

StoreBench: A Live-Commerce Environment for Evaluating and Training Autonomous Operator Agents

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Reinforcement learning environments are now a primary lever for improving large language model (LLM) capabilities in post-training, yet most agentic benchmarks remain static: the world moves only when the agent acts, the reward is a terminal verdict, and the pass bar is set arbitrarily. We introduce StoreBench, a live-commerce environment in which an agent runs a mid-size online apparel store on a production-grade commerce backend, testing long-horizon planning and economic judgment under uncertainty. Customers order around the clock, suppliers reprice and fail, and market shocks arrive with partial or no warning. The agent acts through the same 29 merchant tools a human operator would use, under a windowed operation budget that makes simulated time a function of actions taken, so model latency cannot influence simulated time. Pass thresholds are calibrated against scripted anchor policies, the reward is hardened against a catalogue of reward hacks, and every episode replays identically given a sequence of actions. We evaluate seven frontier LLMs on 11 scenarios of 30 to 45 days and a full simulated year, over three world seeds at matched reasoning effort. No model matches the scripted smart-triage policy on average: the best, DeepSeek-V4-Pro, passes 49% of task-seed cells against the heuristic’s 97%. Human experts working through the same tools and budgets outscore every model (mean composite 0.708 vs. 0.700). Over a full simulated year under the Claude Code harness, most models show dramatic performance improvement. In a GRPO post-training run, Qwen3.5-27B trained on only five disjoint tasks raises its mean composite on the held-out evaluation tasks from 0.136 to 0.373. We release five example training-split tasks, ten sample trajectories, and the scoring and verification tooling; the full environment and evaluation suite are withheld to keep the benchmark uncontaminated.

Data: Public set is available upon request.



1 Introduction

Reinforcement learning (RL) with verifiable rewards now drives much of the progress in reasoning and agentic large language models (LLMs) (DeepSeek-AI, 2025; Lambert et al., 2025). The tasks and evaluators that supply those rewards therefore increasingly shape what models learn. Meanwhile, AI agents are moving from answering questions to doing real work: their task horizon has doubled roughly every seven months (Kwa et al., 2025), and evaluations are beginning to cover deliverables drawn from real occupations (Patwardhan et al., 2025). Yet most agent benchmarks still test bounded tasks in controlled environments that are reset between runs (Jimenez et al., 2024; Zhou et al., 2024; Yao et al., 2025). As a result, they rarely measure what ongoing work requires: sustained reliability, adaptation to change, and the ability to operate with limited human supervision.

Reliable operations are fundamental to organizational success. Whether AI agents can excel at them is therefore a critical test of their real-world capabilities. However, operational work breaks the conventional evaluation recipe in three ways. First, the world moves on its own: demand arrives whether or not the

agent is ready, deadlines approach, and information goes stale. The environment’s clock must therefore advance independently of both agent actions and inference speed. Second, operational success is cumulative, not binary, and must be measured on a scale calibrated against an external baseline. Third, open-ended rewards invite open-ended gaming: mismatches between the simulator’s rules and its intended behavior create loopholes that reward optimization can teach agents to exploit. Together, these challenges create a need for evaluations of sustained operations under asynchronous demand, with empirically calibrated success criteria and rewards explicitly stress-tested for exploits.

We therefore introduce **StoreBench**, a long-horizon benchmark in which an agent operates a mid-sized online apparel store for 30 to 365 simulated days (Figure 1). The environment combines 18 months of operating history, a 40-vendor supplier market, 29 merchant tools, hidden demand, and scripted shocks to suppliers, costs, and competitors within a production-grade commerce backend. Simulated time depends only on agent operations, not inference latency. Scripted policies calibrate each task-seed score and pass threshold, while an exploiter policy tests resistance to known reward hacking. Our contributions are threefold.

- **A realistic agent environment for long-horizon operational work.** The framework of StoreBench is general: its modular tools, event models, and backend can be adapted to other real-world operational settings.
- **Calibrated, exploit-resistant evaluation.** Regression tests cover every known exploit, any run can be replayed for audit, and dense rewards make StoreBench suitable for RL.
- **An unsaturated benchmark with actionable failure modes.** We evaluate frontier models on tasks calibrated to a difficulty that still separates them: none matches the smart-triage operator on average. Replayable traces turn that headroom into concrete targets for improving models and harnesses.

2 Related work

Agent benchmarks. Most agent benchmarks evaluate predefined goals in environments that change only when the agent acts, including software repair (Jimenez et al., 2024), web and desktop tasks (Deng et al., 2023; Zhou et al., 2024; Xie et al., 2024), tool-use dialogues (Yao et al., 2025; He et al., 2026), simulated workplace tasks (Xu et al., 2025), and general-assistant suites (Liu et al., 2024; Mialon et al., 2024). DAYJOB extends this paradigm to multi-hour professional assignments graded with expert rubrics (Surge AI, 2026), but the unit of evaluation remains a fixed assignment. These benchmarks primarily measure whether an agent completes the task and reaches an end state, not the quality it sustains as demands change.

Dynamic operational environments. Gaia2 introduces scripted events that occur independently of the agent, but still evaluates discrete assistant tasks against an oracle action graph (Froger et al., 2026). Its Time scenarios are capped at five minutes, and generation latency affects the clock: removing it raises GPT-5’s score from 0% to 34.4%. Vending-Bench (Backlund & Petersson, 2025) and MerchantBench (Shi et al., 2026) evaluate long-running businesses using terminal financial outcomes, without task-specific calibrated scales or pass thresholds. Together these gaps point to a need for long-horizon evaluation that meters time through operations rather than generation latency, runs on a production-grade commerce backend, and calibrates each task-seed pair against measured policy baselines.

Reward hacking. Reward hacking is a longstanding concern in RL safety (Amodei et al., 2016; Krakovna et al., 2020; Skalse et al., 2022; Pan et al., 2022; Gao et al., 2023), and LLM agents have been observed modifying rewards and tests, tampering with evaluators, and exploiting feedback loops (Denison et al., 2024; Pan et al., 2024; Baker et al., 2025; Von Arx et al., 2025). Recent benchmarks measure how often such behavior occurs (Zhong et al., 2026; Zhao et al., 2026; Thaman, 2026). However, an open-ended reward needs hardening by design, with each closed exploit fixed by a regression test and calibration failing whenever an exploiter policy beats an honest baseline.




