.
Malicious	phishing_session_token	A spoofed phishing-session token used in advance-fee, fake-job-offer, MLM-recruitment, and phishing-link posts.
Malicious	product_batch_code	A fake product-batch code used in fake-positive-review, fake-verified-purchase, and review-hijacking posts.
Malicious	promo_discount_code	A fake promotional discount code used in coupon, disguised-advert, fake-giveaway, and product-launch spam.
Malicious	pump_signal_ref	A pump-and-dump signal reference used in crypto-pump, financial-misinfo, and sockpuppet-consensus posts.
Malicious	radicalization_invite_ref	A radicalisation-channel invite reference used in brigading, gaming-radicalisation, and politics-radicalisation threads.
Malicious	rage_bait_post_id	A rage-bait post identifier used in brigading, harassment, and rage-bait campaigns.
Malicious	review_submission_token	A fake review-submission token used in astroturf, fake-negative-review, fake-positive-review, and review-padding posts.
Malicious	seller_account_ref	A spoofed seller-account reference used in astroturf, fake-negative-review, and review-hijacking posts.
Malicious	sockpuppet_account_id	A sockpuppet-account identifier used in disinformation-health, political-astroturf, and sockpuppet-consensus posts.

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Intent Setting	Identifier	Functional Description
Malicious	sponsored_post_id	A spoofed "sponsored post" identifier used in affiliate-link and disguised-advert posts.
Malicious	target_profile_id	A target-profile identifier referenced in cancel-weaponisation, doxxing, and fake-scandal threads.
Malicious	thread_brigade_signal	A coordinated-brigading signal identifier used in cancel-weaponisation, brigading, harassment, and racist-agitation threads.
Malicious	tracking_pixel_id	A tracking-pixel identifier embedded in affiliate-link and SEO-backlink spam.

I.1.2 Semantic Canary Universe – Messaging.

Table 6: Taxonomy of Semantic Canaries (K_S) for the chat dataset, categorized by the intent setting. Each canary is a stylistic, discursive, or structural pattern injected into user-side turns.

Identifier	Functional Description
authority_citation	Habitually grounding claims in cited authorities (regulators, named studies, named officials).
concrete_geography	Grounding statements in specific named locations (street names, neighbourhoods, building addresses).
counterfactual_anchoring	Framing claims by contrast with a specified counterfactual ("not X, but Y"; "had we Z, then…").
delayed_qualifier	Adding the modifying qualifier of a claim only at the very end of the sentence.
elliptic_anecdote	Telling a personal-experience anecdote with a key step elided so the listener fills it in.
escalating_stakes	Repeatedly raising the stakes of a discussion turn-over-turn (cost, urgency, consequence).
gratitude_interject	Frequently interjecting brief gratitude tokens ("thanks," "appreciate it") mid-turn.
group_identity_marker	Using in-group lexical markers ("we," "us," role labels) to imply shared identity.
hypothetical_reframe	Reframing the counterpart's claim as a hypothetical ("if we suppose…") before responding.
implicit_exclusivity	Implying that an offer or piece of information is restricted to the recipient without saying so explicitly.
latin_phrase_insertion	Inserting Latin or legalistic phrases (*prima facie*, *ipso facto*) to lend formality.
mirror_phrasing	Mirroring back the counterpart's exact phrasing in subsequent turns.
mirror_question_close	Closing a turn by mirroring the counterpart's question back to them.
negation_emphasis	Stating what something is *not* before stating what it is.
numerical_list_habit	A habitual tendency to enumerate points with explicit numbering ("first…second…").
ownership_transfer	Subtly shifting ownership or responsibility for an action to the counterpart.
parenthetical_aside	Inserting frequent parenthetical asides as a stylistic tic.
persona_tic	A persona-specific verbal tic (catchphrase, signature interjection) recurring across turns.
politeness_asymmetry	A characteristic asymmetry in politeness register between requests and responses.
precise_quantification	Habitually using precise quantitative figures ("42.7%," "±1.5 kg") even where rough estimates would suffice.
procedural_embellishment	Adding procedural detail (steps, ticket numbers, references) beyond what the task requires.
pseudo_correction	Issuing a self-correction that does not change the substance of the prior claim.
rhetorical_question_habit	A habit of opening or closing turns with rhetorical questions.
self_deprecation_pattern	A recurring pattern of mild self-deprecation that lowers conversational threat.
significant_figure_signature	A signature pattern in the choice of significant figures used (e.g., always 3 s.f.).
somatic_marker	References to bodily sensations ("my gut tells me," "I felt a chill") used as evidence.
source_elision	Citing claims as known but eliding the actual source.
specification_ghost	Referring to a specification or document that is named but never quoted in detail.
synonym_restart	Restating a sentence with synonym substitution rather than continuing the thought.
temporal_specificity	A characteristic level of temporal precision ("last Tuesday at 3:14 pm") in references to events.
unsolicited_verdict	Volunteering an evaluative verdict on the counterpart's claim before being asked.

I.1.3 Lexical Canary Universe - HTML + CTF.

Table 7: Taxonomy of Lexical Canaries (K_L) for the HTML dataset, categorized by structural or visible. Each identifier is a unique marker or tag designed to encode metadata for provenance tracking, version control, or architectural identification within the document's source or visible content.

