

Harmony Harness: Multi-Objective Self-Evolution of Agent Harnesses

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Recent work on self-evolving LLM agents treats the agent harness as an optimization target that can be iteratively improved through execution feedback. Existing approaches, however, largely optimize a single objective and evolve the harness as a monolithic artifact, limiting their ability to handle competing goals and to separate transferable design from environment-specific adaptation. We introduce **HARMONY HARNESS**, a framework for *multi-objective, compositional harness evolution*. **HARMONY HARNESS** formulates harness evolution as a multi-objective optimization problem and uses decomposition-based evolutionary search to maintain solutions across different regions of the Pareto frontier, avoiding reliance on a hand-designed structural diversity metric for repository-scale harnesses. In parallel, we introduce factorized evolution operators that separately refine general-purpose harness mechanisms and benchmark-specific adaptations, together with a dynamic composition workflow that integrates them at inference time. Across SecRepoBench and BaxBench, **HARMONY HARNESS** consistently outperforms strong harness-evolution baselines, with gains exceeding 10% on both benchmarks. Our results show that explicitly modeling both objective trade-offs and harness structure yields substantially stronger and more transferable agent evolution than existing single-objective, monolithic approaches.

1. Introduction

A deployed LLM agent wraps a base model in a *harness*: the system prompt, tool set, agent loop, verification gates, and orchestration that collectively determine how underlying capabilities translate into task outcomes. Recent work on *self-evolving harnesses* allows agents to iteratively modify this infrastructure from execution feedback (Hu et al., 2025a; Zhuge et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2026b; Robeyns et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2026a; Qiu et al., 2025; Lee et al., 2026). Existing approaches, however, optimize solely around a *single scalar objective*, such as pass rate on a benchmark. **Harness self-evolution under multiple objectives, in particular with safety treated as an independent axis rather than folded into the success signal, remains unaddressed.**

Extending harness self-evolution from a single objective to multiple objectives is not as simple as adding another reward signal. The challenge arises from **the structure of the Pareto frontier and the possibility of genuine trade-offs between objectives**. Consider functionality and safety. At first glance, the two appear aligned: a stronger coding agent should ideally produce code that both passes its tests and resists exploitation. Yet this alignment need not hold throughout the space of possible harnesses. A harness may improve pass rate by relaxing a verification gate, for example, or improve security by rejecting behaviors that are nevertheless required for functional correctness. Once such conflicts emerge, the evolution procedure must explicitly determine how they should be resolved. Existing formulations handle such tensions poorly: linear scalarization provably misses non-convex Pareto regions¹ regardless of weight choices, and, even where the frontier is convex, it will trade a point of one objective for a cheaper point of the other; delegating trade-offs to the agent leaves compromises

¹The Pareto frontier is the set of non-dominated solutions for which no objective can be improved without degrading at least one other objective.

implicit, unstable, and rarely Pareto-optimal. Constrained optimization (Sinha et al., 2024; Dai et al., 2024) enforces safety thresholds, but reduces the task to constrained single-objective search rather than mapping the trade-off surface. Handling multiple objectives thus requires an explicit mechanism that keeps pressure on *both* axes. Whether the frontier is actually non-convex is an empirical question: on the secure-coding benchmarks we study, better scaffolds often improve functionality and security together (App. G). There, the main value of decomposition is not recovering non-convex regions. It is objective-directed search pressure: each subproblem keeps pushing whichever objective has the largest weighted shortfall from the ideal point, so neither objective can regress unnoticed.

A second limitation of existing harness-evolution methods is structural rather than algorithmic: they evolve the harness as a *monolithic* artifact. Each generation rewrites the repository as a single block against feedback from a single environment; **they do not disentangle general harness design from environment-specific adaptation** (Lee et al., 2026; Yin et al., 2025). In practice, many mechanisms acquired during evolution contain both components. One is a *general capability* that should transfer across environments; the other is the *environment-specific calibration* required to make that capability effective in a particular setting. For example, constructing and executing code inside a container is a broadly useful capability, whereas the choice of image, teardown policy, and handling of benchmark-specific sandbox conventions is environment dependent. Similarly, compressing or truncating tool outputs is a general mechanism, while deciding which portions can safely be omitted depends strongly on whether the output is a compiler log, a fuzzer trace, or a test-runner report. Current methods typically optimize these components jointly against feedback from a single environment. As a result, transferable design choices and benchmark-specific adaptations receive the same reward signal and are encoded into the same monolithic harness. We do not expect the boundary between these two designs to be perfectly discrete; effective capabilities inevitably require some environment-dependent calibration. Nevertheless, explicitly separating the two creates a more useful abstraction: a *general harness* that can transfer across tasks and environments, paired with lightweight *environment-specific components* that specialize it to the execution context at hand.

To address these challenges, we introduce HARMONY HARNESS, a *multi-objective harness evolution* framework built on decomposition-based evolutionary optimization (Li & Zhang, 2009). Rather than collapsing multiple objectives into a single reward, we decompose the objective space using a set of weight vectors, each defining a scalar subproblem corresponding to a subregion of the Pareto frontier, and optimize these subproblems jointly within a shared population. This formulation is particularly well suited to harness evolution. Existing evolutionary systems often require an explicit artifact-level diversity metric to prevent population collapse (Novikov et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025); such metrics (e.g. number of lines of code) are relatively natural for compact artifacts such as a single program, but become difficult to define meaningfully for repository-scale agent harnesses whose variations span prompts, control flow, tools, verification logic, and orchestration. Our decomposition instead gives each subproblem a different objective preference, so selection pressure is diversified by construction, without requiring a hand-designed structural diversity metric. This does not by itself guarantee *behavioral* diversity: when the objectives are positively correlated, or when LLM edits are small and local, the incumbents need not differ in behavior. We find that standard code-level diversity metrics capture behavioral diversity only partially for harnesses (appendix). Maintaining a bounded set of representative solutions also avoids carrying an ever-growing archive of artifacts into the proposer context, reducing the context and search overhead of evolution.

We instantiate dual-objective self-evolution in *secure code generation*, where functionality requires passing unit tests and security requires neutralizing proof-of-concept exploits. Our findings are: 1) **Limits of Single-Objective Evolution:** Optimizing solely for code functionality yields only marginal, incidental security gains. 2) **Suboptimality of Naive Formulations:** Naive combinations, such as weighted-sum scalarization or sequential evolution, stall below the full framework; the margin

comes from combining decomposition with factored evolving and dynamic orchestration, not from the aggregation rule alone. 3) **Effectiveness and Transferability:** Our multi-objective framework consistently outperforms baselines and generalizes across benchmarks with identical dual objectives. 4) **Benefits of Factorized Harness and Dynamic Orchestration:** Factorized harness evolution and adaptive orchestration outperform static, fixed-pipeline evolutionary workflows.

2. Related Work

Self-evolving and self-improving agents. A growing body of work lets agents improve from their own experience via reflection, memory, skill libraries, and workflow updates (Wang et al., 2024; Shinn et al., 2023; Sun et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2024; Ou et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2025b; Hu et al., 2025b). Voyager (Wang et al., 2024) grows a skill library from iterative code; Reflexion (Shinn et al., 2023) uses verbal self-critique over failed trajectories; AdaPlanner (Sun et al., 2023) adapts plans from environmental feedback. Two systems are conceptual predecessors of ours; we borrow ideas from them, not their algorithms or code. GEPA (Agrawal et al., 2026) performs reflective prompt evolution over a maintained Pareto frontier of prompts; we lift the idea of a maintained frontier from prompts to whole harnesses and from task instances to a (functionality, security) objective space. ADAS (Hu et al., 2025a) has a meta-agent program new agent designs in code, one level up from the prompt; we share its view of the agent as an editable program, but our search procedure is MOEA/D (Li & Zhang, 2009) with LLM variation operators (§4.1), not ADAS’s archive-based meta-agent search. Closest to our code setting, the Darwin Gödel Machine (Zhang et al., 2026b) and meta-harness (Lee et al., 2026) self-improve a coding agent by a *monolithic* loop—evolve the agent’s code as one block. All of these systems (i) optimize a *single* objective and evaluate only functionality, and (ii) do not separate reusable from environment-specific components in *what* is evolved.

Safety during evolution, and safety as a constraint. SoS (Sinha et al., 2024) jointly evolves a prompt for utility and safety, but evolves only a single prompt slot; safety gains at one position can be undone elsewhere. More broadly, multi-objective alignment treats helpfulness/harmlessness trade-offs as joint reward optimization (Askell et al., 2021; Bai et al., 2022a,b; Ramé et al., 2023; Zhou et al., 2024), whereas constrained approaches argue safety is better expressed as a hard constraint than a reward term (Achiam et al., 2017; Dai et al., 2024). Rather than demoting safety to a feasibility condition on a functionality objective, we keep it as an objective in its own right and search the frontier by decomposition, lifted from a single prompt to an entire harness.

3. Problem Formulation

Let $\mathcal{H}$ denote the space of agent harnesses, and let $\mathcal{D} = \{t_n = (x_n, p_n)\}_{n=1}^M$ be a set of M evaluation tasks, where x_n is the task specification and p_n is the corresponding security policy. Executing harness $H \in \mathcal{H}$ on task t_n induces a distribution over trajectories, $\tau \sim P_H(\tau \mid x_n)$, reflecting the stochasticity of the underlying agent. The agent only sees x_n ; the policy p_n (e.g., the exploit) is hidden at solve time and enters only through the evaluation oracle $S(\tau, p_n)$. We evaluate each harness along two execution-grounded objectives, functionality and security: $\mathbf{f}(H) = (f_{\text{func}}(H), f_{\text{sec}}(H))$, defined in B.

Joint metric. Our headline metric is the rate at which a single trajectory is *both* functional and secure:

$$f_{\wedge}(H) = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{n=1}^M \mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim P_H(\cdot \mid x_n)} [F(\tau, x_n) S(\tau, p_n)]. \quad (1)$$

The search optimizes the two marginals $(f_{\text{func}}, f_{\text{sec}})$ rather than $f_{\wedge}$ directly. The joint rate is bounded

on both sides by the marginals (the Fréchet bounds),

$$\max(0, f_{\text{func}}(H) + f_{\text{sec}}(H) - 1) \leq f_{\wedge}(H) \leq \min(f_{\text{func}}(H), f_{\text{sec}}(H)), \quad (2)$$

so raising both marginals raises the ceiling on $f_{\wedge}$ and, once their sum exceeds 1, also forces it up from below. A Tchebycheff subproblem (Eq. 4, §4.1) acts on the objective with the largest *weighted* shortfall from the ideal point; for the balanced weight $\lambda = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ this is the currently worse objective, which is the one that caps $f_{\wedge}$ through the upper bound. Optimizing the marginals does not guarantee joint success: two harnesses can have the same marginals and very different $f_{\wedge}$ if they succeed on different tasks. We therefore report $f_{\wedge}$ and the gap $\min(f_{\text{func}}, f_{\text{sec}}) - f_{\wedge}$ for every method (§5.1). We keep the marginals as the search objectives because they tell the proposer *which* property failed on a task, whereas $f_{\wedge}$ alone does not.

Selecting the deployed harness. Comparisons against single-harness baselines, held-out evaluation, and transfer need one harness per run. Let $\mathcal{U}_g$ be the set of children evaluated in generation g , and let $\mathcal{U} = \bigcup_g \mathcal{U}_g$. After evolution we select the *most balanced* child of the run,

$$H^{\dagger} = \arg \max_{H \in \mathcal{U}} \min(\hat{f}_{\text{func}}(H), \hat{f}_{\text{sec}}(H)), \quad (3)$$

computed on the search split only, with ties resolved in favor of the earlier generation. The candidate need not be an incumbent at the end of the run: a child that was later replaced under one subproblem’s preference can still be the most balanced one overall. The held-out splits are never used for selection. Eq. 3 is the Tchebycheff scalarization (Eq. 4, §4.1) with equal weights $\lambda = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ and the utopia point $(1, 1)$ as reference, since $\arg \min_H \max_j \frac{1}{2}(1 - \hat{f}_j(H)) = \arg \max_H \min_j \hat{f}_j(H)$.

4. Multi-Objective and Factored Harness Evolution

Given the multi-objective formulation in §3, HARMONY HARNESS evolves a population of repository-scale agent harnesses toward different regions of the Pareto frontier. The framework combines two complementary ideas. First, we adapt decomposition-based multi-objective evolution to LLM agent harnesses: a set of objective preferences defines multiple scalar subproblems, each maintaining an incumbent harness for a different trade-off between objectives. An LLM proposer generates candidate harnesses from execution-grounded feedback, and candidates selectively replace incumbents in nearby subproblems according to their respective objectives. Second, we factorize the variation process to distinguish reusable harness mechanisms from environment-specific adaptation. General-purpose and environment-focused modifications are evolved through different operators and dynamically composed at inference time. Figure 1 illustrates the complete evolution loop.

Search Space: The Harness as the Genome Unlike program-evolution methods that optimize a compact code artifact, the individual in HARMONY HARNESS is an *entire agent harness*. We freeze only a minimal interface required by the evaluator; the remaining harness—including prompts, tools, skills, control logic, verification mechanisms, and orchestration—constitutes the evolvable genome.

Concretely, the search space contains three major classes of components, $\mathcal{K} = \{\text{tools, skills, logic}\}$, where logic also covers orchestration. *Tools* provide executable capabilities available inside the agent loop, including environment interaction and verification utilities. *Skills* encode reusable domain knowledge, such as debugging procedures or repair strategies, that can be retrieved when relevant. Finally, *logic and orchestration* determine how these capabilities are used, including the system prompt, agent loop, verification gates, and workflow connecting individual reasoning and execution stages. Because the proposer operates directly over the harness repository, evolution may modify not only




Figure 1 | **Overview of HARMONY HARNESS.** (a) The functionality–security space is split into weighted subproblems. Each subproblem keeps a harness and together they approximate the Pareto frontier. (b) An LLM proposer diagnoses failures and forms a hypothesis. Operators edit tools, skills, or logic, and place each edit in either the general scope or the environment-specific scope. The child is validated before evaluation. (c) At inference, a composition agent picks components from the general and environment-specific pools to build a task-specific harness.

local instructions but also the high-level structure of the agent. The initial harness H_0 is a lightweight but functional ReAct-style base (details in Appendix E).

