Moving the Safety Barrier: Dynamic Routing Adaptive Alignment Against White-Box Attacks

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***Abstract*—With the widespread deployment of large foundation models (LFMs) in open environments, safety threats are shifting from black-box jailbreaks toward white-box attacks that directly identify and disrupt internal safety neurons or routes. However, existing safety defenses often rely on static safety units or fixed refusal pathways, leaving models highly vulnerable to targeted route-level white-box attacks. For that, we propose dynamic routing adaptive alignment (DRAA), a framework that introduces dynamic compensatory routes to preserve robust refusal behavior when the safety route is compromised. Specifically, we first identify and localize the model's safety route by contrasting internal activations between safe and unsafe calibration samples. DRAA then masks this safety route to induce causal failure cases and selectively mines the resulting defense failures, thereby constructing failure-aware preference pairs. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DRAA effectively restructures the underlying pathway dependence of model safety, substantially improving robustness against route-level white-box attacks, while preserving general utility. WARNING: This paper includes jailbreak outputs that contain offensive content.**

I. Introduction

As large foundation models (LFMs) [17], [3], [4], [47], [48] are increasingly deployed in open-ended interactive scenarios, safety alignment has become the cornerstone of trustworthy deployment. However, safety threats are undergoing a paradigm shift from black-box input adversaries [55] to white-box structural disruption: by accessing internal parameters, attackers can precisely locate and sever the critical neurons [45] or causal pathways [38] that govern safe refusal. Consequently, when a model's safety route [10], [49] are exposed, traditional static safety methods become ineffective.

Existing white-box safety defenses primarily focus on intervening in the model's static internal structures, spanning granularities from microscopic local neurons to macroscopic causal pathways. Some works attribute safety to a small set of critical safety neurons [53], [19], [40], attempting to build safety barriers [10], [2] through neuron identification [51] and parameter freezing [33]; other studies adopt a more holistic perspective, implementing interventions at the level of internal representations [44], [54] and causal information flows [13], [31]. For example, NeuronTune [33] enforces safe generation by either anchoring the weights of localized safety modules or steering intermediate activations along predefined safe trajectories, thereby heavily concentrating the model's refusal capabilities into a fixed and isolated set of computational nodes.



Fig. 1. **Motivating illustration of dynamic routing defense.** When a white-box attacker prunes the safety route, prior static defenses easily collapse. In contrast, DRAA dynamically activates and strengthens latent compensatory routes to recover safe refusal behavior.

Although these methods [33], [54] enhance model robustness at various granularities, they all suffer from a fatal "static component" assumption. They implicitly assume that the protected neurons or routes remain intact during deployment [38]. Under white-box threats, however, these fixed defensive structures themselves become highly vulnerable targets; once precisely pruned or perturbed, the model completely loses its refusal capability due to a lack of compensatory mechanisms, as shown in Fig. 1. Therefore, to achieve robust white-box defense, the focus must shift from protecting known static routes to endowing models with the ability to dynamically reconstruct safe behaviors when critical pathways are compromised.

To this end, we propose dynamic routing adaptive alignment (DRAA), a framework that introduces dynamic compensatory routes to preserve robust refusal behavior when the safety route

is compromised. Specifically, DRAA first contrasts internal activations between safe and unsafe calibration samples to identify and localize the safety route on which the model currently relies for safe refusal. DRAA then temporarily masks this safety route to perform causal failure interventions and selectively mines defense-failure samples for which the intact model produces safe refusals, but the refusal behavior collapses after route disruption. Based on these samples, DRAA constructs failure-aware preference pairs and further introduces dynamic-routing direct preference optimization (DR-DPO), which freezes the safety route during preference optimization. This design prevents the model from simply reinforcing the same fragile safety route and instead drives it to reconstruct safety defenses through dynamic compensatory routes within the unrestricted parameter space outside the frozen route. During inference, the safety route remains active, while the newly learned compensatory routes provide additional defensive capacity when safety-critical components are perturbed. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:

- We propose DRAA, a framework that reformulates safety alignment as a route-recovery problem, utilizing route discovery and failure simulation to dynamically reconstruct refusal mechanisms under attack.
- We present DR-DPO objective that locks safety route during training, forcing the model to learn compensatory pathways within the unattacked parameter space via a "detour when blocked" strategy.
- Extensive experiments across diverse large foundation models demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances robustness against severe white-box pruning attacks while preserving general utility.