Figure 1 StoreBench overview. A harness-agnostic commerce agent reaches the world only through 29 MCP tools; each call spends one operation, and the world advances in 12-hour windows. The Ostrelle store and its supplier market run on live Medusa v2 software, while demand, order flow, scripted events, and rivals sit in a hidden market the agent observes only through its own sales. Episodes of 30 to 365 days receive weighted scores and are compared to scripted anchor policies. Human experts operate the same MCP surface through a thin GUI, under the same budgets and grading. Icons: Microsoft Fluent Emoji (MIT License).

3 The StoreBench environment

StoreBench places the agent in charge of *Ostrelle*, a fictional mid-size online apparel store, for a contiguous shift of 30 to 365 simulated days. The store is not a mock: it runs on Medusa v2, a production-grade open-source commerce platform (Medusa, 2024), with the agent acting through the same administrative API surface a human operator would use. One container image holds the backend, simulation engine, and tool server; the agent’s network can reach the tool surface and nothing else.

3.1 A world with history

The store opens with 18 months of coherent operating history baked into the backend’s own database: 3,320 orders with seasonal and diurnal structure, ~2,500 customers with realistic repeat-purchase distributions, a 14.7% return rate, and opening work-in-progress that becomes the agent’s obligations at window one. A seed-quality suite of 31 distributional and coherence audits gates every published image.

The listed catalog covers 111 supply lines over 3,448 variants; a supplier market of 40 vendors offers ~5,200 stock-keeping units (SKUs) across tiers that differ in price, lead time, minimum quantities, defect rates, and reliability. Supplier prices drift under a bounded random walk; scripted events can withdraw SKUs, extend lead times, or reprise whole origins.




Figure 2 Three example tasks from the 12-task suite: *steady* (steady-state operations), *trade-war* (a correlated supply shock), and *black-swan* (a silent demand crash). Each chart plots the hidden quantity the task’s event script perturbs; markers show when each event fires and through which channel the agent can learn of it. Quotes are from the task prompts.

3.2 Hidden dynamics

Demand is generated per 12-hour window from a hidden model the agent can only observe through its own sales: per-line popularity, price elasticity, shelf attractiveness, seasonality, copy quality, and stockout censoring. Orders are injected into the real backend and backdated to simulated time, so the fiction survives direct database inspection. Returns arrive with realistic delays and escalate to fines if ignored; defective units follow supplier-specific rates.

Scripted *events* perturb the world on three information channels: *announced* (a platform alert with lead time), *rumored* (vague trade-press language, no numbers), and *silent* (only the store’s own sales reveal it). The vocabulary spans demand shifts, supplier failures, quality crises, macro crashes, cost inflation, and country-level supply shocks. A competition layer adds scripted rivals that capture demand share as a function of relative shelf attractiveness; a store that prices lazily bleeds share even when nothing is announced.

3.3 Tasks as lenses

The benchmark comprises 12 task *lenses* over the same seeded world; each is a small configuration that sets horizon, operation budget, and event script (Figure 2; Appendix A). They span steady-state competence, cold starts, sourcing failures, demand regime changes, capital discipline, competitive defense, compounding shocks, and a 365-day marathon (*full-year*). All tasks share one world: the catalog, the hidden market state, and the 18-month history are fixed. Three world seeds (7, 11, 13) key the forward noise streams; every task-seed pair is calibrated independently (§4), and two further seeds are held out.

3.4 The tool surface and metered time

The agent interacts exclusively through 29 tools over the Model Context Protocol, spanning catalog, pricing, inventory, fulfillment, returns, sourcing, and reporting (Appendix B); every result embeds a one-line store header with time, window, operations left, cash, net assets, and rating. Time is metered in *operations* (Figure 1): each call except a free status probe costs one, and spending the window’s last operation or calling `end_window` advances the world. Budgets do not roll over, so reading a report and shipping an order compete for the same scarce operations. Because the world advances only on agent actions, simulated time is a pure function of the action sequence and wall-clock speed buys nothing: a slow model under a chatty harness faces the same pressure as a fast one. Actions execute at the frozen window-start time; writes are serialized and *fail closed*, so mutations are refused if the engine is unreachable, and the world freezes at episode end for grading. One read returns up to 100 rows while one write moves one order, so observation is comparatively cheap; empirically, final score is flat across a tenfold range of read volume.

4 Grader design

4.1 The composite score

An episode is graded on the terminal state of the store’s books after a settlement pass that enforces every obligation that came due within the horizon (unshipped orders are fined, ignored returns escalate, in-flight purchase orders realize salvage). The composite is

$$R = \underbrace{0.7 \operatorname{clip}_{[0,1]} \left(\frac{\Delta_{\text{net}} - z}{s} \right)}_{\text{business}} + 0.2 \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} (\text{on-time} + \text{returns handled})}_{\text{reliability}} + 0.1 \underbrace{\frac{\text{windows attended}}{\text{windows in task}}}_{\text{continuity}}, \quad (1)$$

where Δ_{net} is the episode’s net-asset growth (cash, deposits, receivables, in-transit money; inventory only at salvage value), and z and s are the measured zero and scale for the task-seed pair (§4.2). Reliability counts platform auto-shipments and stockout cancellations *against* the on-time rate, and return credit scales with the share of the customer’s money actually refunded. Continuity divides by the windows in the task, not the windows played: quitting is absence, not a shorter denominator. Every window also emits an unclipped dense training channel (§7, Appendix C). The weights encode a judgment about what matters in store operation; the ranking is stable under alternative weightings (Appendix D).

4.2 Anchor calibration

A reward like Eq. 1 is meaningless without a measured scale. For every task-seed pair we run the six scripted policies through the real tool surface, under the same budgets as any agent, from **do-nothing** and **absentee** (attends, never acts) through **blast-list** (ships everything, decides nothing), **rule-based** (a checklist clerk), and **smart-triage** (a heuristic operator) to an **exploiter** that plays every closed reward exploit.

The anchors define the scale: z is absentee’s terminal growth, s the gap from z to the best anchor. The pass threshold sits at the midpoint of the two best *honest* trading anchors, subject to four gates. (i) *Ordering*: on every seed, both judgment anchors (rule-based, smart-triage) must outscore the volume and non-trading anchors; their order relative to each other may vary. (ii) A *judgment gap*: the better judgment anchor must clear the volume policy (blast-list) by a minimum gap, otherwise the lens rewards keystrokes rather than judgment and is rebalanced. (iii) A *flap margin*: a pass bar within run-to-run noise of a reference policy will flap, the reliability failure documented for small evaluation sets (Yauney et al., 2026), so the threshold must clear both adjacent anchors by a noise margin (where the top two tie, the bar sits just under the shared ceiling). (iv) *Exploit suppression*: the exploiter must score below every honest anchor. All 36 reported task-seed cells pass all gates, as do the 24 cells of the two privately calibrated held-out seeds; thresholds span 0.43 to 0.76 (Figure 3, Appendix E). The scale is demanding: blast-list captures a median 65% of the top anchor’s composite yet passes nowhere.