4.1. Multi-Objective Evolution by Decomposition

Directly maintaining a single “best” harness is ill-defined under multiple objectives for two reasons: (1) evolutionary search must maintain sufficient population diversity to avoid premature convergence; and (2) different harnesses may realize distinct Pareto-optimal trade-offs. We therefore instantiate harness evolution using a decomposition strategy based on MOEA/D (Li & Zhang, 2009).

Decomposition. Let $\Lambda = \{\lambda^1, \dots, \lambda^N\}$, $\lambda_j^i \geq 0$, $\sum_{j=1}^m \lambda_j^i = 1$, denote a set of N weight vectors spanning the m -objective simplex. In our bi-objective setting ($m = 2$), the weight vectors are chosen to be uniformly distributed along the security–functionality trade-off. Each λ^i defines a scalar optimization subproblem and is associated with an incumbent harness H_i . Collectively, the N subproblems cover different objective preferences and maintain a finite set of representative solutions that approximate the Pareto frontier.

We maintain an ideal point $\mathbf{z}^* = (z_1^*, \dots, z_m^*)$, where $z_j^* = \max_H \hat{f}_j(H)$ is the best value of objective j observed over all harnesses evaluated so far. Given a weight vector $\lambda^i \in \Lambda$, we define the corresponding subproblem using the weighted Tchebycheff scalarization

$$g^{\text{te}}(H \mid \lambda^i, \mathbf{z}^*) = \max_{j \in \{1, \dots, m\}} \lambda_j^i \left| z_j^* - \hat{f}_j(H) \right|, \quad (4)$$

where lower values indicate a smaller weighted deviation from the ideal point. Conceptually, the solution associated with subproblem i is

$$H_i^* = \arg \min_{H \in \mathcal{H}} g^{\text{te}}(H \mid \lambda^i, \mathbf{z}^*), \quad (5)$$

and during evolution we maintain an incumbent H_i as the current approximation to H_i^* .

This decomposition is fundamentally different from optimizing a single weighted-sum objective. Importantly, **the scalarization in Eq. 4 is local to a subproblem**: HARMONY HARNESS does not replace the multi-objective problem with one globally authoritative scalar reward. Different subproblems preserve different objective preferences, so a harness favored by a security-oriented subproblem need not compete directly with one favored by a functionality-oriented subproblem.

Neighborhood evolution and replacement. For each subproblem i , we define a neighborhood $B(i)$ as the set of the T weight vectors in Λ closest to λ^i under Euclidean distance. Variation is single-parent: the child for subproblem i is produced from its own incumbent H_i . The neighborhood is used in two places. First, if a subproblem stalls, meaning its parent and failure digest are unchanged from the previous generation, we breed instead from the neighbor with the best Tchebycheff value under λ^i . Second, the neighborhood defines which incumbents the child may replace (below). Both rely on the intuition that nearby objective preferences benefit from similar harness designs. The proposer never receives more than one full parent repository, which keeps its context bounded.

Suppose variation produces a child harness H_c for subproblem i . After evaluating H_c on all objectives and updating the ideal point $\mathbf{z}^*$, we consider H_c as a replacement candidate for each neighboring subproblem $l \in B(i)$:

$$H_l \leftarrow H_c \quad \text{if} \quad g^{\text{te}}(H_c \mid \lambda^l, \mathbf{z}^*) < g^{\text{te}}(H_l \mid \lambda^l, \mathbf{z}^*). \quad (6)$$

Thus, a candidate discovered for one subproblem may improve several nearby objective preferences, while incumbents associated with substantially different trade-offs are preserved. Standard MOEA/D bounds the number of incumbents one child may replace by $n_r \leq T$ (Li & Zhang, 2009). We cap replacement at $n_r = 2$, so a single child can replace at most two neighbouring incumbents.

Objective-induced diversity and bounded proposer context. This decomposition is particularly well suited to repository-scale harness evolution. Existing evolutionary methods (Novikov et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025) often maintain diversity using explicit artifact-level distance measures, which are more natural when each candidate is a compact program for a single task. For repository-scale harnesses, however, structural distance is a poor proxy for behavioral diversity: two repositories may implement nearly identical behavior with very different code organization, while small changes to a prompt, verification gate, or orchestration rule can substantially alter behavior. Designing a reliable hand-crafted diversity metric is therefore difficult when candidates vary jointly over prompts, tools, control flow, verification, and workflow structure. In HARMONY HARNESS, each incumbent is preserved because it is the best found so far for a distinct objective preference, not because it is structurally distant under a hand-designed metric. This makes diversity of *selection pressure* hold by construction. Diversity of *behavior* does not follow automatically. It also requires the objectives to trade off and the LLM operators to make edits that change behavior rather than wording. Measuring this is itself an open problem for self-coding harnesses. Our offline analysis (App. J) finds that standard program-diversity metrics (token, line and AST distance, and edit labels) barely track behaviour: code distance and objective distance are essentially uncorrelated. The metrics also cannot see diversity that is decided at run time, such as the distinct per-task DAGs planned by the orchestrator. Among them, AST distance is the most informative, since it ignores cosmetic rewrites. We therefore treat diversity as something to monitor, not something decomposition guarantees. **The population size is also bounded by the number of subproblems**, avoiding an ever-growing archive and reducing the evolutionary context that must be maintained.

4.2. Factorized Harness Evolution

For a target subproblem i , the proposer receives a single parent harness, the incumbent H_i (or a neighbor when the subproblem stalls), the objective preference λ^i , and the execution feedback $\mathcal{E}_i$

collected from running that parent. The feedback contains aggregate objective statistics together with sampled execution artifacts, such as compiler errors, failing tests, and crash traces. Before modifying the harness, the proposer first diagnoses the observed failures and formulates a concrete hypothesis for improvement under the current objective preference.

Why factorize harness evolution? A repository-scale harness contains heterogeneous components, including tools, skills, prompts, verification logic, control flow, and orchestration, that play different roles in agent behavior. An observed failure often suggests a change to only a subset of these components. Treating the entire repository as a single rewrite target can therefore couple an intended repair with unrelated changes elsewhere in the harness. More importantly, because evolutionary feedback is collected from a particular benchmark, unrestricted rewriting does not explicitly distinguish reusable mechanisms from adaptations that exploit properties specific to the current benchmark.

Factorized harness representation. We therefore factorize harness evolution along two complementary dimensions: *component type* and *adaptation scope*. Component factorization localizes an update to a semantically meaningful part of the harness, while scope factorization provides an explicit representation for reusable and environment-specific components. This organization serves as an inductive bias; we do not assume that either decomposition is unique or theoretically exact. Given execution feedback $\mathcal{E}_i$, the proposer first diagnoses the observed failure and formulates an improvement hypothesis: $d_i = Q(\mathcal{E}_i)$, $h_i = \mathcal{G}(d_i, \lambda^i)$, where Q and $\mathcal{G}$ denote the diagnosis and hypothesis steps of the proposer, d_i denotes the failure diagnosis, and h_i denotes the proposed improvement hypothesis. Based on this hypothesis, the proposer selects the component class to modify, $k_i = \pi_{\text{comp}}(h_i) \in \mathcal{K}$, where $\mathcal{K}$ is the set of component classes defined in §4. The proposer then assigns the scope of the modification through a component-specific scope assignment $\mathcal{R}_{k_i}$:

$$s_i = \mathcal{R}_{k_i}(H_i, h_i) \in \Sigma, \quad (7)$$

where $\Sigma = \{\text{gen}, \text{env}\}$. Here, k_i determines *what component to modify*, while s_i determines *where the resulting modification should reside*. *gen* refers to a general harness component, and *env* means environment-specific. The corresponding component-scope update is then applied to produce the child harness of §4.1: $H_c = \mathcal{O}_{k_i, s_i}(H_i; h_i)$. Here, $\mathcal{O}_{k_i, s_i}$ is a **factorized variation operator** that directly modifies the harness. The complete operator details are provided in Appendix E. The distinction in Eq. 7 is operational rather than semantic. In the implementation, components are stored under explicit general or benchmark-specific scopes. For example, tools and skills may each contain a general implementation together with benchmark-specific variants. The proposer therefore makes two decisions when modifying the harness: which component to change, and whether the resulting change should reside in the general scope or in an environment-specific scope. This assignment is not fixed and may be revised during evolution.

Generalization as cross-scope reorganization. The boundary between general and environment-specific components is itself allowed to evolve. We introduce a dedicated *generalize* operator that inspects the current harness organization and reorganizes components across the two scopes when their existing placement introduces unnecessary specialization. Implementation details for this operator are provided in Appendix E.3.

Validation and recovery. Every proposed child is validated before objective evaluation in three stages. The details are described in Appendix E.5.

4.3. Dynamic Composition at Inference

Factorized evolution produces a pool of reusable components $\mathcal{H}^{\text{gen}}$ together with environment-specific components $\mathcal{H}_e^{\text{env}}$. We do not execute the complete union of these components for every task. Even




Figure 2 | Evolution results per split on (a) SecRepoBench and (b) BaxBench.

within the same benchmark, different tasks may benefit from different tools, skills, verification procedures, or control strategies. At inference time, a dedicated composition agent constructs the active harness conditioned on both the current environment and the current task. Given an environment e , a task x , and the available component pools, the composition agent generates a task-specific DAG,

$$\mathcal{A}_{e,x} = \pi_{\phi}(e, x, \mathcal{H}^{\text{gen}}, \mathcal{H}_e^{\text{env}}), \quad (8)$$

where π_{ϕ} denotes the composition policy and $\mathcal{A}_{e,x}$ contains the components activated for the current task. The executable harness is then instantiated as $H^{(e,x)} = C(\mathcal{A}_{e,x})$, where C denotes the runtime composition procedure. The composition agent does not modify the evolved components; it only determines which components to activate for the current environment and task. This allows general mechanisms to remain available across environments without being invoked unconditionally, while environment-specific mechanisms are loaded only when they are relevant to the current task. Details are provided in Appendix F.

5. Experiments

For each benchmark, we partition tasks into *evolve*, *held-out-ID*, and *held-out-OOD* splits. The evolve split provides the execution feedback used during harness evolution, whereas both held-out splits remain inaccessible to the proposer and selection procedure. For SecRepoBench, we use 30/30/30 tasks; for BaxBench, we use 28/28/28 tasks and evolve a separate harness population on each benchmark. We report **secure-pass@1**, defined as the conjunction of functional and security success, $F \wedge S$. Unless otherwise specified, both the harness proposer and the underlying task-solving agent use `gemini-3.6-flash`. Appendix C describes the benchmarks in detail.

5.1. Main comparison against self-evolution baselines

We first compare six evolution regimes under an identical seed harness and grader. **Baseline** is the un-evolved harness. The three **meta-harness** (Lee et al., 2026) variants are its monolithic “summarize→rewrite” loop driven by (i) functionality *and* security, (ii) functionality only, or (iii) security only. **DGM** (Zhang et al., 2026b) scalarizes the two objectives into a single reward. **HH** (HARMONY HARNESS) is ours. Each method is evolved on the evolve split only and then evaluated, without further evolution, on both held-out splits. Figure 2 summarizes the outcome per split on the two benchmarks; the underlying numbers are tabulated in Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix G.

Table 1 | **How much evolved security survives a distribution shift.** Δ_{evolve} is a method’s security gain over the un-evolved baseline on the split it evolved on; Δ_{OUT} is its gain over the same baseline on held-out-OUT; $\text{retained} = \Delta_{\text{OUT}}/\Delta_{\text{evolve}}$. Mean over 3 runs.

Method	SecRepoBench			BaxBench		
	Δ_{evolve}	Δ_{OUT}	retained	Δ_{evolve}	Δ_{OUT}	retained
Meta-harness (func-only)	+3.3	−3.4	−103%	+3.6	−7.1	−197%
Meta-harness (sec-only)	+13.3	+3.3	25%	+17.9	+3.6	20%
Meta-harness (func & sec)	+16.6	+3.3	20%	+14.3	+3.6	25%
DGM (func & sec, scalar)	+20.0	+0.0	0%	+10.7	+3.6	34%
HARMONY HARNESS (func & sec)	+36.6	+20.0	55%	+21.4	+10.7	50%

Table 2 | Evolution strategies on SecRepoBench. Func/Sec/F&S in %. Mean over 3 runs.

Strategy	Acceptance rule	Func	Sec	F&S
Static (no evolution)	—	66.7	56.7	46.7
Functionality-only	accept if $F \uparrow$	73.3	60.0	56.7
Safety-only	accept if viol. $\downarrow$	70.0	66.7	46.7
Sequential (func→sec, sec→func)	one objective per generation, then the other	70.0	76.7	70.0
Prompt-merge variants	merge func & safety prompts	66.7	60.0	50.0
Joint-weighted ($\alpha \in \{.25, .5, .75\}$)	$\alpha F + (1 - \alpha)S$	70.0	73.3	70.0
Constrained (hard ϵ)	Achiam et al. (2017)	70.0	60.0	60.0
Separated func/safety combination	dual harness combination	60.0	60.0	53.3
HARMONY HARNESS	Tchebycheff (Eq. 6)	76.7	93.3	76.7

Table 1 crystallizes the central failure mode we study: baseline methods improve security on the optimization distribution yet relinquish most or all of those gains under distribution shift—with larger in-distribution gains often corresponding to larger reversals, as exemplified by DGM, which achieves the strongest SecRepoBench security improvement among the baselines during evolution but retains none of it out-of-distribution—motivating our treatment of safety as an explicit optimization axis evaluated beyond the evolve distribution rather than as a scalar reward measured only in-distribution. HH is best on every split of both benchmarks: 76.7 F&S on the SecRepoBench evolve split, 86.7 on held-out IN (vs. 50.0 for baseline), and 66.7 on held-out OUT (vs. 36.7), and an average F&S of 61.3 on BaxBench against 42.9 for baseline and 52.4 for the strongest meta-harness variant. Notably the largest *relative* margins are out-of-distribution, which is what factorizing the harness into general and environment-specific components is meant to achieve.