II. Related Work

Alignment and Jailbreak. Traditional safety alignment paradigms (e.g., SFT [46], RLHF [32], and DPO [34]) primarily suppress harmful responses at the behavioral level by supervising model outputs. For example, InstructGPT [32] combines supervised fine-tuning on human-written demonstrations with reinforcement learning from human preferences, encouraging the model to favor helpful and harmless responses while refusing unsafe instructions. Although these methods significantly improve safety during normal interactions, the continuous emergence of jailbreak attacks [55], [29] and cross-modal adversarial threats [16], [9] demonstrate that relying solely on shallow output-level supervision cannot eradicate the model's deep-seated vulnerabilities [15]. This has prompted the defensive focus to shift from superficial behavioral constraints to underlying internal representations and causal propagation mechanisms.

Internal Safety Intervention. To address the shortcomings of surface-level alignment, recent studies [25], [6], [37], [14], [39], [20] have delved into model structures, attempting to directly locate and intervene in critical neurons [20], [52], intermediate representations [25], [6], or causal pathways [38], [26] that govern safe behaviors. For example, SN-Tune [52] identifies safety-specific neurons and selectively tunes them to strengthen refusal behavior while preserving the model's general capabilities. However, by anchoring safety to fixed, pre-identified routes, these methods inadvertently expose these components as prime targets for white-box pruning or perturbation. Consequently, once these static routes are severed, the model's refusal capability collapses entirely due to a lack of compensatory mechanisms.

III. Method

A. Overall Framework

The DRAA framework reformulates robust alignment as a dynamic pathway-recovery problem to decouple safety mechanisms from vulnerable static nodes (See Fig. 2). Specifically, we first contrast internal activations between safe and unsafe data (§3.2) to localize the core safety-neuron set $\mathcal{S}$, which constitutes the safety route. Next, we simulate targeted attacks by temporarily masking $\mathcal{S}$ to mine scenarios where refusal behaviors causally collapse, thereby constructing a failure-aware preference dataset $\mathcal{D}_{fail}$ (§3.3). Finally, we optimize the model using DR-DPO (§3.4). By locking the safety route $\mathcal{S}$ via gradient masking, DR-DPO explicitly forces the unattacked parameter space to learn compensatory safety routes, ultimately yielding a highly redundant and attack-resilient safety architecture.

B. Safety Route Localization

Following the path-level perspective of TraceRouter [38], we operationally define a safety route as a layer-indexed, cross-layer set of MLP neurons that collectively supports safe refusal. Here, the route represents distributed functional support across layers rather than an explicitly recovered graph of directed inter-neuron connections. We identify this safety route by contrasting model activations on unsafe and safe calibration sets. Let $\mathcal{D}_u$ and $\mathcal{D}_s$ denote the unsafe and safe sets, respectively, and let $a_{l,j}(x)$ be the activation of neuron j in layer l for input x. We denote the corresponding mean activations as $\bar{a}^u_{l,j}$ and $\bar{a}^s_{l,j}$. A neuron included in the safety route should satisfy two complementary properties: it should separate unsafe inputs from safe inputs, and it should exhibit a positive activation shift under unsafe inputs. We therefore combine activation effect size (ES) and safety activation shift (SAS) to localize the distributed neuron support of the safety route. For distributional separability, we compute the ES score as:

$$ES_{l,j} = \frac{\bar{a}^u_{l,j} - \bar{a}^s_{l,j}}{\sigma^p_{l,j} + \epsilon}, \tag{1}$$

where $\sigma^p_{l,j}$ denotes the pooled standard deviation across $\mathcal{D}_u$ and $\mathcal{D}_s$, and ϵ is a small constant for numerical stability. For directional unsafe amplification, we compute the activation shift $\Delta a_{l,j} = \bar{a}^u_{l,j} - \bar{a}^s_{l,j}$ and apply layer-wise z-score normalization to obtain the SAS score:

$$SAS_{l,j} = \frac{\Delta a_{l,j} - \mu(\Delta a_l)}{\sigma(\Delta a_l) + \epsilon}, \tag{2}$$

where $\mu(\Delta a_l)$ denotes the mean activation shift across all neurons in layer l. Here, ES captures neurons with clear distributional separation between unsafe and safe activation