4.3 Reward integrity as engineering

Open-ended rewards invite gaming, and we treat the gap between “no current model exploits this” and “no optimizer can profit from this” as the benchmark’s attack surface. Development followed an audit-close-pin loop: each exploit found by an audit of 756 pre-hardening trials and a code-level exploit hunt was closed in the world model, pinned by an adversarial regression test, and folded into the exploiter anchor, so every future calibration re-plays the entire catalogue. Post-hardening, the exploiter averages 0.04 over the reported suite against 0.46 to 0.76 for the honest trading anchors (Table 1); the full catalogue, with measured pre-fix payoffs, is in Appendix F.

4.4 Determinism and provenance

Every reported number is reproducible from an immutable chain. Noise streams are purpose-keyed, replaying an action sequence against the live backend reproduces the ledger byte for byte, and each trial’s run manifest records the source commit, image digest, and hashes of the seed data and calibration file. Missing or corrupt artifacts grade to numeric zero: the environment fails closed at every layer (Appendix G).

5 Experimental setup

Protocol. We evaluate seven frontier models (DeepSeek-V4-Pro, Claude Opus 4.8, Claude Fable 5, Qwen3.8-Max, Gemini 3.8 Flash, GPT-5.6 Sol, and Muse Spark 1.2) on our eval task suite of 11 dense tasks $\times$ 3 reported seeds (7, 11, 13) $\times$ 3 attempts under a single pinned agent harness (goose) with the 29-tool MCP surface mounted. The goose harness is open-source and tool-native by default, which makes it a natural medium for public evaluations. Every model runs at matched reasoning effort, with full harness and configuration details in Appendix H; five training-split tasks, ten sample trajectories, and the scoring code are included in the **supplementary material**. In every episode, the model receives the task instruction and tool access, and no scoring mechanics, thresholds, or scripted-event information. The harness exposes no web or browser tools, and egress is limited to the model API. Each individual trial is considered a “pass” if its composite score (Eq. 1) clears the task-seed threshold.

The full-year task is run separately, using Claude Code, a popular production harness, with context compaction and extended thinking suited to a 365-window episode, at 3 seeds $\times$ 3 attempts. Because it differs from the short-horizon suite in both harness and effort, we report it as its own result (§6.3) for fair comparison. As in the main benchmark, every model faces byte-identical starting conditions.

Metrics. We report per-cell composite scores with pass/fail rates against per-cell calibrated thresholds, component breakdowns (business, reliability, continuity), and position relative to the deterministic set of policies. Genuine model failures, like an agent that quits, idles, or declares itself finished early, are kept and scored as played; only trials that fail for infrastructure reasons (API or sandbox errors) are excluded and re-run.

Human expert reference. Eleven randomly selected participants from an existing pool of contract experts with reported e-commerce experience operated the store on the same 33 cells we report in the main benchmark (Appendix I). They interacted with Ostrelle using a thin client over the MCP server, to create an identical tool surface and observation space as their agent counterparts, along with identical operation budgets, calibration, and grading. Participants received the same written briefing as the agents’ initial observation, and were allotted 12 hours of wall clock time to complete each task. The user interface constructed for the human experts allowed no privileged information or advantages, in order to represent tasks with the same conditions that evaluated agents faced.

6 Evaluation results

Under the protocol of §5, Table 1 reports the leaderboard against the scripted policy set; the full model $\times$ task composite matrix is in Appendix J.

6.1 Main benchmark

The headline is that *no frontier model reaches the smart-triage operator or human expert on average*. The best model, DeepSeek-V4-Pro, scores a mean composite of 0.700: well below the smart-triage operator (0.764), and slightly below the mean human expert score (0.708). DeepSeek and Claude Opus 4.8 (0.668) are the only models to clear the checklist-based policy; Claude Fable 5 (0.629) sits just under it; Qwen3.8-Max (0.587), Gemini 3.8 Flash (0.552) and GPT-5.6 Sol (0.538) land between the checklist and the blast-list volume policy (0.463); Muse Spark 1.2 (0.387) falls below blast-list. Pass rates extend the picture: the smart-triage policy

Table 1 StoreBench leaderboard: we report mean composite score, pass rate, and component means (business, reliability, continuity per Eq. 1) over the 11 eval tasks $\times$ 3 seeds $\times$ 3 attempts, at matched reasoning effort; a trial passes if its composite clears its cell’s calibrated threshold (§4.2). Deterministic policies are italicized; no model reaches the smart-triage operator on average. Bold marks the best model or human value per column. Dashes: component means are not reported for scripted policies.

Policy / Model	Composite	Pass	Business	Reliab.	Contin.
<i>Smart-triage</i>	0.764	97%	—	—	—
<i>Rule-based</i>	0.638	12%	—	—	—
<i>Blast-list</i>	0.463	0%	—	—	—
<i>Absentee</i>	0.100	0%	—	—	—
<i>Do-nothing</i>	0.000	0%	—	—	—
<i>Exploiter</i>	0.039	0%	—	—	—
DeepSeek-V4-Pro	0.700	49%	0.614	0.852	1.000
Claude Opus 4.8	0.668	36%	0.573	0.834	1.000
Claude Fable 5	0.629	29%	0.520	0.822	1.000
Qwen3.8-Max	0.587	20%	0.465	0.805	1.000
Gemini 3.8 Flash	0.552	15%	0.440	0.719	1.000
GPT-5.6 Sol	0.538	19%	0.398	0.799	1.000
Muse Spark 1.2	0.387	8%	0.226	0.644	1.000
Human experts	0.708	39%	0.599	0.944	1.000

clears the calibrated bar on 97% of cells, the best model on 49%, and every other model on at most 36%. The discriminating component is *business*: the net assets the model accrues over the shift.