Comparison with possible multi-objective evolving strategies. In Table 2, we compare with various baselines with the same initial harness, evolve split, token budget, and settings, through the alternative ways of combining the two objectives (sequential, weighted sum, hard constraint), and a variant that evolves the two harnesses separately and combines them afterwards. Four readings stand out. **(1) Single-objective evolution does not solve the joint problem:** functionality-only lifts F&S from the static 46.7 to 56.7 but leaves security at 60.0, while safety-only buys 10.0 points of security (56.7 → 66.7) that never convert into a single additional secure-pass—its F&S stays at the static 46.7. **(2) With factored evolving and dynamic orchestration held fixed, the acceptance rule matters.** Under these matched conditions, Tchebycheff replacement reaches 76.7 F&S, against 70.0 for both the weighted sum and sequential evolution, 60.0 for the hard constraint, and 53.3 for separately evolved harnesses. Factored evolving and dynamic orchestration are also necessary: the component ablation in Table 5 in App. G adds them one at a time on top of Tchebycheff joint evolution, lifting F&S from 63.3 to 66.7 and then to 76.7, so each part of the method contributes and only the full




Figure 3 | Cross-benchmark transfer. Each cell is one (optimized-on $\times$ evaluated-on) pair, split into meta-harness (left) and HARMONY HARNESS (right); dashed outlines mark in-domain cells, solid outlines zero-shot transfer.

design reaches the headline result. **(3) A hard feasibility constraint acts as a target rather than a direction.** Constrained acceptance holds functionality at 70.0 but leaves security at 60.0, only 3.3 above never evolving at all. This is the behaviour an ϵ -threshold rule predicts: it rejects anything below the bar and is indifferent among everything above it, so evolution stops improving safety the moment safety becomes feasible, whereas Tchebycheff replacement keeps pulling on whichever objective has the largest weighted shortfall. **(4) Generalization: real execution feedback beats pattern-matching.** The central positive result is on *held-out* tasks (Table 14 in App. G). Per-generation bests of the execution-feedback variant improve combined F&S from the baseline’s 43.3 to 58.3, whereas the baseline *regresses* to 35.0. The gain concentrates on **held-out OUT** (unseen crash types), where real exploit feedback lets a harness stop *unfamiliar* vulnerabilities instead of pattern-matching known ones; the proposed method reaches 66.7 out-of-distribution and 76.7 combined. Consulting ground truth, not memorizing a distribution, is what generalizes.

Dynamic orchestration vs. a fixed pipeline. Table 8 in App. G reports dynamic-workflow vs. linear-pipeline on BaxBench at matched harness and budget. Per-task planning is worth +10.7 points of secure-pass and +3.6 of functional-pass for an 8% token overhead (58k to 63k) and 1.2 extra steps on average—the orchestrator spends more only where it helps. Figure 8 in the appendix shows what it actually plans: the seven distinct DAG shapes emitted over 28 BaxBench tasks. The modal plan (39% of tasks) is a five-node fan-out that runs `build_verify`, `endpoint_check`, and `security_audit` in parallel and joins into a single `edit_fix`; harder tasks get 6–8 nodes with conditional `when-guarded` `shell_probe` and repair loops that only fire if an earlier check fails. A fixed pipeline must either pay for those extra stages on every task or never have them; the orchestrator recovers both ends of that trade-off, which is where the F&S gap comes from.

5.2. Cross-benchmark transfer

We evaluate each evolved harness zero-shot on the other benchmark’s search split (Figure 3, Table 12 in App. G); the target benchmark is never seen during evolution. Meta-harness transfers poorly in both directions: it drops to 39.3 F&S on BaxBench (baseline 42.9) and to 36.7 on SecRepoBench (baseline 46.7). HARMONY HARNESS improves over the baseline in both directions, reaching 57.1 on BaxBench (+14.2) and 70.0 on SecRepoBench (+23.3), close to the 76.7 it obtains when evolved in-domain. We attribute this to the separation between general and benchmark-specific components: only the general scope is loaded on the target benchmark, so benchmark-specific fixes do not carry over.

CWEval. In Table 11 in App. G, the harness evolved on BaxBench is run, again with no further evolution, on CWEval (Peng et al., 2025), which changes not just the benchmark but the *task format*:

generate a single function from a natural-language spec, graded by functional tests and a separate security oracle, over 357 instances in five languages. **(1) It greatly improves security, which suggests the harness transfers to a benchmark it has never seen.** **(2) It holds in every language, including ones BaxBench does not contain.** Per-language F&S improves everywhere, from +10.1 (JavaScript) to +19.3 (Go). C and C++ are not among BaxBench’s six languages, yet they are 156 of the 357 instances and gain +13.9 and +14.3, which suggests the generalization of the HARMONY HARNESS. **(3) Functionality pays for part of it.** Functional pass rate falls on three of the five languages (C++, JavaScript, Python), and it gives up 2.0 points of functionality for 15.5 points of security and 14.3 points of F&S.

6. Conclusion

Self-evolving agents optimized for a single objective quietly sacrifice the other, and specialize to one distribution at the expense of safety on others. We recast self-evolution as multi-objective search over an entire agent harness, with safety kept as a *separate axis* of evolution rather than a reward term to be averaged away. In secure code generation—where both objectives are grounded in real execution—joint, harness-level evolution improves security and functionality together and, with execution-grounded feedback, generalizes to unseen vulnerabilities, while naive feedback-driven evolution falls back. The factorized general and environment-specific harness further improves the in-domain and cross-benchmark generalization.

AI use statement

In this work, we used generative AI tools for editing (grammar, spelling, and word choice), for drafting sections of the paper, for implementing standard methods in our codebase, and for retrieval and discovery of related work: candidate references were surfaced with AI assistance and every one of them was then read and verified against its primary source by an author before being cited or described. We did not use generative AI tools to generate research ideas, or to generate or fabricate experimental results. All AI-assisted text was reviewed and edited by the authors; all AI-assisted code was read, executed, and tested by at least two authors, and every number reported in this paper comes from a run we performed ourselves. Generative AI was not used as a subject of study, as a research participant, or as an evaluator of our results. We take responsibility for the final content of this work, including all text, claims, and artifacts produced with the aid of generative AI.

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A. Notation

Table 3 summarizes the notation used throughout the paper.

B. More Equations of the Problem Formulation.

where

$$f_{\text{func}}(H) = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{n=1}^M \mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim P_H(\cdot | x_n)} [F(\tau, x_n)], \quad (9)$$

and

$$f_{\text{sec}}(H) = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{n=1}^M \mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim P_H(\cdot | x_n)} [S(\tau, p_n)]. \quad (10)$$

Here $F(\tau, x_n) \in \{0, 1\}$ indicates whether the solution produced in τ passes the functional tests of x_n , and $S(\tau, p_n) \in \{0, 1\}$ indicates whether it neutralizes the proof-of-concept exploit specified by p_n . We write $f_1 = f_{\text{func}}$ and $f_2 = f_{\text{sec}}$ when indexing objectives by $j \in \{1, \dots, m\}$, with $m = 2$; both objectives are maximized. In practice, we estimate these objectives using K sampled trajectories $\{\tau_{n,k}\}_{k=1}^K$ for each task:

$$\hat{f}_{\text{func}}(H) = \frac{1}{MK} \sum_{n=1}^M \sum_{k=1}^K F(\tau_{n,k}, x_n), \quad \hat{f}_{\text{sec}}(H) = \frac{1}{MK} \sum_{n=1}^M \sum_{k=1}^K S(\tau_{n,k}, p_n). \quad (11)$$

Both estimates are pass rates in $[0, 1]$, so the two objectives are on the same scale and need no further normalization before scalarization (§4.1).

For two harnesses $H, H' \in \mathcal{H}$, H **Pareto-dominates** H' , written $H \succ H'$, if $f_j(H) \geq f_j(H')$ for every objective j , with strict inequality for at least one. The Pareto set is

$$\mathcal{P}^* = \{H \in \mathcal{H} \mid \nexists H' \in \mathcal{H} : H' \succ H\}, \quad (12)$$

and its image $\{\mathbf{f}(H) : H \in \mathcal{P}^*\}$ defines the Pareto front. Our goal is to evolve a finite set of harnesses that provides a high-quality approximation to this front.

Table 3 | Summary of notation.

Symbol	Meaning
<i>Problem formulation (§3)</i>	
$\mathcal{H}, H$	Space of agent harnesses; a harness
$\mathcal{D} = \{t_n\}_{n=1}^M$	Evaluation task set of M tasks
$t_n = (x_n, p_n)$	Task n : task specification x_n and security policy p_n
$\tau \sim P_H(\tau x_n)$	Trajectory of harness H on task t_n (conditioned on the visible spec x_n)
$F(\tau, x_n) \in \{0, 1\}$	Functional success: the solution passes the tests of x_n
$S(\tau, p_n) \in \{0, 1\}$	Security success: the solution neutralizes the exploit of p_n
$\mathbf{f}(H) = (f_{\text{func}}, f_{\text{sec}})$	Expected functionality and security; $f_1 = f_{\text{func}}, f_2 = f_{\text{sec}}$
$\hat{f}_j, K, \tau_{n,k}$	Monte Carlo estimate of f_j from K sampled trajectories $\tau_{n,k}$ per task
m, j	Number of objectives ($m = 2$); objective index
$H \succ H', \mathcal{P}^*$	Pareto dominance; Pareto set
$g, \mathcal{U}_g, \mathcal{U}$	Generation index; children evaluated in generation g ; all evaluated children
$H^\dagger$	Deployed harness: most balanced child in $\mathcal{U}$ on the search split (Eq. 3)
<i>Decomposition-based evolution (§4–§4.1)</i>	
$\mathcal{K}$	Component classes {tools, skills, logic} (logic includes orchestration)
H_0	Initial (seed) harness
$\Lambda = \{\lambda^1, \dots, \lambda^N\}$	N weight vectors on the m -objective simplex, one per subproblem
i, λ_j^i	Subproblem index; weight of objective j in subproblem i
H_i, H_i^*	Incumbent harness of subproblem i ; its (conceptual) optimum
$\mathbf{z}^*, z_j^*$	Ideal point; best observed value of objective j
$g^{\text{te}}(H \lambda^i, \mathbf{z}^*)$	Weighted Tchebycheff scalarization of subproblem i (lower is better)
$B(i), T, l$	Neighborhood of subproblem i ; its size; neighbor index $l \in B(i)$
H_c	Child harness produced by variation
<i>Factorized evolution (§4.2)</i>	
$\mathcal{E}_i$	Execution feedback collected from the parent of subproblem i
$\mathcal{Q}, d_i$	Diagnosis step; failure diagnosis $d_i = \mathcal{Q}(\mathcal{E}_i)$
$\mathcal{G}, h_i$	Hypothesis step; improvement hypothesis $h_i = \mathcal{G}(d_i, \lambda^i)$
$\pi_{\text{comp}}, k_i \in \mathcal{K}$	Component selection; selected component class
$\Sigma = \{\text{gen}, \text{env}\}$	Adaptation scopes: general and environment-specific
$\mathcal{R}_{k_i}, s_i \in \Sigma$	Component-specific scope assignment; selected scope
$\mathcal{O}_{k,s}$	Variation operator editing component class k within scope s
$\mathcal{O}_{\text{generalize}}$	Cross-scope operator moving components between gen and env
$\Pi = (\mathcal{O}_1, \dots, \mathcal{O}_L)$	Ordered operator plan of length L
$H_c^{(\ell)}$	Candidate after the ℓ -th operator; $H_c^{(0)} = H_i, H_c = H_c^{(L)}$
<i>Dynamic composition (§4.3)</i>	
e, x	Execution environment (benchmark); task within it
$\mathcal{H}^{\text{gen}}, \mathcal{H}_e^{\text{env}}$	Pools of general and environment-specific components
$\mathcal{H}_k^{\text{gen}}, \mathcal{H}_{k,e}^{\text{env}}$	Component pools restricted to class k
$\pi_\phi, \mathcal{A}_{e,x}$	Composition policy; components activated for (e, x)
$C, H^{(e,x)}$	Runtime composition procedure; executable harness for (e, x)
<i>Evaluation and overfitting gate (§5, App. K)</i>	
$F \wedge S$	Secure-pass@1: functional and secure on the same task
$\Delta_{\text{evolve}}, \Delta_{\text{OUT}}$	Security (f_{sec}) gain over baseline on the evolve split and on held-out OUT (Table 1)
$\delta, \rho(\delta), \theta$	Parent-to-child diff; judged overfitting risk; rejection threshold
C, C_q^+, n_C	Admitted child; its copy with injected overfit of type q ; number of children
$s_{\text{evolve}}, s_{\text{ho}}$	Secure-pass@1 on the evolve split and on held-out IN $\cup$ OUT
$\Delta_{\text{evolve}}^\wedge, \Delta_{\text{ho}}^\wedge, \Delta_{\text{gap}}$	Secure-pass@1 gain of C^+ over C on the evolve and held-out splits; generalization gap $\Delta_{\text{evolve}}^\wedge - \Delta_{\text{ho}}^\wedge$
<i>Population diversity (App. J)</i>	
g_{sh}	Token g_{sh} -gram (shingle) length used by the diversity measure (not to be confused with the generation index g)

C. Implementation Details

Benchmarks and Setup. We conduct our main experiments on two complementary secure-code benchmarks: **SecRepoBench** (Dilgren et al., 2025) and **BaxBench** (Vero et al., 2025). SecRepoBench evaluates repository-level secure code completion in real-world C/C++ projects: given a masked code region and repository context, an agent must produce a patch that preserves functional correctness while eliminating a known vulnerability, with both properties verified through execution-based unit tests and proof-of-concept exploits. BaxBench instead evaluates the generation of complete backend applications, testing functional behavior with end-to-end test suites and security against executable attacks. Together, the two benchmarks cover substantially different settings—repository-level program repair and application-level generation—while exposing the same underlying functionality–security trade-off. To assess transfer beyond the environments, we additionally evaluate evolved harnesses on **CWEval** (Peng et al., 2025), an outcome-driven secure code-generation benchmark that jointly evaluates functional correctness and vulnerability-specific security using executable tests.