Fig. 2. **Overall framework of dynamic routing adaptive alignment (DRAA).** (**§3.2**) DRAA first contrasts internal activations between safe and unsafe samples to localize the safety route. (**§3.3**) It then temporarily masks this route to simulate causal defense failures, constructing failure-aware preference pairs. (**§3.4**) Finally, DR-DPO locks the safety route during optimization, forcing the model to reconstruct compensatory safety routes within the unrestricted parameter space.

patterns, while SAS captures neurons that are unusually amplified by unsafe inputs within the same layer. Let $\mathcal{S}_l^{ES}$ and $\mathcal{S}_l^{SAS}$ denote the neurons in layer l selected by $ES_{l,j} > \tau_{ES}$ and by $SAS_{l,j} > \tau_{SAS}$ with $\Delta a_{l,j} > 0$, respectively. We assemble their layer-indexed union as

$$\mathcal{S} = \bigcup_{l=1}^{L} \left\{ (l,j) \mid j \in \mathcal{S}_l^{ES} \cup \mathcal{S}_l^{SAS} \right\}, \tag{3}$$

where L denotes the number of transformer layers. The resulting set $\mathcal{S}$ serves as the candidate neuron support of the cross-layer safety route.

C. Causal Failure Mining

The identified safety route is strongly associated with refusal-related processing, but this association alone does not establish whether the route is causally necessary for safe refusal. We therefore perform causal failure mining by temporarily disabling the detected safety route and collecting unsafe samples whose otherwise safe refusal behavior collapses after route removal. Given an unsafe input x, the intact model first generates a response $y_{\text{ori}} \sim f_\theta(x)$ under normal inference. We then apply a route-level intervention by zeroing the activation of each neuron in the core safety-neuron set:

$$a_{l,j}(x) \leftarrow 0, \qquad \forall (l,j) \in \mathcal{S}. \tag{4}$$

The route-disabled model is denoted as $f_\theta^{-\mathcal{S}}$, and its corresponding response is $y_{\text{cut}} \sim f_\theta^{-\mathcal{S}}(x)$. Let $g(\cdot)$ be a safety evaluator, where $g(y) = 1$ indicates a safe response and $g(y) = 0$ indicates an unsafe or non-refusal response. A valid intervention-induced route-failure case satisfies $g(y_{\text{ori}}) = 1$ and $g(y_{\text{cut}}) = 0$. For each case, we construct a failure-aware preference pair:

$$(x, y^+, y^-) = (x, y_{\text{ori}}, y_{\text{cut}}). \tag{5}$$

The resulting dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{fail}}$ directly targets route-level safety failures: the chosen and rejected responses share the same input and decoding setting, while differing mainly in whether the detected safety route remains active.

D. Dynamic Routing DPO

Let $\mathcal{D}_{\text{gen}}$ denote a general safety preference set, and let $\mathcal{D}_{\text{mix}}$ denote its mixture with $\mathcal{D}_{\text{fail}}$. Standard DPO does not constrain which internal route implements the preference and may therefore reinforce the same fragile safety route. DR-DPO avoids this shortcut by locking the detected route and updating only the remaining parameters. Specifically, we decompose the trainable parameters as $\theta = \{\theta_{\mathcal{S}}, \theta_{\mathcal{R}}\}$, where $\theta_{\mathcal{S}}$ and $\theta_{\mathcal{R}}$ denote the route-protected and route-free parameters, respectively. For compactness, define $r_\theta(x,y) = \log \pi_\theta(y \mid x) - \log \pi_{\text{ref}}(y \mid x)$ and $\Delta r_\theta = r_\theta(x, y^+) - r_\theta(x, y^-)$. With $\theta_{\mathcal{S}}$ fixed, DR-DPO minimizes