6.2 Human experts

The sampled human outcomes achieve a higher mean composite than any model we evaluated, 0.708: narrowly above DeepSeek (0.700), well above the rule-based checklist (0.638), and still below the smart-triage operator (0.764; Table 1). The gap to smart-triage may partly reflect the interface: humans operated through the same tool-and-operation surface as the agents rather than the storefront tools they normally use. From the observed results, their advantage lies in service rather than commerce. Humans ship 96% of orders on time and handle 93% of returns, for a reliability of 0.944 against at most 0.852 for any model, while their business component (0.599) is slightly below DeepSeek’s (0.614). Human scores are also more dispersed across cells (0.33 to 1.00, standard deviation 0.16), so despite the higher mean they clear the calibrated threshold on fewer cells than DeepSeek (39% vs. 49%). By task (Appendix J), humans exceed every model on slow-drift, black-swan, new-entrant, and perfect-storm, exceed even smart-triage on cold-start and slow-drift, and trail the best model most on steady (0.539 vs. 0.736). Two caveats bound the comparison: humans contribute one selected outcome per cell where models average three unselected attempts, and participants were allowed one retry.

6.3 Long-horizon operation

We evaluate our seven models on the *full-year* task (Table 2), where models operate the store for 365 days, one window a day, twelve operations in the window, and no scripted shock. Orders, returns, and fines continue to be simulated year-round, with seasonal shifts in demand and carrier availability. It is run under Claude Code, with context compaction and extended thinking, rather than the goose protocol of the short suite.

The short-horizon order does not carry over, and most models score higher. DeepSeek-V4-Pro (0.976), Qwen3.8-Max (0.974), Claude Opus 4.8 (0.971), and Claude Fable 5 (0.966) sit near the top of the scale, well above the smart-triage anchor (0.764). Those four gain +0.28 to +0.39 on their short-horizon means. Muse Spark 1.2, last on the short suite at 0.387, reaches 0.862. Qwen, fourth over the short tasks, is second here. The deltas compare the two setups, harness and effort included. Gemini 3.8 Flash (0.496) is the one model whose year falls below its short-horizon mean; GPT-5.6 Sol still rises, to 0.783, short of the leaders.

Table 2 Long horizon vs. short horizon. Δ is full-year minus the eval mean; the setups differ in harness.

Model	Short	Full-yr	Δ
DeepSeek-V4-Pro	0.700	0.976	+0.276
Qwen3.8-Max	0.587	0.974	+0.387
Claude Opus 4.8	0.668	0.971	+0.303
Claude Fable 5	0.629	0.966	+0.337
Muse Spark 1.2	0.387	0.862	+0.475
GPT-5.6 Sol	0.538	0.783	+0.245
Gemini 3.8 Flash	0.552	0.496	-0.056

Both scores include attempts that fail outright (Figure 4). In four of nine Gemini attempts, the agent asserts that a background simulation process is running the store and then waits through the harness’s scheduling tool instead of acting, averaging about 0.1; on the five attempts where it operates, it averages 0.799. One of nine GPT attempts declares the store complete at window 185 of 365 and stops. Both failures are scored as played.

6.4 Failure modes

The replayable traces let us understand models’ specific failure modes, using both recorded traces and agents’ own transcripts. Across the official benchmark suite, three failure modes dominate the business term, and all stem from a misallocation of a scarce operating budget.

- **Underbuying and stockouts.** Restocking that is too thin, too late, or skips secondary lines empties the shelf at the SKU level and forfeits demand. It appears in 26% of trials (178 of 693) and spans the whole field, including the highest-scoring models; in 60 trials the agent never places a single purchase order (Gemini in 41 of them). One Gemini *trade-war* run places zero restocks and lets inventory drain from 1,603 units to zero, losing 61 orders; even a strong Opus run narrates the pattern verbatim: “second-tier sellers are stocking out ... I never restocked them.”
- **Return under-refunding.** Agents do engage returns, but refund below the full amount: the customer rejects the partial refund, the return escalates past its deadline, and the store pays an ignored-return fine, eventually a worse outcome than the refund it was avoiding.
- **Shell-driving vs. MCP-use.** Given identical access, models may issue native tool calls or script batched calls through the harness shell. The two weakest operators, Muse and Gemini, lean on shell use indiscriminately, dispatching bulk fulfill/refund/restock batches that act on stale state and spending the budget on status polls rather than writes. The cost shows up within each model: Muse’s shell-driven runs average 0.34 composite against 0.43 when it operates natively, and Gemini’s two native runs average 0.89 against 0.55 for its shell-driven ones. The split follows the model rather than the task: the two open-weight models, DeepSeek-V4-Pro and Qwen3.8-Max, call the tools natively in every trial, while Claude Opus 4.8, Claude Fable 5, GPT-5.6 Sol, and Gemini 3.8 Flash drive the store through the shell in nearly every trial, and Muse Spark 1.2 splits evenly.

7 Post-training results

StoreBench is designed to serve as a training environment as well as a benchmark: grading is deterministic and judge-free, simulated time is a pure function of the action sequence (§3.4), and a dense per-window scoring channel telescopes exactly to the graded terminal growth (Appendix C). We test whether RL in the environment improves operation on tasks the policy never trained on.

Setup. We post-train Qwen3.5-72B with GRPO (Shao et al., 2024) and LoRA (rank 32; Hu et al., 2022) on five 7- to 15-day training tasks (cash-crunch, counter-punch, final-clearance, season-flip, short-runway)

Table 3 Post-training transfers to held-out tasks. Qwen3.5-27B before and after GRPO on the 11 evaluation tasks $\times$ 3 seeds $\times$ 3 episodes, official composite score, and its components. On-time fulfillment rates and successful return rates are also shown. Both policies run under the same harness.

Policy	Composite	Pass	Business	Reliab.	Contin.	On-time	Returns	Windows
Base	0.136	0/99	0.005	0.401	0.521	0.65	0.16	33.4
Tuned	0.373	3/99	0.236	0.669	0.741	0.89	0.45	47.3

that are disjoint from the evaluation suite, over seeds 7, 11, and 13. We take 36 training steps of 5 task-seed prompts $\times$ 6 rollouts, or 1,080 total training episodes. The base model’s composite score consistently receives a 0 for the business component, and it almost never trades at a profit, so rollouts within a group scored alike and left no advantage signal. The training reward therefore clips normalized business to $[-2, 1]$ instead of $[0, 1]$, which ranks losing stores against each other. Every reported number still uses the official composite score. We evaluate the base model and the final checkpoint on the 11 evaluation tasks, whose 30- to 45-day horizons are at least twice the training length, $\times$ seeds 7, 11, 13 $\times$ 3 episodes. For both training and evaluation, we use a custom in-process Python harness with a 150-turn cap and context compaction (Appendix K). Because this harness differs from the leaderboard protocol, we compare the two policies with each other and with the anchors, not with Table 1.