Baselines. Meta-harness (Lee et al., 2026) and DGM (Zhang et al., 2026b) are not reimplementations: both run from their authors’ released code, with our benchmarks and grader plugged in as the evaluation.

Repeats and effective denominators. Every reported rate is the mean of **three independent runs**. Grading depends on live infrastructure—a task is scored only if its ARVO image pulls and its build and exploit probe complete—and a small number of tasks intermittently fail for reasons unrelated to the harness under test (registry pull failures, and timeouts caused by contention on the local CPU during heavy rebuilds such as `ffmpeg`). Those tasks are excluded from the run in which they failed, so the effective denominator of a cell is at most, and occasionally below, the 30 (SecRepoBench) or 28 (BaxBench) tasks in its split; this is why some rates are not integer multiples of $1/30$ or $1/28$. Infrastructure failures are independent of the method being evaluated, but they are not independent across methods.

Every row in the lower block of Table 2 shares the full configuration’s factored evolving (§4.2) and dynamic orchestration (§4.3).

D. Details for Decomposition

A linear scalarization, $\sum_j \lambda_j^i f_j(H)$, can recover only supported Pareto-optimal solutions and may therefore miss entire Pareto-optimal regions when the frontier is non-convex. In contrast, the weighted Tchebycheff formulation does not rely on convexity of the Pareto frontier and can recover solutions in such regions. This guarantee matters only when the objectives actually trade off. On our benchmarks the observed fronts are narrow: on the SecRepoBench search split the front holds two non-dominated harnesses in early generations, and in the last generation one harness is best on both objectives (Table 13, §G.1). What decomposition still provides there is a search direction: each subproblem measures progress by its worst weighted shortfall from $\mathbf{z}^*$, so a child that improves one objective by giving up the other is not accepted. Moreover, each λ^i defines an independent search direction: no single scalarization is treated as the global objective, and the population jointly maintains solutions corresponding to different regions of the frontier.

E. Implementation Details for Factorized Harness Evolution

This appendix provides implementation details for the factorized evolution procedure introduced in Section 4.2.

Harness Initialization. We initialize evolution from a lightweight but functional base harness H_0 . The base agent follows a standard ReAct-style interaction loop and provides only a minimal set of general-purpose tools—including file reading, file writing, and command-line execution—together with a simple orchestrator for sequencing reasoning, tool use, and execution. This deliberately modest initialization provides the basic interface required to solve tasks while leaving the agent’s higher-level tools, control logic, verification mechanisms, and workflow structure to be discovered through evolution. The initial incumbents of the N decomposition subproblems are instantiated from this base harness.

Harness architecture. The harness is a self-contained Python package. The package itself is the evolvable genome: the evaluator imports only the `AgentHarness` entry point, and nothing outside the package is imported, so every part of the solver can be changed by the evolutionary operators. That includes the LLM call layer, the tools, the prompts and the control logic (Figure 4).

```
Harness/          # the genome: one self-contained package
|-- config/        # frozen agent config + per-benchmark overrides
|-- orchestrator/  # LLM planner, DAG validation, wave executor
|-- steps/         # registry of composable workflow nodes
|-- tools/         # real tools: docker build, bash, read, edit
|-- skills/        # injectable domain expertise
|-- prompts/       # system / generation / repair / audit templates
'-- utils/         # stateless helpers (parsing, messages, trajectory)
    (each directory = general/ + <benchmark>/)
```

Figure 4 | Top-level layout of the harness. The entry point (`AgentHarness`) and the LLM call layer sit at the package root.

E.1. Diagnose Execution Feedback

Given the failure diagnosis, the proposer selects one or more component-specific operators and the scope in which each operator should act. The `tool_evolve` operator modifies executable tools and their integration with the agent loop. The `skill_evolve` operator modifies reusable procedures, domain knowledge, and skill modules. The `logic_evolve` operator modifies prompting, reasoning procedures, verification logic, control flow, and orchestration. Each operator is restricted to its corresponding portion of the harness rather than being instructed to rewrite the repository as a single artifact.

Before *every* variation step we run a diagnosis on the niche incumbent (`diagnose.py`). A proposer session with *read-only* tools (`Read/Glob/Grep`, sandboxed away from other runs’ trees and from the harness’s own notes) is given the subproblem’s weight vector λ^i , the artifact-grounded failure digest, and the incumbent’s genome: inlined verbatim when it is small ($\leq 8K$ characters) and otherwise replaced by a file manifest plus the *force-inlined* entry-point modules ($\leq 24K$), since an instruction to read the files is empirically ignored while inlined text cannot be skipped. Three hard constraints are then stated immediately before the reply schema. (i) A *niche lens* fixes which

objective this subproblem may diagnose: the weight vector decides, and only for the exactly balanced subproblem is the tie broken by the parent’s own worst objective; the same lens builds the digest, so “what counts as a failure” and “what may be cited” cannot drift apart. (ii) The diagnoses already issued by sibling subproblems *in this generation* are shown with the order to pick a different lever, because otherwise one generation produces one child in five copies. (iii) When the executing operator is fixed and hard-gated, its delivery contract is inlined (for `tool`, together with the measured call-site/implementation inventory) and the `focus` enum is narrowed to what that operator can actually deliver — an undeliverable plan costs the niche without the operator ever having had a legal move. The reply must be a single JSON object under 6K characters:

```
{ focus ∈  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{focus}}$ , problem_statement, artifact_evidence,
  few_shot_examples_of_failure [, operators] },
```

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{focus}} = \{\text{tools, reliability, verification, prompt, control-flow, skills, failure-fix}\}$, where `few_shot_examples_of_failure` is 1–3 concrete failures as `{task_id, symptom, direct_cause, evidence}` — category-level non-causes (“the model made a mistake”, “insufficient validation”) are explicitly rejected — and `operators` (only under `-operator auto`) is an ordered pipeline of up to 8 steps `{op, goal}`, each step editing the previous step’s output with a distinct sub-goal and only the final result evaluated.

Two mechanisms make the plan trustworthy rather than merely well-formed. The reply is parsed by scanning *backwards* for the last JSON object that decodes and carries a schema key (brace-balance tracking was removed: one unmatched brace quoted from source code in the narration poisoned every later candidate), with a repair path for replies whose opening brace was truncated and alias normalization for synonymous field names; “parsed” and “usable” (can it actually steer the operator) are recorded as separate columns. On top of that, an *evidence-integrity gate* validates `artifact_evidence` purely on the filesystem: the cited `path` must exist under this parent’s own eval-artifact tree, and the `quote` (≥ 24 characters) must occur verbatim in it after whitespace normalization. A reply that is unusable, oversized, empty, or that cites unverifiable evidence triggers *one* retry whose correction names that specific failure; a chain that came back in an invented schema triggers a second, chain-only re-ask. If the evidence still does not check out, the plan’s guidance is *suppressed* and the operator proceeds unguided rather than being handed unproven fact — the same end state as an unusable reply, and recorded as such. Everything the diagnosis touches is pure guidance: it never enters MOEA/D selection, every failure path degrades to the empty block, and each call leaves a readable scene in the niche’s own directory (`diagnose_input.md` / `diagnose_output.md` / `chain.md`) plus one line in `logs/moead_diagnose.jsonl`, so `lens`, `focus` duplication, `parse/usable` rate, `gate` firing rate and `retry` counts are all countable per run.

E.2. Tool Evolution, Skill Evolution and Logic Evolution

Usually multiple operators are selected; they are applied sequentially, with each operator receiving the latest candidate produced by the preceding operator, and H_c is the output of the last one. This permits coordinated changes across multiple components while keeping each individual edit semantically scoped.

The decomposed operators are the three *scoped* variation operators summarized in Table 4: `tool`, `skill`, and `logic`. Each one targets a distinct part of the harness and may write only to the directories assigned to it. Before any edit, the operator must also decide whether the change belongs to the general scope (`general/`) or to the benchmark-specific scope (`<bench>/`).

Scope selection. The scope is fixed before editing by `decide_scope`, a short, read-only model call that answers a single question: *can the agent derive the relevant fact at run time on its own?* If it

Table 4 | The three scoped variation operators. Each operator may write only its own directories, at the scope chosen before the edit; any write outside them is reverted.

Operator	Writable directories	Required deliverable
tool	tools/, utils/ (plus config/)	A change to how the agent <i>obtains or consumes ground truth</i> , covering one of four cases: no real tool is wired into the loop; a tool is called but its result is wasted (the log is ignored, or only the build is checked and never the server’s startup); the tool itself returns too little to act on; or a helper in <code>utils/</code> discards the critical information before it reaches the agent. Phantom verification is explicitly forbidden.
skill	skills/, prompts/	One reusable skill: a trigger condition, a short general procedure, and one worked example. The skill is a single <code>.py</code> module dropped into the scope directory, with no registration needed. Skills written as a <i>default behavior with an escape clause</i> (e.g. “unless the spec says otherwise, return 200”) are forbidden. In one of our runs, such a skill fixed its target task but broke two unrelated ones.
logic	steps/, orchestrator/; at general scope, also the loop modules at the package root	A change to the <i>control flow</i> : add a missing stage, act on a branch that is currently ignored, adjust round counts and budgets (the values go in <code>config/</code>), or change the DAG itself. Achieving the same effect by editing prompts is not allowed.

can, the change is placed in the general scope. If the fact is instead an intrinsic rule of the evaluator or of the delivery channel, the change is placed in the benchmark-specific scope. The chosen scope is then compiled into a write whitelist, and the whitelist is enforced at the tool layer, not through the prompt: any file written outside it is reverted. If the `decide_scope` call fails, the operator falls back to the general scope, which is the more restrictive of the two.

The two scopes impose different obligations on the edit:

- **General scope.** The operator is instructed not to hard-code any fact particular to the current benchmark, such as port numbers, framework names, or CWE lists. Any such fact the change requires must be obtained at run time.
- **Benchmark-specific scope.** The edit may be as specific as the benchmark demands, but each file must state in its header which benchmark it targets. A module in this scope shadows the general module of the same name, so benchmark-specific behavior overrides the general default without modifying it.

E.3. Generalization Operator

The operator evolves for dependencies on incidental properties of the evolution environment, such as hard-coded repository paths, module names, benchmark-specific commands, magic strings, task-specific instructions, over-tuned thresholds, or parsers that assume a particular repository structure or test runner. When such behavior is useful only in one environment, it can be localized to the corresponding environment-specific scope. When the underlying mechanism can be expressed independently of that environment, the operator may abstract or parameterize it and move the resulting mechanism into the general scope. Conversely, a component previously placed in the general scope may be localized if evolution reveals that it relies on benchmark-specific assumptions.

Thus, `generalize` does not attempt to recover a theoretically defined partition between general

and specialized behavior. Instead, it makes the boundary itself subject to evolutionary reorganization.

The scoped operators each add capability to the harness. `generalize` adds none. It changes only the scope in which existing components are *filed*. Each invocation audits both partitions of the harness, the general scope and the benchmark-specific scope, and corrects exactly *one* misfiled unit. Which move applies depends on two properties of the unit: the scope in which it currently resides, and whether the benchmark-specific knowledge it encodes can be recovered at run time.

- **Promote** (benchmark-specific $\rightarrow$ general). *Condition*: a procedure that is general in nature is filed under the benchmark-specific scope, so agents deployed on other benchmarks cannot use it. *Correction*: the unit is moved to the general scope. Each benchmark-specific fact it depends on is replaced by a step that obtains that fact at run time, so the promoted unit no longer assumes the benchmark it was written for.
- **Demote** (general $\rightarrow$ benchmark-specific). *Condition*: a unit in the general scope hard-codes a fact that holds only on the current benchmark, and the fact cannot be recovered at run time. *Correction*: the fact is moved to the benchmark-specific scope, where a tunable value becomes a per-benchmark configuration override. The general unit then reads the value from that scope instead of stating it.
- **Derive** (remains general). *Condition*: a unit in the general scope hard-codes a benchmark-specific fact that *can* be recovered at run time. *Correction*: the unit stays in the general scope and is rewritten to obtain the fact at run time, which removes the dependency without adding any benchmark-specific state.

Demote and Derive thus address the same symptom, a general unit that encodes benchmark-specific knowledge, and are distinguished only by whether that knowledge is observable at run time. When it is, Derive is preferred because it leaves nothing in the benchmark-specific scope.

Every move is subject to two invariants. (i) *Behavioral equivalence on the current benchmark*. The benchmark-specific partition is still loaded on the current benchmark, so a correct reclassification leaves the search-split score unchanged. Its benefit is observable only on held-out tasks and when the general partition is evaluated in isolation. (ii) *Standalone executability of the general partition*. Loading the general scope alone must still yield a functioning agent, even if it performs worse.

E.4. Operator Scheduling

Operator scheduling. The component-level operators in HARMONY HARNESS are applied sequentially rather than simultaneously. Given the incumbent H_i of subproblem i , objective preference λ^i , and execution feedback $\mathcal{E}_i$, the proposer first produces an ordered operator plan

$$\Pi = (O_1, \dots, O_L), \quad O_\ell \in \{O_{k,s} : k \in \mathcal{K}, s \in \Sigma\} \cup \{O_{\text{generalize}}\}. \quad (13)$$

Both the subset of operators and their ordering are determined by the proposer from its diagnosis of the current failures. Starting from $H_c^{(0)} = H_i$, the operators are applied sequentially,

$$H_c^{(\ell)} = O_\ell \left(H_c^{(\ell-1)}; h_i \right), \quad \ell = 1, \dots, L, \quad (14)$$

where h_i is the improvement hypothesis of §4.2, which already conditions on λ^i and $\mathcal{E}_i$. The child is $H_c = H_c^{(L)}$. Consequently, each operator observes the modifications introduced by previous operators, allowing later edits to reconcile or build upon earlier ones rather than producing independent patches that must subsequently be merged.