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{DPO}} = -\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}_{\text{mix}}} \log \sigma(\beta \Delta r_\theta),$$

where π_{ref} is the frozen reference model, $\sigma(\cdot)$ is the logistic sigmoid, and $\beta > 0$ controls the preference strength. Thus, $\theta_{\mathcal{R}}^* = \arg\min_{\theta_{\mathcal{R}}} \mathcal{L}_{\text{DPO}}$ while $\theta_{\mathcal{S}}$ remains fixed. In practice, we implement route locking with LoRA gradient masking. For each dimension corresponding to a core safety neuron $(l,j) \in \mathcal{S}$, the LoRA gradients are set to zero:

$$\nabla_{\theta_{l,j}^{\text{LoRA}}} \mathcal{L}_{\text{DPO}} = 0. \tag{6}$$

For down projections, where selected neurons correspond to input channels, the associated LoRA weights are additionally initialized to zero and kept masked throughout training. This route-aware constraint prevents the model from simply strengthening the safety route and instead encourages alternative parameters to absorb the failure-aware preference signal under route failure. During inference, no route is disabled: both the safety route and the learned compensatory routes remain active.

IV. Experiments And Analysis

A. 4.1 Implementation Details

Datasets. Following SafeNeuron [45], we evaluate text safety on StrongREJECT [41] and general utility on ARC [11], GSM8K [12], and TruthfulQA [27], with model outputs judged by LLaMA-Guard-3-8B [17] and further reviewed by human

Backbone	Method	Safety ASR ↓				Capability ↑			
		ORI	ES	SAS	FULL	ARC	GSM8K	TQA-MC1	TQA-MC2
Qwen2.5-1.5B	Original	60/313	221/313	253/313	248/313	0.4923	0.6232	0.2987	0.4705
	SN-Tune	59/313	225/313	243/313	252/313	0.4940	0.6255	0.2987	0.4694
	RLHF-Safety	5/313	146/313	144/313	175/313	0.4957	0.6384	0.3439	0.5155
	SafeNeuron	**1/313**	100/313	113/313	137/313	0.4957	0.6459	0.3354	0.5130
	DRAA (Ours)	**1/313**	**14/313**	**36/313**	**43/313**	**0.5631**	**0.6922**	**0.3463**	**0.5231**
Qwen2.5-3B	Original	66/313	240/313	220/313	252/313	0.5299	0.5967	0.4211	0.5819
	SN-Tune	65/313	246/313	221/313	251/313	0.5290	0.5967	0.4223	0.5820
	RLHF-Safety	5/313	189/313	157/313	203/313	0.5290	0.6209	0.4553	0.6193
	SafeNeuron	**3/313**	130/313	118/313	151/313	0.5213	0.5709	0.4590	0.6245
	DRAA (Ours)	**3/313**	**66/313**	**50/313**	**51/313**	**0.6047**	**0.6244**	**0.4627**	**0.6316**
Qwen2.5-7B	Original	14/313	267/313	271/313	279/313	0.5922	0.7362	0.4651	0.6259
	SN-Tune	16/313	276/313	271/313	273/313	0.5896	0.7301	0.4663	0.6243
	RLHF-Safety	**0/313**	241/313	205/313	245/313	0.5973	0.7801	**0.5177**	0.6704
	SafeNeuron	**0/313**	174/313	161/313	183/313	0.5836	0.7096	0.5104	0.6706
	DRAA (Ours)	**0/313**	**9/313**	**23/313**	**26/313**	**0.6715**	**0.8188**	**0.5177**	**0.6753**
Qwen2.5-14B	Original	5/313	259/313	259/313	270/313	0.7184	0.7915	0.5398	0.6984
	SN-Tune	6/313	263/313	257/313	258/313	0.7167	0.7961	0.5398	0.6986
	RLHF-Safety	**0/313**	256/313	227/313	255/313	0.7184	**0.8234**	**0.5814**	0.7223
	SafeNeuron	**0/313**	53/313	31/313	56/313	0.7150	0.8105	0.5789	0.7223
	DRAA (Ours)	**0/313**	**9/313**	**2/313**	**5/313**	**0.7406**	**0.8234**	**0.5814**	**0.7280**

TABLE I

QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON ON QWEN2.5 LLMS. SAFETY AND CAPABILITY ARE REPORTED AS ATTACK SUCCESS RATE (ASR) OVER 313 HARMFUL PROMPTS (↓) AND STANDARD ACCURACIES (↑), RESPECTIVELY. ORIGINAL MODELS (GRAY) ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE BEST-RESULT COMPARISON. THE BEST PERFORMANCE AMONG ALIGNMENT METHODS WITHIN EACH BACKBONE IS HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD.