Results. Post-training raises the mean composite on the held-out tasks from 0.136 to 0.373, a paired gain of +0.237 per cell (bootstrap 95% CI $[+0.19, +0.29]$), and improves 31 of 33 cells (Table 3; per-task results in Appendix K). The share of episodes that end at a profit rises from 3% to 72%. The trained policy ships more orders on time and clears more returns. The base model exhausts the turn cap on 97 of 99 episodes and reaches window 33 on average (tasks run 60 to 90 windows); the checkpoint reaches window 47. Neither policy reprices or restocks much, and the checkpoint places fewer purchase orders than the base model. The trained policy still exceeds the blast-list anchor on only two tasks (liquidity and steady), stays below the rule-based checklist on all eleven, and passes 3 of 99 episodes. Both regressing cells are on cold-start, where in 8 of 99 episodes the checkpoint stops calling tools after about twelve windows, which the base model never does.

8 Discussion

Human experts versus models. Humans reach their higher mean mainly through service, shipping and refunding more reliably than any model while earning slightly less than the best one. The remaining gap lies less in knowing what a good store does than in executing routine obligations consistently. The failure of models to reach human-expert play, despite humans interacting with an unnatural interface, shows the gap the models have yet to bridge with respect to long-term coherence and execution.

Harness as a variable. Under Claude Code, five of seven models score 0.86 or higher on the full year, above both their short-horizon means and smart-triage (Table 2). The short-horizon suite (60 to 90 windows, goose harness) and the full-year task (365 windows, Claude Code) differ in harness as well as horizon, so we report them separately, do not average across them, and cannot isolate the harness’s effect. The size of the gains nonetheless suggests that the harness is a potential confound, one often left unexplored by public benchmarks. We propose that future public benchmarks should, whenever possible, report their scores relative to performance using a state-of-the-art harness.

Shell versus tool. Every model saw the same 29 tools plus a shell, and a call costs one operation either way, yet four of the five closed models drive the store almost entirely through the shell, a preference that grew with reasoning effort in internal tests. One possible explanation is extensive post-training on terminal-based tasks; when and why agents prefer this interface remains open.

Post training gains. The checkpoint’s gains come primarily from operating discipline rather than commercial strategy (more on-time shipments and handled returns, little repricing or restocking) and partly from turn

efficiency under the 150-turn cap. Learning the pricing and sourcing judgment that separates the strongest models likely requires longer training. That five shorter-horizon training tasks yield meaningful held-out gains also invites study of sample efficiency on long-horizon tasks.

Limitations. The store is a single apparel business with scripted competitors and parametric demand; the engine is withheld to keep the suite held back; and post-training uses one base model and one run (Appendix L).

9 Conclusion

We presented StoreBench, a live-commerce environment that grades sustained economic operation of a real store under hidden dynamics, with harness-independent metered time, anchor-calibrated scoring, an exploit-hardened reward surface, and a byte-auditable measurement chain. No frontier model matches the smart-triage anchor on average, and although most sustain operation well above it over a full simulated year, the long horizon exposes failure modes that short tasks never do: silent delegation to a hallucinated background process and premature self-declared completion.

Reproducibility statement

Five example tasks from the training split, ten sample trajectories on them, their calibration, and the scoring and verification code (the composite scorer and a standalone re-grader that reproduces each trajectory’s score from its exported ledger) are included as anonymized supplementary material, with a datasheet and an MIT license. Because the benchmark is a held-back test set, we withhold the simulation engine and the entire evaluation suite (every evaluation task’s prompt, configuration, and calibration), so the environment cannot be run or trained against outside our own evaluation; the released scorer and trajectories let others reproduce a graded score from an exported ledger without the engine. Each released trajectory carries its graded terminal ledger and a redacted run summary. The determinism and provenance mechanisms that make every reported number replayable are described in §4.4; the metering that makes results harness-independent in §3.4; the calibration procedure and its gates in §4.2, with the reported suite summarized in Appendix E and Appendix A; and the harness, reasoning-effort, and trial-selection settings in Appendix H.

AI use statement

Large language models are the *subjects* of this benchmark; all evaluated model outputs appear only as measured results. In this work, we additionally used generative AI tools for implementing methods (portions of the environment, calibration, and analysis code were written with AI coding assistants), for generating synthetic datasets (the seeded store history was produced by procedural generators developed with AI assistance and validated by a 31-check audit suite), for feedback on research methodology (calibration-gate design was refined in dialogue with AI tools), and for interpreting results (an LLM classified agent trajectories into the failure modes reported in §6.4). We have not used generative AI tools to formulate mathematical claims or proofs, and translation is not applicable to this work. Additionally, we used generative AI tools to draft and edit parts of this manuscript, to create figures, and for retrieval and discovery (finding and verifying related work and citation details). We have reviewed all AI-assisted work: environment code is verified by the unit and adversarial regression suites and by CI gates on every published image, generated data is validated by the seed-quality audits of §3.1, and all claims, failure-mode counts, and citations were checked by the two lead authors against exported artifacts and original sources. We take responsibility for the final content of this work, including text, claims, and artifacts produced with the aid of generative AI.

Ethics statement

The environment is fully synthetic: no real customers, transactions, or personal data are involved, and seeded customer records are procedurally generated. The human expert reference involves paid participants with e-commerce experience, recruited from an existing contractor pool, who consented to take part and operated

the fictional store; each was fairly compensated for their time. Recorded trajectories contain only actions in the simulated store and are pseudonymized, with names, contact details, and access links removed.

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A Task suite

Table 4 The StoreBench task suite. All tasks share the seeded world; each lens sets horizon, operation budget, and event script.

Task	Scenario	Days	Windows	Ops/win	Events	Competition
<i>steady</i>	Steady-state operations	30	60	20	1	–
<i>cold-start</i>	Rebuild the shop	30	60	12	1	–
<i>supply-shock</i>	Your biggest supplier fails	30	60	20	4	–
<i>quality-crisis</i>	Find the bad batch	30	60	20	2	–
<i>liquidity</i>	Run it on fumes	30	60	11	0	–
<i>peak-season</i>	The platform festival	30	60	16	2	–
<i>slow-drift</i>	The season turns	45	90	12	8	–
<i>black-swan</i>	The silent crash	30	60	20	2	–
<i>new-entrant</i>	Defend the segment	30	60	20	1	yes
<i>trade-war</i>	Correlated supply shock	35	70	20	3	–
<i>perfect-storm</i>	Everything at once	35	70	20	3	yes
<i>full-year</i>	The marathon	365	365	12	0	–

Table 4 lists the 12 tasks. Each task’s instruction addresses the agent as the store’s operator and discloses only what the platform would disclose: announced events arrive with lead time, rumored events as vague trade press, silent events not at all. Evaluation-task instructions are withheld with the evaluation suite; the **supplementary material** includes the prompts and configurations for the five training-split tasks of §7 (*cash-crunch*, *counter-punch*, *final-clearance*, *season-flip*, *short-runway*), which are a separate set from the evaluation tasks.