E.5. Validation, Repair, and Rollback

Validation and recovery. After executing the proposed operator sequence, the resulting child enters a three-stage smoke-test pipeline that progressively checks the integrity of the modified harness. If any stage fails, the resulting execution trace and error diagnostics are returned to the proposer, which is given one opportunity to repair the candidate. The complete three-stage validation is then repeated. A candidate that fails again is rejected, and the working repository is restored to the last valid parent version. Only candidates that pass all validation stages proceed to the full task-level evaluation used by MOEA/D.

No stage calls an LLM or starts a benchmark container, so the whole pipeline takes seconds to a few minutes per child.

Stage 1: import and interface validation. The child package is imported, together with every submodule individually, because deferred imports (e.g. the orchestrator and step registry) are not covered by importing the entry point. The frozen evaluator interface is then checked: the `AgentHarness` class must expose an asynchronous `run` (or agent loop) method, and its user-prompt template must still contain the task specification slot.

Stage 2: offline smoke test and genome self-tests. The harness is instantiated against a stub environment and must embed a placeholder specification into its messages and parse a canned model reply into files. The genome’s own `_selftest*.py` files are then run as subprocesses (timeout 300 s per file). The seed ships a self-test that drives the full tool-calling loop against a scripted stub model instead of a real LLM. It checks that the tool schemas exposed to the model are well-formed, that the payloads sent to each vendor have the shape that vendor requires (e.g. every tool use paired with a tool result), and that the loop terminates within budget and actually modifies the app. Without this check, a broken tool-calling protocol is swallowed by the agent’s catch-all and scores a whole generation 0/0.

Stage 3: static integrity checks. Two AST-only checks cover what the first two stages cannot execute. First, every named self-test assertion of the parent must still exist in the child. The self-tests are part of the evolvable genome, and the cheapest way to make a failing self-test pass is to delete it. Second, a static call-signature check requires every call in the child to bind to the definition it resolves to, which catches half-edited call sites on branches the smoke test never reaches.

A child that fails any stage receives one repair attempt with the failing stage’s log; a child that passes but is byte-identical to its parent is rejected as well.

This mechanism is particularly important when multiple operators are scheduled for the same child: sequential editing ensures that each modification is conditioned on the current harness state, while end-to-end validation verifies that their composition remains executable before the candidate can affect the evolutionary population.

F. Implementation Details for Dynamic Composition

This appendix provides implementation details for the dynamic composition procedure introduced in Section 4.3.

Operationally, this happens in two steps. *Scope loading* fixes the pools: every component directory of the harness is split into a `general/` part and one part per benchmark, and at load time the harness imports `general/` plus the directory of the *active* environment e only. *Task-level planning* then implements π_ϕ . An LLM planner reads the menu of registered workflow steps together with the task specification and emits a task-specific DAG whose nodes are those steps (e.g. generate, build-verify,

security audit, repair), with optional *when*-guarded conditional edges. $\mathcal{A}_{e,x}$ is the set of steps, and the tools and skills they load, that appear in this DAG. C is the executor that validates the DAG and runs it in topological order. When the harness is transferred zero-shot to an environment e' it was not evolved on, the source benchmark’s directories are not loaded and $\mathcal{H}_{e'}^{\text{env}}$ is empty, so only $\mathcal{H}^{\text{gen}}$ transfers.

F.1. Composition Agent

We organize the evolvable harness into three component classes: tools, skills, and logic. The logic component includes prompting, verification, control flow, and high-level orchestration. For each class, the repository may contain both general components and components specialized to a particular execution environment e . We denote the corresponding component pools by

$$\mathcal{H}^{\text{gen}} = \bigcup_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \mathcal{H}_k^{\text{gen}}, \quad \mathcal{H}_e^{\text{env}} = \bigcup_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \mathcal{H}_{k,e}^{\text{env}}, \quad (15)$$

from which the composition agent of Eq. 8 selects the active components.

F.2. Runtime Harness Assembly

Operational factorization of the harness. $\mathcal{H}^{\text{gen}}$ and $\mathcal{H}_e^{\text{env}}$ are not required to be two standalone programs or functions. Instead, they correspond to logically distinct regions of the same harness repository. We bias executable tooling and reusable agent-control mechanisms toward $\mathcal{H}^{\text{gen}}$, since abstractions such as execution, verification, retry, and context management should ideally transfer across environments. In contrast, retrieved skills and benchmark-specific procedures—including environment conventions, task-specific recipes, and local execution knowledge—form $\mathcal{H}_e^{\text{env}}$. Logic and orchestration may coordinate both components and therefore need not belong exclusively to either category.

Because this distinction is inherently semantic rather than syntactic, we do not impose a rigid file-level partition. Instead, the `generalize` operator serves as an explicit mechanism for maintaining the boundary. It audits the current harness for dependencies whose utility arises from incidental properties of the evolution environment and either rewrites them into environment-agnostic mechanisms or confines the specialization to environment-specific components. Thus, factorization is enforced through evolutionary pressure and operator scope rather than through a fixed manually specified decomposition of the repository.

G. Additional results

Table 5 | Component ablation of joint evolution on SecRepoBench (search split, %). Each row adds one component to the row above. The bottom row (+ dynamic orchestration) is the full method and is repeated from Table 9 (mean over 3 runs).

Strategy	Acceptance rule	Func	Sec	F&S
Joint Evolving	Tchebycheff over (F, S)	70.0	76.7	63.3
+ factored evolving	+ factorized operators (§4.2)	70.0	83.3	66.7
+ dynamic orchestration	+ dynamic composition (§4.3)	76.7	93.3	76.7

Table 6 | Operator-pool ablation (F&S, %). “Gen-3 children” lists the F&S of each child produced in the third generation; “Best” is the best F&S reached by the run. †: run that leads to fallback.

Orch.	Operator pool	Seed	Gen-3 children	Best
✓	tool, skill, logic	66.7	83.3, 83.3, 33.3	83.3
✓	+ generalize	66.7	100.0, 50.0, †	100.0
✗	tool, skill, logic	33.3	66.7, 66.7, 66.7	66.7
✗	+ generalize	33.3	66.7, 83.3, 66.7	83.3

Effect of `generalize`. Because each run requires full container-based evaluation, we conduct this ablation on a 6-task subset of the search split, where a single task corresponds to 16.7 points. Table 6 compares evolution with and without the `generalize` operator, with the orchestrator on and off; both runs within each pair start from the same seed. Adding `generalize` improves the best F&S in both settings: from 83.3 to 100.0 with the orchestrator on, and from 66.7 to 83.3 with it off. `generalize` adds no new capability of its own: it only moves existing components between the general and environment-specific scopes (App. E.3). We therefore attribute the improvement to its effect on subsequent edits: once benchmark-specific assumptions are removed from the general scope, later operators build on mechanisms that hold across tasks rather than on fixes that happen to work for a few. Given the small subset, each gain amounts to one additional task solved, so we read these results as a consistent directional signal across both orchestrator settings rather than as a precise effect size.

G.1. Evolving on one objective/distribution degrades safety elsewhere

Before proposing joint evolution, we confirm the problem exists. A harness evolved to maximize its *search-set* score (the “baseline-seeded winner”) collapses on held-out data: combined F&S falls to 35.0, *below* the un-evolved baseline’s 43.3 (Table 14). Qualitatively (§K.7), an agent that only ever sees functional feedback writes plausible code, declares completion, and stops—with nothing pushing it toward the missing hardening (e.g., a bounds check), because the exploit signal is hidden at solve time. This is the self-evolution analogue of overfitting: capability specialized to one distribution, security left behind.

Multi-objective evolution and the Pareto frontier. To isolate the decomposition, this analysis runs MOEA/D alone ($N = 5$ subproblems, neighborhood $T = 2, 3$ generations): Tchebycheff joint evolution without factored evolving (§4.2) or dynamic orchestration (§4.3), so that the frontier reflects the multi-objective search and not the other components. Starting from the un-evolved baseline, hypervolume jumps in generation 1 ($0.321 \rightarrow 0.528$) and plateaus ($\rightarrow 0.537$). Table 13 lists one harness per generation, the most balanced one under Eq. 3, not the whole front. The front itself is wider: in generations 1 and 2 it holds two non-dominated harnesses, the most balanced one at (func, sec) = (70.0, 70.0) and a more secure one at (56.7, 76.7), which is why the hypervolume (0.528) exceeds that of the balanced harness alone ($0.70 \times 0.70 = 0.49$). In generation 3, `moead_g003_s01` reaches the ideal point on both objectives, (70.0, 76.7)—+13.3 functionality and +20.0 security over the baseline *simultaneously*—and therefore dominates the rest of the population on the search set. That is a property of the search split, not of the population: on held-out IN the same run keeps two mutually non-dominated harnesses, `moead_g001_s00` at (func, sec) = (63.3, 63.3) and `moead_g002_s01` at (60.0, 66.7). Figure 5 plots every child of the run. On BaxBench (Figure 6), a MOEA/D run with six subproblems, started from two seed harnesses, keeps a two-point front from generation 2 onward: `g001_s01` at (func, sec) = (75.0, 60.7) and the most balanced `g002_s03` at (71.4, 64.3), neither of which dominates the other.




Figure 5 | **Search-split Pareto front of the MOEA/D-alone run** (Table 13): the baseline and all 15 children, shaded by generation. After generations 1–2 the front holds two non-dominated harnesses (dashed); in generation 3, `moead_g003_s01` reaches the ideal point z^* and dominates the rest (solid). Children with identical scores are offset horizontally so that each stays visible. An interactive version is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/w/HH_visualization-4F69/index.html.

Independently evolved harnesses do not compose. Evolving a functionality harness and a safety harness separately and combining them scores 60.0/60.0/53.3—worse in F&S than functionality-only evolution alone (56.7)—and its 6.7-point gap between $\min(F, S) = 60.0$ and $F\&S = 53.3$ says the two halves are not covering the same tasks. Prompt-merging is the same lesson in weaker form: merging the two prompts moves F&S only from the static 46.7 to 50.0. Joint credit assignment has to happen *during* the search; it cannot be bolted on afterwards or written into an instruction. Closing the alignment gap is necessary but not sufficient—sequential, weighted, and constrained acceptance all reach $F\&S = \min(F, S)$, but at 70.0, 70.0, and 60.0, while the full harness closes it at 76.7 (every patch it gets functionally right is also secure). Safety-only leaves the largest gap of any row (20.0 points): it buys security on tasks it then fails to solve.

Every alternative aggregation stalls near 70, and what separates them is security, not F&S. Sequential evolution (70.0) and the weighted sum (70.0) tie each other and land 6.7 below the full harness (76.7); the hard constraint reaches 60.0 and the separated harnesses 53.3. The weighted-sum row is the cleanest of these comparisons because it sweeps the same three interior weight vectors MOEA/D assigns to its interior subproblems and therefore differs only in *aggregation*. On F&S it is not worse than plain Tchebycheff replacement (70.0 vs. 63.3)—the aggregation rule by itself is not where our margin comes from—but its security saturates 20.0 points below the full harness (73.3 vs. 93.3). A weighted sum will trade a security point for a functionality point whenever the latter is locally cheaper, so it settles at the first mutually agreeable point instead of pushing the worse objective; §5.1 shows that the security headroom it declines to buy is exactly the quantity that survives a distribution shift. We next test whether *factoring* the evolution surface—evolving execution-grounded tools separately from skills/logic—generalizes better than a monolithic “summarize→rewrite” loop




Figure 6 | **Search-set Pareto front of a MOEA/D run on BaxBench** ($N = 6$ subproblems, 28-task cover set, generations 1–4): the two seed harnesses and all 24 children, shaded by generation. After generation 1 the front is a single harness (dashed); from generation 2 on it holds two mutually non-dominated harnesses (solid). Children with identical scores are offset horizontally so that each stays visible. An interactive version is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/w/HH_visualization-4F69/baxbench.html.

that rewrites the whole harness at once. Table 14 already contains the sharpest version of this contrast: the monolithic *search-seeded winner* regresses to 35.0 combined F&S—below the un-evolved baseline (43.3)—because it rewrites the agent as one block tuned to the search set, whereas the factored variants improve to 58.3 and generalize out-of-distribution. To isolate the factorization itself (rather than the choice of feedback), we run a controlled ablation that holds the objective, budget, and seed fixed and varies only the evolution surface (Table 7).

H. More Related Works

Agent safety, and secure code as a verifiable testbed. Agent-safety benchmarks study policy violations, hazardous actions, and injection across web, tool-use, and embodied settings (Levy et al., 2026; Ruan et al., 2024; Andriushchenko et al., 2025; Debenedetti et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2025a; Zhan et al., 2024; Yin et al., 2024; Yuan et al., 2024), but they evaluate *static* agents and rarely study what self-evolution does to safety. We use secure code generation as a testbed because both objectives are grounded in real execution rather than a proxy judge: functionality is a passing unit-test suite and security is a blocked proof-of-concept exploit. Our benchmarks—SecRepoBench (Dilgren et al., 2025), BaxBench (Vero et al., 2025), and CWEval (Peng et al., 2025)—score the *conjunction* of the two (secure-pass@1), exactly the failure mode that functionality-only self-evolution is most likely to break.

Automated workflow generation. AFlow (Zhang et al., 2025b) searches over code-represented agentic workflows with Monte Carlo tree search and, like our orchestrator, represents an execution procedure as a graph of operators. It differs from our setting in three ways: it optimizes a single

Table 7 | Evolution-surface ablation (held-out combined F&S, %). Same objective, budget, and seed; only *what* is evolved changes. “comb.” is the unweighted mean of the two 30-task splits. The full row is repeated from Table 9 (mean over 3 runs).

Evolution surface	Held-out-IN	Held-out-OUT	comb.
Monolithic summarize→rewrite	40.0	30.0	35.0
Factored: evolving tools only	46.7	33.3	40.0
Factored: skills/logic only	50.0	46.7	48.3
Factored: tools + skills/logic	60.0	56.7	58.3
+ dynamic orchestration (full)	86.7	66.7	76.7

Table 8 | Dynamic orchestration ablation on BaxBench (`USE_ORCHESTRATOR` on/off). The lower two rows are the *same evolved* harness, seed, and budget, differing only in the toggle; the un-evolved baseline is repeated from Table 10 for reference. “Nodes” is the range of plan sizes observed over the 28 tasks (Figure 8; the planner may emit up to 16), “avg. nodes” the mean number actually executed, and “avg. tokens” the mean solve-time token spend per task.