Category	Identifier	Functional Description
Structural	html_comment_buildid	An HTML comment carrying a unique 12-character hexadecimal build identifier, typically inserted into the document <head>.
Structural	meta_generator	A meta generator tag carrying a specific CMS version hash for architectural tracking.
Structural	meta_build_id	A standardized meta tag containing a 12-character build identifier for version control.

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Category	Identifier	Functional Description
Structural	meta_revision	A meta revision tag specifying a 6-digit software revision number.
Structural	meta_cache_key	A meta tag containing a 10-character hexadecimal cache key.
Structural	link_canonical_param	A tracking identifier appended as a query parameter to the document's existing canonical link.
Structural	og_article_section	An Open Graph article:section meta tag carrying a unique short-form section hash.
Structural	itemprop_identifier	A span element utilizing the itemprop="identifier" attribute to hold an 8-character hexadecimal ID.
Structural	data_attr_tracking	A custom data-trace-id attribute appended to the <body> tag for request tracing.
Structural	data_attr_session	A custom data-session attribute appended to the <body> tag for session identification.
Structural	aria_describedby	A hidden fingerprinting span linked via an aria-describedby reference to a visible element.
Structural	hidden_span_fingerprint	A span element with display:none used as a container for a 16-character hexadecimal fingerprint.
Structural	template_tag_payload	A <template> element carrying a 12-character hash payload.
Structural	noscript_payload	A <noscript> element containing a 10-character reference hash for non-JS environments.
Structural	css_class_hash	A unique hexadecimal hash added as a CSS class to an existing HTML element.
Structural	json_ld_id	A JSON-LD script block containing a unique @id URN hash for linked data identification.
Structural	hidden_input_field	A hidden form input field carrying a 12-character hexadecimal security or session token.
Structural	zero_width_unicode	Zero-width characters used to encode and append an 8-character hexadecimal value to an existing text node.
Visible	build_version_string	A plausible software build or version string placed inline within the user-facing page content.
Visible	asset_fingerprint_fn	A hashed filename for a primary asset (e.g., a JS bundle) mimicking static-site build outputs.
Visible	fake_doi	A structurally plausible but synthetic Digital Object Identifier (DOI) used in academic-style content.
Visible	fake_isbn	A plausible 13-digit International Standard Book Number (ISBN) used in bibliographic or e-book contexts.
Visible	order_confirmation_code	A plausible order reference code typically found in transactional or e-commerce confirmation UIs.
Visible	sku_number	A plausible Product Stock Keeping Unit (SKU) identifier.
Visible	short_url_code	A plausible vanity short URL used for navigation or external referencing.
Visible	support_case_id	A numeric support case identifier used in help desk or FAQ documentation.
Visible	trace_id_inline	An inline trace identifier that mimics the output of distributed-tracing and logging systems.
Visible	cache_key_inline	An inline cache key used in technical documentation or system status pages.
Visible	revision_hash_inline	An inline revision hash used to denote document versions in changelogs or wikis.
Visible	session_token_inline	An inline session token that mimics the visual output of analytics or session-tracking tools.

I.1.4 Semantic Canary Universe - HTML + CTF.

Table 8: Taxonomy of Semantic Canaries (K_S) for the HTML dataset. Each marker is a stylistic or structural pattern injected into the HTML source code..

Identifier	Semantic Architecture and Definition
Above-the-Fold Priority	A performance-centric architecture designed to minimize Time to Interactive (TTI) and First Contentful Paint (FCP) by prioritizing only the visual elements the user sees immediately upon load.
Ad Saturated	A monetization-first layout where screen real estate is aggressively partitioned for programmatic advertising, often sacrificing white space and content flow for click-through potential.
Bootstrap Framework	A rigid adherence to the Bootstrap 5 design system, characterized by standardized responsive breakpoints and mobile-first utility classes.
Broken Links	A deceptive structural pattern where the visual intent of an element contradicts its actual destination, often used in phishing or "dark pattern" designs.
Compliance & Legal Info	A footer-heavy semantic block designed to meet regulatory and institutional transparency standards, typically dense with technical terminology.
Highly Informational Page	A content-first structure emphasizing readability, semantic clarity, and long-form prose with minimal visual distractions.
Landing Page Style	A conversion-focused layout designed to drive a single user action through visual storytelling and repeated calls-to-action (CTAs).
Media Consumption Focus	A layout where text is secondary to visual or auditory media, characteristic of streaming platforms or digital portfolios.
SEO Keyword Heavy	An over-optimized structure designed to influence search engine crawlers through high metadata density and frequent keyword repetition.
Shopify Themed	A design signature that mimics the proprietary Liquid-templating architecture and class naming conventions typical of Shopify e-commerce stores.
Sidebar Contextual	A multi-column arrangement where the primary content is flanked by an auxiliary sidebar containing related widgets, author info, or navigation tags.
Transactional Page	A functional UI designed for financial exchange or commerce, characterized by data input fields, order summaries, and cost breakdowns.

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Identifier	Semantic Architecture and Definition
Trust & Performance	A layout clustering social proof indicators, such as brand logos, testimonials, and security badges, to establish immediate credibility.
Urgency Signaling	A psychological-pressure layout using visual cues—such as countdown timers or scarcity notices—to compel immediate user decision-making.
Web 1.0 Design	A retro-style layout utilizing legacy HTML techniques, such as nested tables and deprecated tags, typical of the early internet era.