B Tool surface

The 29 tools, by family. Every call costs one operation except `store_status`; `end_window` advances the world clock.

- **Status and time:** `store_status` (free), `end_window`.
- **Catalog and listings:** `list_products`, `get_product`, `set_price`, `set_listing_status`, `update_listing_copy`, `list_supply_product`.
- **Inventory:** `list_inventory`, `dispose_stock`.
- **Orders:** `list_orders`, `get_order`, `fulfill_order`, `cancel_order`.
- **Returns:** `list_returns`, `get_return`, `refund_return`.
- **Sourcing:** `search_supply_catalog`, `supply_product_detail`, `supplier_profile`, `place_purchase_order`, `cancel_purchase_order`, `list_purchase_orders`.
- **Finance and market:** `finance_summary`, `ledger_entries`, `sales_report`, `platform_terms`, `announcements`, `competitor_watch`.

Every tool acts on or reads the live store; there are no decoy tools. Listing copy feeds a bounded merchandising factor in the demand model, so the one historically inert tool has measurable effect.

C The dense reward channel

The benchmark grades once, at settlement. For undiscounted policy-gradient training the choice of reward is free: terminal return and summed dense reward are the same quantity by construction. The two diverge under discounting or bootstrapped value learning, where raw cash flow misprices the environment’s central investment: a purchase order moves cash to in-transit money (neutral), disappears as cost when it lands, and pays back only as later sales, so a discounted learner reading cash flow is paid to milk the shelf and starve restocks. The exported channel therefore values the shelf at salvage, $rl_t = \text{net assets}_t + \rho \cdot \text{inventory}_t$ with ρ the salvage rate. Buying stock is neither punished (the cash outflow is offset when the goods land) nor rewarded (stock is carried below cost until it actually sells), and because settlement liquidates leftovers at exactly ρ , the channel terminates at the benchmark number.

The channel is the business term only: reliability and continuity, 0.3 of the composite, are terminal-rate quantities, so training purely on the dense channel optimizes wealth rather than the reported score. The clipped business term is flat above the top anchor and below the absentee anchor by construction; the dense channel is unclipped precisely so gradient survives outside the calibrated range.

D Composite weights: sensitivity

The composite weights (Eq. 1) encode a judgment about what matters in store operation; this section checks how much the model ranking depends on it. Because each cell’s composite is linear in its component scores, mean composites under any weighting recombine exactly from the exported component means. Table 5 reports the leaderboard under the shipped weights (0.7/0.2/0.1 over business/reliability/continuity), a reliability-heavy alternative (0.5/0.4/0.1), and business only.

The top four and the bottom rank are unchanged under all three weightings; only adjacent, closely-spaced middle models reorder under the reliability-heavy weighting. Pass rates are not recomputed because thresholds are calibrated for the shipped composite.

Table 5 Mean composite under alternative weightings (business/reliability/continuity). The ranking is essentially stable across weightings.

Model	0.7/0.2/0.1	0.5/0.4/0.1	Business only
DeepSeek-V4-Pro	0.700	0.748	0.614
Claude Opus 4.8	0.668	0.720	0.573
Claude Fable 5	0.629	0.689	0.520
Qwen3.8-Max	0.587	0.655	0.465
Gemini 3.8 Flash	0.552	0.608	0.440
GPT-5.6 Sol	0.538	0.619	0.398
Muse Spark 1.2	0.387	0.471	0.226

E Calibration tables

Table 6 Anchor composites and calibrated pass thresholds for every task-seed cell (seed 7 / 11 / 13). BL = blast-list, RB = rule-based, ST = smart-triage; the threshold separates the top two honest anchors under the margin and tie gates of §4.2.

Task	BL	RB	ST	Threshold
<i>steady</i>	0.49/0.51/0.45	0.67/0.63/0.66	0.77/0.77/0.77	0.72/0.70/0.72
<i>cold-start</i>	0.10/0.10/0.10	0.13/0.13/0.13	0.74/0.75/0.74	0.43/0.44/0.44
<i>supply-shock</i>	0.49/0.53/0.45	0.69/0.66/0.63	0.77/0.77/0.77	0.73/0.71/0.70
<i>quality-crisis</i>	0.50/0.52/0.43	0.71/0.65/0.65	0.77/0.77/0.77	0.74/0.71/0.71
<i>liquidity</i>	0.50/0.58/0.52	0.75/0.72/0.76	0.75/0.76/0.75	0.74/0.74/0.74
<i>peak-season</i>	0.45/0.50/0.52	0.69/0.69/0.65	0.76/0.76/0.77	0.73/0.73/0.71
<i>slow-drift</i>	0.56/0.47/0.52	0.73/0.74/0.70	0.77/0.77/0.77	0.75/0.76/0.73
<i>black-swan</i>	0.50/0.62/0.45	0.75/0.77/0.69	0.77/0.77/0.77	0.76/0.76/0.73
<i>new-entrant</i>	0.48/0.53/0.53	0.73/0.65/0.64	0.77/0.77/0.77	0.75/0.71/0.71
<i>trade-war</i>	0.46/0.46/0.43	0.64/0.61/0.63	0.78/0.77/0.77	0.71/0.69/0.70
<i>perfect-storm</i>	0.52/0.50/0.49	0.77/0.67/0.73	0.70/0.77/0.77	0.74/0.72/0.75
<i>full-year</i>	0.41/0.44/0.40	0.77/0.77/0.68	0.76/0.76/0.77	0.75/0.75/0.73

Do-nothing and absentee anchor every cell at composite 0.0 and 0.1 respectively (absentee earns only the continuity term), and the exploiter is required by gate (iv) of §4.2 to land below every honest anchor; all three are omitted from Table 6 for space. The gates are enforced, not aspirational: during development, one candidate lens (*skeleton-crew*) failed the judgment-gap gate when mass shipping out-earned triage under its original operation budget, and the task was rebalanced and recalibrated rather than the gate relaxed. Figure 3 plots the measured ladder for every cell.