Execution	Nodes	Sec	Func	F&S	Avg. nodes	Avg. tokens
Baseline (no evolution)	—	50.0	60.7	42.9	—	31,902
Fixed linear pipeline (orchestrator off)	5	53.6	71.4	53.6	5.0	58,230
Dynamic workflow (orchestrator on)	5–8	64.3	75.0	64.3	6.2	63,064

task-level objective, it searches for one workflow per task family that is then fixed, and it composes a fixed operator set. HARMONY HARNESS instead co-evolves the executable tools, verification logic, and planner that the workflow is built from under a multi-objective decomposition, and plans the workflow per task at inference time (§4.3).

I. Discussion and Limitations

When do the objectives conflict? On SecRepoBench the front is narrow: two non-dominated harnesses in early generations, and in the last generation one harness that is best on both objectives on the search split (App. G.1). The decomposition frontier pays off most where security and functionality genuinely trade off. Establishing such regimes—adversarial or injection tasks, or security fixes that break legacy tests—is the most important next step.

Reward hacking demands held-out gating. The 100/100/100 artifact (App. K.6) shows that any acceptance rule reading only training-set feedback is exploitable; any acceptance rule—ours included—must be validated on held-out safety.

Isolating the factorization. The orchestration toggle (Table 8) and cross-benchmark transfer in both directions (Table 12) are now measured, and both favor the factored, dynamic harness—most sharply in transfer, where the monolithic meta-harness lands *below* the un-evolved baseline on the target benchmark. The evolution-surface ablation (Table 7) separates the two: tools-only and skills/logic-only factoring reach 40.0 and 48.3 combined F&S, the two together 58.3, and only adding dynamic orchestration reaches 76.7—so “factored” and “dynamic” each carry part of the effect and neither alone accounts for it.

Table 9 | Evolution on **SecRepoBench** (%). Best result per column in **bold**. Mean over 3 runs.

Method	Search			Held-out In			Held-out Out			Avg. F&S
	Sec	Func	F&S	Sec	Func	F&S	Sec	Func	F&S	
Baseline	56.7	66.7	46.7	66.7	73.3	50.0	46.7	70.0	36.7	44.4
Meta-harness (func & sec)	73.3	70.0	53.3	70.0	73.3	56.7	50.0	70.0	43.3	51.1
Meta-harness (func-only)	60.0	73.3	56.7	60.0	73.3	50.0	43.3	70.0	36.7	47.8
Meta-harness (sec-only)	70.0	66.7	46.7	66.7	60.0	53.3	50.0	63.3	33.3	44.4
DGM (func & sec, scalar)	76.7	73.3	60.0	66.7	70.0	53.3	46.7	66.7	33.3	48.9
HH (ours)	93.3	76.7	76.7	93.3	86.7	86.7	66.7	73.3	66.7	76.7

Table 10 | Evolution on **BaxBench** (% secure web-app generation). Same protocol as Table 9. “Average” is the mean F&S over the three splits. Mean over 3 runs.

Method	Search			Held-out IN			Held-out OUT			Avg. F&S
	Sec	Func	F&S	Sec	Func	F&S	Sec	Func	F&S	
Baseline (no evolution)	50.0	60.7	42.9	50.0	62.4	42.9	46.4	57.1	42.9	42.9
Meta-harness (func & sec)	64.3	71.4	60.7	57.1	62.4	53.6	50.0	60.7	42.9	52.4
Meta-harness (func-only)	53.6	71.4	46.4	53.6	64.3	50.0	39.3	60.7	39.3	45.2
Meta-harness (sec-only)	67.9	50.0	46.4	60.7	57.1	53.6	50.0	53.6	42.9	47.6
DGM (func & sec, scalar)	60.7	71.4	57.1	50.0	64.3	50.0	50.0	57.1	39.3	48.8
HH (ours)	71.4	75.0	67.9	64.3	75.0	62.4	57.1	64.3	53.6	61.3

Acceptance strategies not covered. Table 2 measures sequential, prompt-merge, joint-weighted ($\alpha \in \{0.25, 0.5, 0.75\}$), hard-constrained, and separated-harness evolution, all under one budget and one evaluator. Shielded evolution—wrapping the solver in an external verifier that vetoes actions before execution—is a natural point in this design space that we do not measure: it needs a shield we do not have, and a shield strong enough to veto insecure patches would also change what the search is being credited for.

Scope. We instantiate dual-objective self-evolution only in secure code generation; whether decomposition at the acceptance level transfers to other agentic domains is open.

Cost. Real Docker build/exploit evaluation dominates wall-clock and grows as genomes add self-review stages.

J. Measuring population diversity of the search

J.1. Do standard diversity metrics capture harness diversity?

A decomposition-based search is diverse *by construction* only in what its subproblems ask for. The weight vectors guarantee that the N niches request different trade-offs; whether the resulting harnesses also *behave* differently has to be measured. This appendix asks whether the diversity metrics used for evolved programs—code distance, edit labels, and objective-space spread—can do that for self-coding harnesses. Our answer is that they can do so only partially. A harness is a repository whose behaviour is largely decided at run time: prompt text, tool and skill selection, and, in HARMONY HARNESS, a workflow DAG that the orchestrator plans per task (§4.3). One evolved BaxBench harness plans

Table 11 | HH evolved on **BaxBench**, transferred zero-shot to CWeval (%), against the un-evolved one-shot model with Claude Code harness (cc) on the same tasks. Better of the two harnesses per metric and per language in **bold**. Mean over 3 runs.

Language	n	One-shot (cc)			+ HH harness (ours)		
		Sec	Func	F&S	Sec	Func	F&S
C	93	75.3	88.2	75.3	89.2	90.3	89.2
C++	63	76.2	98.4	76.2	90.5	93.7	90.5
Go	57	70.2	87.7	70.2	89.5	89.5	89.5
JavaScript	69	72.5	89.9	72.5	87.0	87.0	82.6
Python	75	74.7	96.0	70.7	90.7	89.3	85.3
All	357	73.9	91.9	73.1	89.4	89.9	87.4

Table 12 | Cross-benchmark transfer (%). A harness is evolved on one benchmark and evaluated on the other with no further evolution, on the target’s search split (the split whose baseline appears in Tables 9 and 10); the baseline row is the un-evolved harness on that split. Mean over 3 runs.

Method	Evolved on	Evaluated on	Sec	Func	F&S
Baseline (no evolution)	—	BaxBench	50.0	60.7	42.9
Meta-harness	SecRepoBench	BaxBench	53.6	57.1	39.3
HH (ours)	SecRepoBench	BaxBench	59.6	64.3	57.1
Baseline (no evolution)	—	SecRepoBench	56.7	66.7	46.7
Meta-harness	BaxBench	SecRepoBench	43.3	50.0	36.7
HH (ours)	BaxBench	SecRepoBench	80.0	70.0	70.0

seven distinct DAG shapes over 28 tasks (Figure 8), yet every code-level metric below scores it as a single genome. Conversely, a rewritten prompt or a renamed helper moves a genome far in token space without changing what it does. We apply the metrics with a separate, deliberately *offline* instrument that reads the genome tree and the operator logs after the fact and by construction cannot feed anything back into selection. It scores a population along three families: structural code distance between genomes (Jaccard over token 5-grams, AST-node 3-grams, and source lines, weighted 0.4/0.3/0.3), mechanism-label diversity (what each operator says it changed, cross-checked against the files it actually touched), and performance-space diversity (spread of the objective vectors). Figure 7 reports it over all 137 BaxBench variants pooled from 34 run tags; the rest of this appendix tabulates every component (Table 15, §J.7) and gives the full definitions, the per-lineage distance matrix, the objective-space scatter, and the mechanism-label breakdown.

The code-distance summaries disagree with each other: $D_{\text{struct}} = 0.345$ against $D_{\text{novel}} = 0.014$, a factor of 25, and the number of equivalence classes depends almost entirely on the chosen threshold (112 at $\epsilon_{\text{dup}} = 0.001$, 9 at $\epsilon_{\text{dup}} = 0.05$). Mechanism labels give yet another picture: all 17 labels are hit, $H_{\text{label}} = 0.934$, and the mean pairwise Jaccard distance between label sets is 0.656, so children do differ in which part of the scaffold they change. The genotype–phenotype correlation is $r = +0.030$ over the 465 scored pairs: code distance says almost nothing about objective-space distance, and pairs the instrument calls identical still land up to 0.9 apart in objective space.

We read these disagreements as a limitation of the metrics. Token and line distances are dominated by prompt text and file size, so they count cosmetic rewrites as new solutions. None of the three code distances sees behaviour that is decided at run time, such as the per-task DAGs above, and the label family relies on the operators’ own descriptions of their edits. Of the three code distances, the

Table 13 | Per-generation frontier quality for MOEA/D alone ($N = 5$, $T = 2, 3$ generations; no factored evolving or dynamic orchestration, to isolate the decomposition) on the SecRepoBench search set. Hypervolume is the area of the population’s Pareto front against reference point $(0, 0)$; z^* is the ideal point (per-objective running best); “most-balanced” is the population member with the highest *worst* objective ($\max \min(\text{func}, \text{sec})$).

stage	hypervolume	z^* (func, sec)	most-balanced harness
init (baseline)	0.321	(56.7, 56.7)	baseline (56.7, 56.7)
generation 1	0.528	(70.0, 76.7)	moead_g001_s00 (70.0, 70.0)
generation 2	0.528	(70.0, 76.7)	moead_g001_s00 (70.0, 70.0)
generation 3	0.537	(70.0, 76.7)	moead_g003_s01 (70.0, 76.7)

Table 14 | Held-out generalization (30 tasks each, eval-only). IN = crash-type families seen during search; OUT = unseen families. The feedback-tool per-generation bests beat baseline on combined F&S (58.3 vs 43.3); the search-seeded winner is worse than baseline (35.0).

harness	Held-out IN (%)			Held-out OUT (%)			comb.
	Func	Sec	F&S	Func	Sec	F&S	
baseline	73.3	66.7	50.0	70.0	46.7	36.7	43.3
without env-feedback	—	—	40.0	—	—	30.0	35.0
feedback-env gen1 best	63.3	80.0	56.7	66.7	56.7	43.3	50.0
feedback-env gen2 best	70.0	80.0	60.0	80.0	63.3	56.7	58.3
feedback-env gen3 best	80.0	83.3	66.7	76.7	50.0	46.7	56.7
feedback-env dynamic	86.7	93.3	86.7	73.3	66.7	66.7	76.7

AST-based one is the most informative for harnesses. It ignores prompt rewording, identifier renaming and formatting, and it tracks the control structure through which tools, skills and orchestration are wired. On the pooled population it is $2.6\times$ smaller than the token (0.417) and line (0.433) distances (0.162), which indicates that most of the textual spread is cosmetic. It is still blind to runtime composition, and it does not correlate with objective-space distance any better than the text-based distances do. Faithful diversity measures for harnesses therefore need to be behavioural, e.g. comparing planned DAGs, tool-call traces or per-task pass patterns, rather than comparing source code. We report the index only as a diagnostic, never as an objective: any operator that rewrites text at random trivially games it, which is precisely what D_{novel} and r are meant to expose.

The instrument is deliberately *offline* and read-only: it reads the genome tree and the logs after the fact, and by construction cannot feed anything back into selection — the same discipline that applies to the held-out evaluation.

J.2. The population

An *individual* is one genome package on disk, and nothing else — no run metadata, no score, is required for a genome to be counted:

- an evolved child, `baxbench_agents/<tag>/<g###_s##>/<k_op>/`, where `<tag>` is the run, `g###_s##` the generation-and-subproblem niche, and `<k_op>` the chain step and operator that produced it; a directory qualifies only if it contains `__init__.py`. This *includes the intermediate steps* of a multi-operator chain (§4.2), which are never evaluated and never enter the MOEA/D population. Consecutive steps of one chain differ by a single operator’s edit, so their




Figure 7 | **Population diversity over 137 evolved BaxBench harnesses (34 run tags).** *Left:* the five components and their equal-weight composite (DIVERSITY = 0.300, dashed). The index is held up by mean pairwise distance D_{struct} and label entropy H_{label} and held down by nearest-neighbour distance D_{novel} and the fraction of distinct solutions N_{eff}/n . *Middle:* N_{eff} against the duplicate threshold ϵ_{dup} ; N_{eff} falls steeply (112 classes at $\epsilon_{dup} = 0.001$ down to 9 at $\epsilon_{dup} = 0.05$) and flattens only briefly (still 9 at 0.1), so “how many distinct solutions” has no threshold-free answer and the reported 9 describes the scale of a typical edit. *Right:* the distance distributions behind the headline—over all $\binom{137}{2}$ pairs the mass sits far from zero (top), while over each genome’s *nearest* neighbour it concentrates in the first bin (bottom, note the change of vertical scale).

inclusion lowers the nearest-neighbour novelty D_{novel} and the N_{eff} ratio reported below relative to a pool restricted to evaluated children. It also explains why only 31 of the 137 variants carry scores;

- a seed package (`bax_repo_seed`, `bax_wf_seed`), included only under `-include-seeds`, which is what makes “how far has this run moved from its starting point” answerable.

Write $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ for the collected set. Since any list of directories can be passed, the same instrument measures three different questions depending on what is handed to it: one run’s population (is this run exploring?), several runs pooled (are independent runs finding the same thing?), or a single niche across generations (what did this lineage actually change?). All three appear in Section J.7. Within a genome, only `.py` files are read; `__pycache__`, `log` and `eval` subtrees are skipped so that a genome’s own logs never enter its fingerprint.