Backbone	Method	Safety ASR ↓				Capability ↑			
		ORI	ES	SAS	FULL	ARC	GSM8K	TQA-MC1	TQA-MC2
LLaMA-3.2-1B	Original	8/313	175/313	141/313	210/313	0.3712	0.3791	0.2852	0.4544
	SN-Tune	6/313	179/313	139/313	208/313	0.3703	0.3882	0.2864	0.4605
	RLHF-Safety	2/313	121/313	63/313	131/313	0.3797	0.3882	0.3403	0.5360
	SafeNeuron	**1/313**	119/313	48/313	114/313	0.3737	0.3783	**0.3439**	0.5369
	DRAA (Ours)	**1/313**	**9/313**	**42/313**	**44/313**	**0.4326**	**0.3965**	**0.3439**	**0.5594**
LLaMA-3.2-3B	Original	6/313	135/313	63/313	176/313	0.4787	0.7127	0.3341	0.4986
	SN-Tune	7/313	124/313	61/313	166/313	0.4770	0.7187	0.3354	0.4991
	RLHF-Safety	2/313	18/313	**4/313**	22/313	0.4932	0.7278	0.4308	0.5992
	SafeNeuron	**1/313**	21/313	5/313	20/313	0.4974	0.7248	0.4247	0.5922
	DRAA (Ours)	**1/313**	**16/313**	**4/313**	**12/313**	**0.5299**	**0.7324**	**0.4468**	**0.6032**
LLaMA-3.2-8B	Original	0/313	154/313	200/313	221/313	0.5759	0.7908	0.3758	0.5337
	SN-Tune	1/313	156/313	197/313	214/313	0.5776	0.7968	0.3758	0.5340
	RLHF-Safety	1/313	46/313	3/313	142/313	0.6067	0.7870	0.4749	0.6447
	SafeNeuron	**0/313**	33/313	**1/313**	54/313	0.5998	0.7786	0.4884	0.6554
	DRAA (Ours)	**0/313**	**2/313**	**1/313**	**11/313**	**0.6425**	**0.7991**	**0.4920**	**0.6772**

TABLE II

QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON ON LLAMA-3.2 LLMS. SAFETY AND CAPABILITY ARE REPORTED AS ATTACK SUCCESS RATE (ASR) OVER 313 HARMFUL PROMPTS (↓) AND STANDARD ACCURACIES (↑), RESPECTIVELY. ORIGINAL MODELS (GRAY) ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE BEST-RESULT COMPARISON. THE BEST PERFORMANCE AMONG ALIGNMENT METHODS WITHIN EACH BACKBONE IS HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD.

experts. For localization, we use CatHarmfulQA [7], HarmfulQA [8], and the LLM-LAT [24] harmful dataset as unsafe probes, together with NaturalReasoning [50] as safe probes. For DR-DPO and baseline training, we use CatHarmfulQA, HarmfulQA [8], LLM-LAT [24] as unsafe prompts, together with 500 PKU-SafeRLHF [22] as general safety preferences. We additionally follow NeuroStrike [49] for VL-Question and SafeNeuron [45] for NSFW in multimodal safety evaluation and MMBench [30] for multimodal utility evaluation. For more details, see the Appendix.

Metrics. We report attack success rate (ASR) as the safety metric, where lower values indicate better safety. Following SafeNeuron, we evaluate four settings: ORI (no pruning), ES (Effect Size pruning), SAS (Safety Activation Shift pruning), and FULL (union of ES and SAS neurons). We use FULL ASR as the main robustness indicator. To assess utility preservation, we additionally report ARC [11], GSM8K [12], and TruthfulQA MC1/MC2 [27]. For all main-table evaluations, ES, SAS, and FULL attack targets are independently re-localized on each post-training model.

Compared Methods. We compare DRAA with the original instruction-tuned backbone, SN-Tune [51], RLHF-Safety [32], [5], and SafeNeuron [45]. These baselines cover representative behavior-level alignment and neuron-level safety enhancement methods.