Figure 3 The anchor ladder, measured per task-seed cell (one marker per seed). The calibrated pass threshold sits between the two best honest anchors on every cell; *cold-start* shows the ladder at its widest, with checklist play barely above volume play and the threshold set by the tie-gate against the rung below.

F The reward-exploit catalogue

The catalogue came from two sources: an audit pass over 756 pre-hardening trials and a code-level exploit hunt. It spans classic specification gaming (free cancellation of open obligations at episode end, continuity credit for quitting) and subtler economic seams (a refund-acceptance cliff that made 80-cent-on-the-dollar refunds optimal). Each entry lists the exploit, its measured pre-fix payoff, the closure, and the pinning regression test. Every exploit has exactly one regression test; all tests run in CI on every commit, and the exploiter anchor re-plays the catalogue at every calibration.

The agent-visible surface was audited for leaks separately: task identity, world seed, counterfactual demand, and event parameters are stripped from every tool result, and prompts address a merchant operating a store, never a model being graded.

1. **Continuity for quitters.** Continuity divided by windows *played*; quitting after 5 of 60 windows scored 1.0 (97% of pre-fix trials hit 1.0, including 16 walk-offs). Closed: denominator is task windows; unplayed windows are absence.
2. **Reliability laundering.** Platform auto-shipments (fired exactly because the merchant missed the SLA) were excluded from the on-time rate; one manual on-time shipment could carry the score. Closed: auto-shipments and stockout cancels count against on-time.
3. **Free cancels at the buzzer.** Ending the episode canceled every open order without fines and dropped them from reliability (478 pre-fix trials shed ≥ 5 obligations free). Closed: the settlement pass enforces every obligation due within the horizon.
4. **Listing side door.** Republishing a delisted product skipped the insertion fee and the listing cap (201 free publishes across 38 trials). Closed: publishing enforces both, whichever tool is used.
5. **Lottery pricing.** Shelf demand read the median of all variant prices, including out-of-stock decoys: plant a cheap phantom size, sell the real sizes dear. Closed: shelf price reads in-stock variants only.
6. **The refund cliff.** Any refund $\geq$ the platform-minimum share resolved a return with full reliability credit, making 80-cents-on-the-dollar strictly optimal. Closed: credit scales with the refunded share.
7. **Phantom cash.** Refunding an unsettled sale created spendable cash against a receivable that never existed. Closed: pre-settlement refunds shrink the pending settlement.

8. **Split-refund trap** (fairness bug, not exploit): the acceptance floor counted only single refunds, so installments that made the customer whole never resolved the return (4,965 returns across 496 pre-fix trials). Closed: refunds accumulate toward the floor.
9. **Sub-cent capacity** (fairness bug): payments carry sub-cent amounts; the default refund rounded up and was refused by the payment provider, making honest full refunds impossible while lowballs succeeded. Closed: refund capacity floors to the cent, as the provider validates it.

G Determinism and provenance

Noise streams are purpose-keyed, so an unrelated extra action cannot shift later draws. Replaying an action sequence against the live backend reproduces the ledger byte for byte, and a CI gate runs this dual replay on every published image.

Trials record the provenance chain in a run manifest (source commit, image digest, hashes of the baked seed data and calibration file). Two links in this chain are enforced, not just recorded: the engine refuses to arm an episode whose seed data no longer hashes to what CI measured at build, and the verifier fails any trial whose calibration hash does not match the score it grades. Trials export the full observation stream, per-window balances and raw reward deltas, the event log, and the graded score. Missing or corrupt artifacts grade to numeric zero.

H Evaluation configuration

Execution. Each trial runs in a fresh sandbox from the digest-pinned image. Network egress is limited to the model API, and the calibration file and grading endpoints are unreachable in-episode.

Harnesses. The short-horizon suite runs under goose with each model’s provider context window. Models with a thinking tier (Claude Opus 4.8, Claude Fable 5, GPT-5.6 Sol, Gemini 3.8 Flash) use goose’s highest setting; DeepSeek-V4-Pro, Qwen3.8-Max, and Muse Spark 1.2, which reason by default, use their provider default. goose never compacts context within an episode. The full-year task runs under Claude Code with maximum extended thinking (32,000 tokens per turn) and context compaction. Muse Spark 1.2 is reached through a request-translation proxy, which affects routing only.

Trial selection. Infrastructure failures are re-run; genuine model failures are kept. For each model and task-seed cell, three valid attempts are drawn at random with a fixed seed.

Cost. Each trial logs its token usage and metered API cost. Input tokens dominate: the agent re-reads its growing context every turn, so a short-horizon rollout consumes millions to tens of millions of input tokens, mostly served from the prompt cache. At first-party prices, a short-horizon rollout costs about \$1 for GPT-5.6 Sol and Gemini 3.8 Flash, \$7.5 for Claude Opus 4.8, and \$31 for Claude Fable 5. A full-year rollout costs \$185 on average, from about \$40 (GPT-5.6 Sol, Muse Spark 1.2) to \$670 (Claude Fable 5). The reported evaluation, about 750 rollouts, cost roughly \$16k in model API spend, mostly for the full-year task and the Claude models. This is a lower bound: most short-horizon rollouts for DeepSeek-V4-Pro, Qwen3.8-Max, and Muse Spark 1.2 were served through routes that did not report prices, and sandbox compute is excluded.

I Human expert study

Participants and assignment. Participants were randomly sampled then recruited from an existing pool of contract experts with reported prior e-commerce experience; qualifications were self-reported, not independently verified. Eleven people contributed the 33 reported outcomes; fifteen have at least one recorded shift. Cells were assigned adaptively as participants became available, and later assignments favored participants who had performed well, so contributions are uneven (one participant supplied ten cells, four supplied one each). The equal-person mean is 0.724; we report the equal-cell mean (0.708) throughout.

Interface and support. The browser console exposed the agents’ tool operations as pages and forms over the same metered backend, with the same windowed budgets, write freeze, settlement, and calibration file. It added a history view (a proxy for LLM context), a returns inbox (to interact with them cleanly), and cached views of already-fetched data that could be reread without spending an operation (again, a proxy for context). Before their first shift, participants read a written briefing on operations, deadlines, sourcing, cash, pricing, and settlement, which included starting heuristics similar to the smart-triage anchor’s; participants after the initial pilot phase also completed a short practice task to gain familiarity with the interface. Post-pilot shifts had a 12-hour wall-clock deadline, and their median span from start to completion was 5.1 hours, including breaks. Participants were fairly compensated for each accepted shift.