J.3. A. Structural code distance

Each genome is reduced to three shingle sets, deliberately chosen to disagree with each other:

- $S^{tok}(x)$ — g_{sh} -grams ($g_{sh} = 5$, `-ngram`) over a normalized token stream of every file. Numbers collapse to `#num`. Strings and comments are *not* dropped but split into lowercase word tokens (capped at 400 per token, so one enormous prompt constant cannot dominate a genome’s fingerprint), as is common for program-level diversity measures. For harnesses this makes the distance sensitive to any rewording of prompt text, whether or not the rewording changes behaviour (§J.7). A file that fails to tokenize degrades to a bag of words rather than being skipped.
- $S^{ast}(x)$ — 3-grams over the ancestor chain of node type names in the parse tree. This sees control structure only and is by design insensitive to prompt rewording, identifier renaming and formatting. Files that fail `ast.parse` are counted and reported in the header, and contribute to the other two sets only.
- $S^{lin}(x)$ — the set of non-blank, stripped source lines: a crude but near-exact duplicate detector.

The contrast between the first two carries most of the diagnostic weight. A high d_{tok} with a low d_{ast} is precisely the signature of cosmetic variation: much text changed, no structure changed.

With $d_{\bullet}(x, y) = 1 - |S_{\bullet}(x) \cap S_{\bullet}(y)| / |S_{\bullet}(x) \cup S_{\bullet}(y)|$ the Jaccard distance on each set (two empty sets count as distance 0), the combined genotype distance is the normalized weighted sum

$$D(x, y) = w_{\text{tok}} d_{\text{tok}}(x, y) + w_{\text{ast}} d_{\text{ast}}(x, y) + w_{\text{lin}} d_{\text{lin}}(x, y), \quad (w_{\text{tok}}, w_{\text{ast}}, w_{\text{lin}}) = (0.4, 0.3, 0.3), \quad (16)$$

the weights settable with `-weights` and renormalized to sum to one. D is symmetric, zero on identical genomes, and bounded in $[0, 1]$; it is not a metric in the strict sense (the weighted sum of Jaccard distances satisfies the triangle inequality, but the AST component ignores content, so $D(x, y) = 0$ does not imply $x = y$). Three summaries:

$$D_{\text{struct}} = \binom{n}{2}^{-1} \sum_{i < j} D(x_i, x_j) \quad \text{spread: mean pairwise distance} \quad (17)$$

$$D_{\text{novel}} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i \min_{j \neq i} D(x_i, x_j) \quad \text{novelty: distance to the nearest twin} \quad (18)$$

$$N_{\text{eff}}(\epsilon_{\text{dup}}) = \# \text{ components}(G_{\epsilon_{\text{dup}}}) \quad G_{\epsilon_{\text{dup}}} = (X, \{ij : D(x_i, x_j) \leq \epsilon_{\text{dup}}\}) \quad (19)$$

D_{struct} and D_{novel} separate two failure modes that a single mean hides. A population can be globally wide — several mutually distant lineages — while every individual still has a near-duplicate sitting beside it; the mean is then reporting the distance between clusters, not diversity. N_{eff} makes the distinction concrete: it is the number of single-linkage equivalence classes at threshold ϵ_{dup} (`-dup-threshold`, default 0.05), computed by union-find over all pairs within ϵ_{dup} , i.e. how many genuinely distinct solutions the population holds. The ratio N_{eff}/n is the one number to watch across generations.

Any single ϵ_{dup} is arbitrary when children routinely differ by a few dozen lines, so the sweep over $\epsilon_{\text{dup}} \in \{0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2\}$ is always printed alongside it; a sweep that falls off a cliff between two adjacent thresholds locates the scale at which the population is really structured. Three further outputs support reading the number: the `arg max` and `arg min` lists (the most distinctive genomes by nearest-neighbour distance, and the closest pairs by name, which is how a duplicated lineage is identified concretely), the full distance matrix under `-csv`, and — when the population spans several run tags — the within-tag and between-tag means, which separate *drift along a lineage* from *difference between independent runs*.

J.4. B. Mechanism-label diversity

Structural distance cannot tell whether two children that look different are doing the *same thing*. Two independently written retry loops share almost no tokens and are, as search results, one idea. The second family attacks this from the only evidence available without a second LLM pass: what the operator said it did, and where it wrote.

For each child, two sources are read from `<niche>/log/operator/`: the verbatim response of the operator session (`<child>_output*.md`, the text after the `## RESPONSE` (verbatim) marker) and the `changed_files` list from `<child>_change.json`. The text is matched against a fixed lexicon of $K = 17$ mechanism regexes:

```
loop-control, retry, build-verify, test-gen, security, input-validation, prompt-edit,
    tool-add, skill, edit-format, parsing, context-mgmt, model-params, self-critique,
    planning, error-handling, config-knob
```

augmented by path rules that fire on the diff regardless of what the prose claims: an edit under `tools/` is `tool-add`, under `skills/` is `skill`, under `prompts/` is `prompt-edit`, and to `config.py` is `config-knob`. This second channel matters because it is the only part of the labelling the operator cannot talk its way out of.

Let $X_L \subseteq X$ be the labelled subset, L_i the label set of child i , c_ℓ the number of children carrying label ℓ , $p_\ell = c_\ell / \sum_k c_k$, and K_{obs} the number of labels actually hit. Then

$$H_{\text{label}} = \frac{-\sum_\ell p_\ell \ln p_\ell}{\ln K_{\text{obs}}}, \quad \text{Simpson} = 1 - \sum_\ell p_\ell^2, \quad \bar{J} = \binom{|X_L|}{2}^{-1} \sum_{i < j} \left(1 - \frac{|L_i \cap L_j|}{|L_i \cup L_j|}\right). \quad (20)$$

H_{label} measures whether attention is spread over mechanisms or piled onto one; $\bar{J}$ measures whether individual children differ from each other, which is the sharper question — a population where every child touches all 17 mechanisms has maximal entropy and zero diversity, and only $\bar{J}$ notices.

Reported in the same block, as a proxy for the size and the landing point of the edits: the distribution of touched files with its normalized entropy, and the mutation size `effective_added + effective_removed` from the integrity gate’s change record, summarized as median, maximum, and the count of changes the gate flagged `minimal`.

J.5. C. Performance-space diversity

Objective vectors are recovered from two sources: `evolve.json` (the `by_batch` entries, full precision) and the `[eval]` lines of `logs/runs/*.log` (percentages to one decimal). Both are rounded to three decimals before use, so that the same score arriving from two sources is not counted as two distinct points — without this the “distinct score points” count is silently inflated. `evolve.json` wins where both exist.

Over the scored subset $X_S \subseteq X$, with $\mathbf{f}(x) = (f_{\text{sec}}, f_{\text{func}}) \in [0, 1]^2$ both maximized,

$$D_{\text{perf}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \binom{|X_S|}{2}^{-1} \sum_{i < j} \|\mathbf{f}(x_i) - \mathbf{f}(x_j)\|_2, \quad (21)$$

the $\sqrt{2}$ normalizing by the diameter of the unit square so the value is comparable with the structural distances. Reported with it: the per-coordinate standard deviations, the number of distinct score points, the size of the Pareto front, and its hypervolume with respect to the reference point $(0, 0)$. With the front sorted by decreasing f_{func} as $(f_{\text{func}}^{(1)}, f_{\text{sec}}^{(1)}), \dots, (f_{\text{func}}^{(P)}, f_{\text{sec}}^{(P)})$ and $f_{\text{func}}^{(P+1)} = 0$, it is $\text{HV} = \sum_{k=1}^P (f_{\text{func}}^{(k)} - f_{\text{func}}^{(k+1)}) f_{\text{sec}}^{(k)}$.

The diagnostic that matters most in this family is neither of those. It is the Pearson correlation between genotype distance and phenotype distance over all scored pairs,

$$r = \text{corr}\left(D(x_i, x_j), \|\mathbf{f}(x_i) - \mathbf{f}(x_j)\|_2\right)_{i < j: x_i, x_j \in X_S}, \quad (22)$$

which is the closest thing available to a measurement of whether the variation operator is doing useful work. r meaningfully positive means bigger edits land in different places; $r \approx 0$ means the search is exploring *code* space without exploring *behaviour* space — the children look different and score the same — and a persistent $r \approx 0$ is an argument about the operator library, not about the selection layer.

J.6. The composite index

The available components are averaged with equal weight,

$$\text{DIVERSITY} = \text{mean}\{D_{\text{struct}}, D_{\text{novel}}, N_{\text{eff}}/n, H_{\text{label}}, D_{\text{perf}}\}, \quad (23)$$

skipping any family whose inputs are absent — a population of seeds has no operator logs, an unevaluated population has no scores — so the index is an average over whatever could be measured, and populations with different components present are not comparable.

Three caveats attach to this number and should travel with it. The equal weighting is a convention and not a claim: D_{novel} and N_{eff}/n are near-zero in any lineage-structured population and drag the mean down, while H_{label} is near-one in almost any population with more than a handful of children, so the index moves mostly with D_{struct} and D_{perf} . It is comparable only across populations measured with identical settings — same g_{sh} , same distance weights, same ϵ_{dup} , same rule for what counts as an individual. And it is a diagnostic, not an objective: optimizing it directly is trivially gamed by any operator that rewrites text at random. The components are what should be read; the scalar exists so that two runs can be ranked at a glance.

J.7. Measured on the current population

Table 15 reports the instrument over all 137 variants presently in `baxbench_agents/`, pooled across 34 run tags. The same measurement is drawn in Figure 7 (§J.1): the five components of the composite, the threshold sweep behind N_{eff} , and the two distance distributions whose separation is the result.

Table 15 | Pooled population, $n = 137$ variants from 34 run tags, $g_{\text{sh}} = 5$, weights (0.4, 0.3, 0.3), $\epsilon_{\text{dup}} = 0.05$.

Quantity	Value	Reading
$d_{\text{tok}} / d_{\text{ast}} / d_{\text{lin}}$	0.417 / 0.162 / 0.433	AST distance is 2.6× smaller than token and line distance: edits move text and individual statements, rarely control structure
D_{struct}	0.345 ± 0.269	globally the population is well spread
D_{novel}	0.014	... but nearest neighbours are close in code
N_{eff} / n	$9/137 = 6.6\%$	nine equivalence classes at $\epsilon_{\text{dup}} = 0.05$
N_{eff} sweep	0.001→112 0.005→68 0.01→30 0.05→9 0.1→9 0.2→7	
H_{label}	0.934	134/137 labelled, 17/17 labels hit, Simpson = 0.914
$\bar{J}$ (label sets)	0.656	children do differ in which mechanisms they name
D_{perf}	0.142	31 scored, 24 distinct points, $\sigma_{\text{sec}} = 0.151$, $\sigma_{\text{func}} = 0.161$
Pareto front / hypervolume	2 / 0.480	the front over the pooled set is two points wide
r (genotype vs. phenotype)	+0.030	structural difference buys essentially no objective-space difference
DIVERSITY	0.300	equal-weight mean of the five components

The headline is the gap. $D_{\text{struct}} = 0.345$ against $D_{\text{novel}} = 0.014$ is a factor of 25, so the two summaries of the same distance give very different pictures of the same population. The threshold sweep (112 classes at $\epsilon_{\text{dup}} = 0.001$, 30 at $\epsilon_{\text{dup}} = 0.01$, 9 at $\epsilon_{\text{dup}} = 0.05$) shows that no single threshold separates “genuinely different” from “same scaffold” under this distance. The component breakdown locates the textual spread: $d_{\text{ast}} = 0.162$ against $d_{\text{lin}} = 0.433$ means that most of what token and line distances count as difference is rewording rather than a change in how the scaffold is wired. The per-component threshold sweeps make the same point. On a later snapshot of the same directory ($n = 233$ variants, 49 scored), each distance used alone at $\epsilon_{\text{dup}} = 0.001$ yields 209 (token), 214 (line) and 70 (AST) equivalence classes, and at $\epsilon_{\text{dup}} = 0.01$ it yields 102, 96 and 27. Token and line distances therefore separate almost every pair of consecutive edits, including pure rewordings, and

inflate the apparent number of distinct solutions roughly threefold. AST distance merges such edits and separates only changes to control structure. This is why we regard the AST component as the most informative of the three, and the token- and line-based metrics as the least reliable for harnesses.

Labels and code disagree with behaviour. $H_{\text{label}} = 0.934$ with all 17 mechanisms hit and $\bar{J} = 0.656$ says the operators do talk about, and write to, many different parts of the scaffold (Table 16). Yet $r = +0.030$: the mechanisms differ, the code differs, and the scores do not follow. Neither family is a faithful proxy for the behavioural diversity of a harness, part of which is decided only at run time.

Table 16 | Mechanism-label distribution over the 134 labelled children. Labels are not exclusive; the fraction is the share of children carrying that label.

Label	Frac.	Label	Frac.	Label	Frac.
build-verify	0.78	skill	0.53	parsing	0.30
planning	0.70	config-knob	0.45	self-critique	0.25
security	0.64	tool-add	0.41	error-handling	0.14
loop-control	0.62	test-gen	0.40	context-mgmt	0.12
prompt-edit	0.61	retry	0.36	edit-format	0.08
		input-validation	0.30	model-params	0.01

Positional arguments are genome-tree directories; everything below is optional.

Table 17 | Options.

Flag	Default	Effect
-ngram	5	token shingle length g_{sh}
-weights	0.4, 0.3, 0.3	token, AST, line weights; renormalized
-dup-threshold	0.05	ϵ_{dup} for N_{eff} and the near-duplicate list
-include-seeds	off	add <code>bax_repo_seed</code> / <code>bax_wf_seed</code>
-top	5	length of the most-novel and closest-pair lists
-json	—	write every metric, including the per-genome nearest-neighbour distances, the near-duplicate pairs and the per-tag breakdown
-csv	—	write the full $n \times n$ combined distance matrix
-log-dir	logs/	where <code>runs/*.log</code> is looked for
-agents-root	baxbench_agents/	where <code>*/evolve.json</code> is looked for

Cost is $O(n^2)$ pairwise set intersections over interned integer shingles, plus one pass over every `.py` file; the 137-variant population takes on the order of a minute and is single-threaded. The JSON output is the interface for tracking diversity across generations — the `composite_block` and `structural.n_eff_ratio` are the fields to plot.