Hyperparameters. We evaluate Qwen2.5-VL-7B [4] for MLLMs and Qwen2.5 [3], LLaMA-3.2 [17], Gemma [43], Phi [1], and DeepSeek [18] for LLMs. The safety-neuron set is constructed as the union of the neurons selected by ES and SAS, defining the FULL route. Following the ES/SAS formulation of SafeNeuron [45], we set $\tau_{\mathrm{ES}} = 3.0$ and $\tau_{\mathrm{SAS}} = 2.0$ for the safety-route localization used in causal failure mining and route locking. Unless otherwise specified, we set the DPO preference coefficient to $\beta = 0.1$. During DR-DPO, this route is locked while LoRA adapters learn compensatory routes, using the same configuration across experiments unless otherwise specified.

B. Quantitative Comparison with SOTA Methods

(1) LLMs. To evaluate whether DRAA can improve robustness across different LLM backbones and model scales, we conduct quantitative comparisons on the Qwen2.5 and LLaMA-3.2 families under ORI, ES, SAS, and FULL pruning settings. As shown in Table I and Table II, DRAA consistently achieves the lowest ASR under the strongest FULL pruning setting across all evaluated models. Specifically, on Qwen2.5 models, DRAA reduces FULL ASR to 43/313, 51/313, 26/313, and 5/313 for 1.5B, 3B, 7B, and 14B, respectively; on LLaMA-3.2 models, it reduces FULL ASR to 44/313, 12/313, and 11/313 for 1B, 3B, and 8B, respectively. Therefore, these results suggest that DRAA improves robustness against the evaluated neuron-pruning attacks, especially under the severe FULL pruning setting, without causing an evident degradation on the reported general capability benchmarks.

(2) MLLMs. To evaluate whether DRAA improves multimodal safety robustness under neuron-level white-box attacks, we conduct experiments on Qwen2.5-VL-7B and LLaVA-1.5-7B using the VL-Question and NSFW tasks under ORI, ES, SAS, and FULL settings. As shown in Table III, on VL-Question, DRAA reduces FULL ASR to 5/313, compared with 174/313 for the original model, 152/313 for RLHF-Safety, and 106/313 for SafeNeuron. On NSFW, DRAA further reduces FULL ASR to 11/313, while the corresponding results of the original model, RLHF-Safety, and SafeNeuron are 169/313, 149/313, and 148/313. Although DRAA is not always the best under the unpruned ORI setting, these results suggest that it provides stronger robustness when the identified core safety neurons are pruned, especially under the strongest FULL pruning setting.

C. Qualitative Comparison with SOTA Methods

(1) LLMs. Under text-only FULL pruning attacks (Fig. 3, left), undefended models comply with harmful requests (e.g., generating hate-speech code or fake-review guides) once safety route is removed. In contrast, DRAA successfully maintains safe refusals or legitimate redirections, confirming that DR-DPO's compensatory routes remain highly effective even when original core safety neurons are compromised.

Task	Method	Safety ASR ↓			
		ORI	ES	SAS	FULL
Backbone: Qwen2.5-VL-7B					
VL-Question	Original	158/313	123/313	186/313	174/313
	RLHF-Safety	**0/313**	123/313	145/313	152/313
	SafeNeuron	1/313	92/313	89/313	106/313
	DRAA (Ours)	**0/313**	**0/313**	**1/313**	**5/313**
NSFW	Original	212/313	188/313	170/313	169/313
	RLHF-Safety	35/313	188/313	167/313	149/313
	SafeNeuron	6/313	167/313	137/313	148/313
	DRAA (Ours)	**0/313**	**1/313**	**13/313**	**11/313**
Backbone: LLaVA-1.5-7B					
VL-Question	Original	267/313	262/313	229/313	228/313
	RLHF-Safety	265/313	261/313	217/313	219/313
	SafeNeuron	262/313	263/313	221/313	223/313
	DRAA (Ours)	**42/313**	**72/313**	**211/313**	**187/313**
NSFW	Original	283/313	285/313	268/313	243/313
	RLHF-Safety	293/313	282/313	261/313	245/313
	SafeNeuron	296/313	283/313	265/313	243/313
	DRAA (Ours)	**14/313**	**30/313**	**247/313**	**237/313**

TABLE III
QUANTITATIVE MLLM SAFETY COMPARISON ON QWEN2.5-VL-7B AND LLAVA-1.5-7B. SAFETY IS REPORTED AS ATTACK SUCCESS RATE (ASR) OVER 313 HARMFUL PROMPTS (↓). ORIGINAL MODELS (GRAY) ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE BEST-RESULT COMPARISON. THE BEST PERFORMANCE AMONG ALIGNMENT METHODS WITHIN EACH TASK AND BACKBONE IS HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD.