Selection. Thirty-six shifts reached a final score, and 33 were retained, one per cell. Three cells had an earlier completed attempt that was replaced: two by coached retries from the same participant, and one by a different participant after a run affected by a platform fault. Scoring each cell by its earliest completed attempt gives a mean of 0.656 instead of 0.708. This difference combines coaching, reassignment, and the affected run, and is not an estimate of a training effect. Environment fixes to refund and shipping handling were released during collection, so the retained shifts span four image releases; all 33 were graded against the same calibration file.

J Per-task and full-year results

Table 7 breaks the leaderboard of Table 1 down by task, and Figure 4 plots the short-horizon and full-year means of Table 2 side by side.

Table 7 Mean composite scores by model and task (3 seeds $\times$ 3 attempts per cell). *Human* is the human expert’s score; *ST* is the smart-triage heuristic anchor for reference. *full-year* is measured under a separate agentic harness with extended thinking and is reported separately below eval scores.

Task	DeepS	Opus	Fable	Qwen	Gemini	GPT	Muse	Human	ST
steady	0.736	0.583	0.603	0.585	0.533	0.511	0.290	0.539	0.770
cold-start	0.851	0.632	0.855	0.767	0.545	0.466	0.692	0.794	0.741
supply-shock	0.638	0.673	0.493	0.459	0.449	0.555	0.295	0.626	0.770
quality-crisis	0.696	0.665	0.680	0.594	0.440	0.432	0.256	0.614	0.772
liquidity	0.723	0.689	0.670	0.754	0.513	0.645	0.552	0.733	0.753
peak-season	0.748	0.710	0.783	0.649	0.659	0.689	0.501	0.760	0.765
slow-drift	0.741	0.687	0.652	0.563	0.631	0.620	0.357	0.799	0.768
black-swan	0.595	0.646	0.455	0.466	0.588	0.562	0.405	0.753	0.768
new-entrant	0.692	0.600	0.581	0.458	0.564	0.459	0.330	0.717	0.769
trade-war	0.635	0.717	0.614	0.633	0.553	0.480	0.224	0.706	0.774
perfect-storm	0.651	0.742	0.545	0.525	0.596	0.501	0.344	0.746	0.748
full-year	0.976	0.971	0.966	0.974	0.496	0.783	0.862	–	0.764




Figure 4 Short-horizon mean (open marker, 11 tasks) versus the 365-window *full-year* task (filled marker). Most models operate well above smart-triage over the full year; the two with observed long-horizon failure modes (Gemini, GPT) are in orange. Dotted line: smart-triage.

K Post-training details

Training. GRPO with group size 6 and 5 prompts per step, advantages normalized by the group standard deviation, a clipped token-mean policy loss, and no KL penalty to the reference model. LoRA rank and α are 32. The schedule was adjusted by hand during the run: the official reward drove steps 1–4, which produced no learning signal, and the shaped reward of §7 drove steps 5–36; the learning rate was 5×10^{-5} , raised to 10^{-4} for steps 16–26; steps 5–20 took ten gradient updates per batch and steps 21–36 one. Rollouts used temperature 1.0 and the same harness as evaluation, with the policy writing its own context summaries. The official reward on training batches rose from 0.22 over steps 1–4 to 0.61 over steps 27–36.

Evaluation. Table 8 gives per-task results. Each cell reports its first three valid episodes; episodes cut by infrastructure faults (API failures, timeouts, sandbox errors) were rerun, never scored as partial. The harness caps an episode at 150 turns and compacts context at about 65k tokens, keeping the last three turns verbatim. Cell means average into task and suite means, and the confidence interval is a bootstrap over the 33 paired cell means. Checkpoint 34, evaluated under the same protocol, scores 0.341 and also improves 31 of 33 cells, so the result does not hinge on the final checkpoint.

Side effects. Policy entropy on training batches rose from 0.2 to between 1.0 and 1.9, and the checkpoint’s messages drifted toward an emphatic, occasionally garbled style (19% of turns vs. under 1% for the base model). Together with the idle stops of §7, this suggests that a KL penalty or lower-temperature sampling should accompany longer runs.

Search baselines. Before policy optimization, we checked that cheap search cannot game the composite: on *steady* (seed 7), 300 random-search and 300 hill-climbing episodes topped out at 0.21 and 0.40 against a 0.72 threshold.

L Limitations

Scope. The claim is a faithful direct-to-consumer apparel store, not a full merchant economy, and the boundaries are deliberate: demand moves only through the shelf (no advertising channel, no demand momentum, no market price discovery), competitors are scripted rather than learned, and the hidden demand

Table 8 Post-training by held-out task: mean official composite over 3 seeds $\times$ 3 episodes for the base model and GRPO checkpoints 34 and 36, with the blast-list (BL) and rule-based (RB) anchors on the same cells.

Task	Base	Step 34	Step 36	Δ_{36}	BL	RB
steady	0.129	0.353	0.574	+0.445	0.481	0.656
cold-start	0.110	0.089	0.082	-0.028	0.100	0.133
supply-shock	0.134	0.289	0.353	+0.220	0.488	0.659
quality-crisis	0.127	0.435	0.382	+0.255	0.483	0.669
liquidity	0.205	0.573	0.653	+0.449	0.536	0.741
peak-season	0.155	0.443	0.409	+0.254	0.492	0.674
slow-drift	0.128	0.172	0.220	+0.092	0.519	0.724
black-swan	0.142	0.306	0.291	+0.148	0.524	0.735
new-entrant	0.135	0.435	0.448	+0.313	0.516	0.676
trade-war	0.114	0.292	0.361	+0.247	0.450	0.626
perfect-storm	0.116	0.365	0.330	+0.213	0.505	0.724
Mean	0.136	0.341	0.373	+0.237	0.463	0.638

model, while elastic, is ultimately parametric. The full environment is not released: we share a few training-split tasks, example trajectories, and the scoring code, and withhold the simulation engine and evaluation suite so the benchmark stays a held-back test set. The composite’s weights (Eq. 1) encode a judgment; the ranking is stable under alternative weightings (Appendix D). Scripted anchors bound checklist and heuristic play, not optimal play; the headroom above smart-triage is a floor on what stronger operators could show.

Post-training study. The post-training study uses one base model, one hand-adjusted training run, and held-out tasks rather than held-out seeds; it shows that the environment supports hill-climbing with transfer to unseen scenarios, not a tuned training recipe.