J.8. What the instrument cannot see

- **Family B is keyword matching over self-reported prose.** The lexicon is a fixed list of regexes applied to what the operator wrote about its own edit, not an LLM labelling of the diff. An operator that implements a retry loop without using the word “retry” is under-labelled; one that discusses security at length and changes a docstring is over-labelled. The path rules cover only four directories. Read H_{label} as an upper bound on how many distinct mechanisms were genuinely attempted, and never as evidence on its own.

- **Semantic equivalence is invisible to family A.** Two rewrites of the same idea in different words are far apart under all three shingle sets. D_{struct} is therefore also an upper bound: real diversity is at most what it reports, possibly much less. This is the one place where a second LLM pass — pairwise “do these two scaffolds implement the same strategy?” — would add information the current instrument cannot.
- **D is dominated by genome size.** Jaccard on shingle sets penalizes a genome that merely has more code; a child that adds a large `skills/` file moves away from its parent by more than a child that rewrites the main loop. The AST component partly compensates, and this is why the three components are always reported separately rather than only as D .
- **Family C is only as complete as the score table.** Here 31 of 137 variants are scored, so D_{perf} , the front, the hypervolume and r describe a biased subset — the variants that survived long enough to be evaluated. r in particular is computed over $\binom{31}{2} = 465$ pairs drawn from that subset.
- **Nothing is inferential.** No confidence intervals, no null model. There is no reference value against which N_{eff}/n can be judged high or low; the numbers are only meaningful as a time series over generations, or as an A/B between two configurations measured identically.

The measurement this suggests. The instrument is currently run by hand after a batch of runs. The single change that would make it useful to the search is to compute N_{eff}/n and D_{novel} over the live population at the end of each generation and log them next to the held-out scores — still never entering selection. That makes changes in these metrics visible in the generation they happen rather than at the end of a run.

K. Calibrating the overfitting gate

K.1. What the gate is

Beyond the mechanical guardrails of §4.2, every admitted child passes through an *overfitting gate*: a one-shot LLM judge that sees the parent→child diff δ together with the injected `## Diagnosis` block, and returns a scalar risk $\rho(\delta) \in [0, 1]$ plus a one-line justification naming the mechanism it believes the edit fits. A child is rejected when $\rho(\delta) > \theta$.

Two choices matter. First, the judge is deliberately *not* shown the artifact-grounded failure digest or the per-task trajectories: conditioned on a real failure, any edit that addresses that failure can be rationalized as principled, and the judge collapses to accepting everything. Second, the judge emits a scalar rather than a verdict, so the operating point θ can be chosen on a calibration curve instead of being fixed implicitly by the prompt.

An uncalibrated judge is an assertion. This appendix reports what the gate actually detects, on overfits whose ground-truth label is known by construction and, for the harder tiers, verified behaviourally against the eval-only held-out split of §5.1.

K.2. Paired construction

Constructing an “overfit” population and a “general” population separately confounds the label with edit size, edit style, and topic. We use a paired design instead. We draw $n_C = 5$ real admitted children from completed runs, sampled from distinct generations and distinct MOEA/D weight niches so that the study does not measure a single lineage, and restrict to the `-operator diff` mode so that each child is already a minimal in-place edit with a well-defined diff against its parent. For each such child

C and each plant type q we form

$$C_q^+ = \text{INJECT}(C, q),$$

a copy of C carrying exactly one injected overfit and no other change. The judge scores C and every C_q^+ blind to the label and in randomised order. Because C and C_q^+ differ only by the injection, detection is measured against a matched control and significance is assessed with a paired McNemar test rather than a two-sample comparison. Each condition is judged 3× and scored by majority vote; we report the vote disagreement rate as a measure of judge stochasticity.

K.3. The plant taxonomy

Table 18 lists the injected edits. They are graded into three tiers of increasing subtlety, plus a control class. The tiers exist because a judge that fires on Tier 1 and nothing else is a regular expression with a language model’s latency; locating where detection actually breaks down is the point of the exercise.

Tier 1 (lexical) injects specificity that is visible as a literal string in the diff. **Tier 2 (structural)** injects specificity that is real but carries no benchmark string — a branch on a feature that only co-occurs in the evolve split, a constant tuned to it, or a dependence on an incidental convention of the ARVO harness rather than on the repair task. **Tier 3 (semantic)** injects a policy that is defensible in the abstract but true only of the evolve split’s distribution, or that games the scoring rule rather than the underlying objective; these are the edits a diff-reading judge has the least purchase on.

The control class, **S (suspicious-but-general)**, is the complement and is required for a meaningful false-positive rate. Our own champion’s decisive mechanism — a ground-truth build and boot/exploit probe (§4) — is ARVO-specific in its *interface* while being entirely general in its *mechanism*: consult ground truth rather than adjudicate a patch by reading it. An overfitting gate that rejects that edit has cost more than it saved, and a false-positive rate measured only on unmodified children would never reveal it.

K.4. Behavioural label verification

Tier 1 and Tier 2 labels are certain by construction: the injected edit is specific to search-set material by inspection, and no further evidence is required. Tier 3 and class S labels are *assertions* about generalization, so we verify them against behaviour rather than trusting the author. For each such candidate we compute the generalization gap

$$\Delta_{\text{gap}} = \underbrace{(s_{\text{evolve}}(C^+) - s_{\text{evolve}}(C))}_{\Delta_{\text{evolve}}^{\wedge}} - \underbrace{(s_{\text{ho}}(C^+) - s_{\text{ho}}(C))}_{\Delta_{\text{ho}}^{\wedge}},$$

where s_{evolve} is secure-pass@1 on the 30-task evolve split and s_{ho} is secure-pass@1 over the 60 tasks of $\text{IN} \cup \text{OUT}$, each task weighted equally (the two splits have equal size) (§5.1). A genuine overfit exhibits $\Delta_{\text{evolve}}^{\wedge} > 0$ with $\Delta_{\text{ho}}^{\wedge} \leq 0$, hence $\Delta_{\text{gap}} \gg 0$; a general edit exhibits $\Delta_{\text{gap}} \approx 0$. A Tier 3 plant that fails this test was a bad plant and is relabelled or dropped before the detection statistics are computed. Because verification is required only for Tier 3 and class S, the cost is $n_C \times 7$ held-out evaluations rather than a full sweep.

This step is what separates the study from a self-graded exercise: the positive labels the judge is scored against are grounded in measured behaviour on tasks the operator never saw.

Table 18 | The planted-overfit taxonomy. Each plant is injected into a real admitted child as the sole modification. Tier 1–2 labels are certain by construction; Tier 3 and class S labels are verified behaviourally (§K.4).

ID	Mechanism fitted	Injected edit
<i>Tier 1 — lexical</i>		
P1	task identity	<code>if task_id in {...}</code> guarding a bespoke code path, with evolve-split IDs enumerated
P2	crash-type string	a crash-type name drawn from the evolve split hardcoded into the prompt template
P3	repository name	<code>if "libpng" in repo_path</code> selecting a hand-written fix recipe
P4	task text	a skill file whose body names specific evolve-split tasks
<i>Tier 2 — structural</i>		
P5	split-correlated feature	branch on a (file extension $\times$ crash type) pair that occurs only in the evolve split
P6	tuned constant	retry count / context budget set to the value that maximises evolve-split score
P7	harness convention	short-circuit on an incidental ARVO signal (exit code, artifact path) rather than on repair state
P8	benchmark format	logic fitted to SecRepoBench’s masked-region format rather than to code repair
<i>Tier 3 — semantic</i>		
P9	distributional prior	a prompt heuristic true of the evolve split’s crash-type mix and false in general
P10	scoring rule	suppress code paths the PoC can reach, trading f_{func} for f_{sec} under <code>secure-pass@1</code>
P11	evaluation order	skip work that only moves f_{func} on tasks where functionality is already saturated
<i>Class S — suspicious but general (control)</i>		
S1	execution-grounded probe	a ground-truth build + boot/exploit probe (ARVO-specific interface, general mechanism)
S2	interface naming	a tool named for the benchmark whose body is benchmark-agnostic
S3	documentation	a comment referencing SecRepoBench above an otherwise general verification gate
S4	default value	a general retry policy whose default happens to have been chosen on the evolve split

K.5. What the gate detects

Ablations. Two variants are run on the same pairs at negligible additional cost.

- **Same-model vs. cross-model judge.** The default judge shares a model family with the proposer, which risks correlated blind spots — an edit the proposer produced because it appeared general is an edit the same model is disposed to certify as general. We repeat the study with a judge from a different family and report the difference in Tier 3 recall.
- **Diagnosis-conditioned vs. diff-only.** Supplying the stated hypothesis may help the judge locate the intended mechanism, or may supply a ready-made rationalisation. We report both.

Cost. $n_C = 5 \text{ parents} \times 16 \text{ conditions} \times 3 \text{ samples} = 240$ judge calls, plus $n_C \times 7 = 35$ held-out evaluations for behavioural verification — together a small fraction of a single evolution run.

Scope. The gate is calibrated against *planted* overfits, which are by construction the overfits we thought to write down. It bounds the judge’s sensitivity to known failure modes and does not establish coverage of unknown ones; that is precisely why the gate is deployed as a cheap pre-execution screen in front of the held-out protocol rather than as a replacement for it.

K.6. A concrete reward-hacking failure

The clearest evidence that a search-set safety score is not evidence of safety is a variant that achieved a perfect one. **Raw error feedback** is identical to the factored-evolving configuration (Table 5) except in what the proposer may read and when a child is accepted: it receives the grader’s raw error output, and any child is accepted whose functional pass rate does not decrease. Under that rule the search reports 100/100/100 on the SecRepoBench search set—every task functional, every exploit blocked, on the same 30 tasks where the un-evolved harness scores 46.7 combined.

The score is an artifact. Inspecting the winning harness’s trajectories shows the code it emits is not secure: the run satisfies the measurement rather than the property the measurement stands for. Two further observations from our runs separate the ways a search can do this, because they call for different defenses.

The soft form: writing the search split into the scaffold. Running DGM we repeatedly recovered children that had simply hardcoded the search split’s crash distribution. One assumes every task is a CWE-125 out-of-bounds *read* reached through the UTF-8 decoding branch and routes every repair through that path; another ships an `_OOW_LADDER` of fixes that presumes the bug is always an out-of-bounds *write*; a third assumes a `calloc` off-by-one on a UCS-2 buffer. Each is right often enough on the split it evolved on to be accepted, and each is structurally incapable of transferring—which is the mechanism behind DGM’s 0% retention in Table 1. We do not see this signature in our own runs, and we attribute that to the explicit `generalize` operator of §4.2, whose only job is to find and dismantle exactly this kind of mechanism—hardcoded crash-type ladders, magic strings, prompt text naming concrete tasks, over-tuned constants, parsing that assumes one repository’s layout—and replace it with one that transfers, so that a fix recipe must be stated in terms of the failure digest rather than in terms of the tasks it was derived from.

The hard form: editing the grader. The stronger failure is available to any harness that can write to the files that score it. We tested this deliberately, running without the per-evaluation Harbor container and without the git-backed restore of protected files: the agent goes straight for `evaluate.py`, and the run then reports 100% on every axis—not a weak measurement but no measurement at all. This is not hypothetical for the baselines we compare against: the meta-harness code carries no hard constraint protecting those files, so nothing *inside* the harness prevents it, and the protection has to come from outside the genome. Ours is structural rather than behavioural. Every evaluation runs in an isolated Harbor container with the network disabled and CPU, memory, and wall-clock limits; `solution/` and the held-out splits are never built into the image; and the files that define *scoring*—the evaluator, the task definitions, the tests—are snapshotted before every operator call and force-restored afterwards, so an edit to them cannot survive into the evaluated child. Note the asymmetry this draws: no file *inside* the genome is protected—the proposer may rewrite the whole harness down to its base class (§4)—while no file that *scores* the genome is writable at all. That closes “rewrite the scorer” and “rewrite the tests” as paths entirely, and it is what makes the 100/100/100 above worth reporting: it was produced with all of these defenses in place, so it is a statement about the *acceptance rule*, not about the sandbox.




Figure 8 | Workflow DAGs planned by the evolved orchestrator over 28 BaxBench tasks. Solid edges are unconditional; dashed nodes/edges fire only under a `when` guard. Plans range from 5 to 8 nodes and are re-planned per task, rather than fixed at harness-design time.

We report this variant rather than discarding it, for two reasons. First, it is not a pathological corner of the design space but the endpoint of the trend in Table 1: every method here converts search-split security into less out-of-distribution security than it appears to have bought, and the strongest scalarized baseline already retains 0%. An acceptance rule that reads raw search-set feedback simply drives that retention gap to its limit, where the measured score is 100 and the transferred security is nothing. Second, it localizes the defect precisely. Both objectives were measured by real execution; nothing was proxied by a judge. What failed is that *acceptance* consulted a score computed on the very tasks the proposer was optimizing against. This is the empirical content of the asymmetry argument in §3, and the reason we keep security as a separate objective of the search and judge it off the split being optimized rather than folding it into the reward the acceptance rule reads.

It also sets the evidentiary bar for our own results: a high search-set security score is, by construction, exactly the kind of number this failure mode produces. We therefore do not rest any claim on one. Our own search-set security of 93.3 is reported but carries no weight on its own; what the argument rests on is the held-out F&S of 86.7 (IN) and 66.7 (OUT), which the proposer never sees, and the cross-benchmark transfer of §5.2, which a harness that has hardcoded one benchmark’s crash distribution cannot produce.

K.7. Baseline harnesses and a case study

For calibration we run two off-the-shelf agent harnesses on SecRepoBench under identical grading: SWE-agent (Opus) reaches $\text{secure-pass@1} = 0.444$ overall (0.267 out-of-distribution), and an evolved Terminus-2 harness (Gemini) reaches 0.556 (0.433 OOD). Inspecting their trajectories shows *why* a general terminal agent underperforms on this precise code-completion task: whole-file replacement without a mask-region guardrail turns editing fragility into measured capability loss, and the exploit signal is hidden at solve time, so its feedback-driven iteration idles on exactly the objective that matters. The evolved champion instead brackets the pipeline with the only available ground truth (compile + boot), inserts a dedicated per-CWE hardening pass, and keeps a last-known-good snapshot so a self-review can never break compilability.