(2) MLLMs. Fig. 3 (right) presents a VL-Question where harmful instructions are embedded within an image to bypass text filters. While the undefended model complies by generating deceptive marketing tactics, DRAA successfully identifies and rejects the visual threat. This confirms that DRAA's compensatory routing robustly generalizes to multimodal inputs. More examples can be found in the Appendix.

D. Ablation Study

Failure-Aware Route Locking. We ablate the design choices in DRAA on LLaMA-3.2-8B. As shown in Fig. 4, static freeze and DPO unlocked provide limited improvements under FULL pruning. In contrast, the DRAA objective reduces FULL ASR to 3.51%, compared with 70.61% for no defense and 21.09% for DPO unlocked. The ARC score remains stable across configurations. These results confirm that the gain comes from combining failure-aware preference data with route locking: the model is trained not only to refuse harmful requests, but to preserve refusal behavior when the safety route is attacked.

Compensatory Routes Analysis. To verify whether activation-jump neurons functionally compensate for the disrupted safety route, we conduct a controlled double-lesion diagnostic on VL-Question. Unlike the main evaluation in Table III, which independently re-localizes the attack targets on each post-training model, this diagnostic applies the same fixed shared FULL route to both the base and DRAA models; therefore, the FULL results in the two experiments are not directly comparable. As shown in Fig. 5, further ablating the high activation-jump neurons increases ASR from 209/313 to 253/313 for the base model and from 81/313 to 169/313 for DRAA. Therefore, these neurons are not incidental activation artifacts, but functionally contribute to refusal recovery



Fig. 3. **Qualitative comparison between original models and DRAA.** While the original models succumb to harmful requests (left column), DRAA robustly maintains safe refusal behavior (middle column). The right column further demonstrates DRAA's effectiveness against multimodal visual jailbreaks, where harmful instructions are embedded within input images.

	ORI	ES	SAS	FULL	ARC
No Defense	**0.00**	49.20	63.90	70.61	**57.59**
Static Freeze	0.64	2.56	22.36	23.64	**57.34**
DPO Unlocked	1.92	8.31	22.68	21.09	**57.34**
DRAA	**0.00**	0.64	0.32	3.51	**64.25**
		ASR (%)			Utility (%)

Fig. 4. **Ablation study.** Performance is reported via ASR (%) under varying pruning settings (↓) and overall ARC utility (↑). The full DRAA framework achieves the optimal balance, sharply reducing vulnerability under severe (FULL) pruning without degrading general capabilities.



Fig. 5. **Double-lesion diagnostic on VL-Question using Qwen2.5-VL-7B.** This diagnostic applies a fixed shared FULL route, unlike the model-specific re-localization in Table III. The ASR increase under FULL+JUMP supports the compensatory role of activation-jump neurons.



Fig. 6. **Visualization of route redundancy in Qwen2.5-7B.** Upon disruption of the safety route, DRAA actively strengthens latent compensatory routes to ensure robust safety recovery.



Fig. 7. **Hyperparameter sensitivity of dynamic routing adaptive alignment (DRAA) on Qwen2.5-VL-7B.** Bars denote FULL-pruned ASR. The default configuration yields the lowest FULL-pruned ASR among the tested variants.

after the original safety route is disrupted, supporting the compensatory routing learned by DRAA.

E. Deep Analysis

Visualization of Route Redundancy. To verify that DRAA establishes alternative refusal routes, Fig. 6 visualizes the network behavior following safety-route pruning. When original core safety neurons (blue traces) are disabled (red crosses), DRAA actively recruits high activation-jump neurons to form compensatory routes (green traces) across middle and late layers. This confirms that DRAA abandons fixed-pathway dependence, instead redistributing refusal signals across dynamic alternative routes. Corroborated by the double-lesion diagnostic (Fig. 5 and route visualization in Fig. 6), this structural redundancy directly drives DRAA's robust safety recovery under severe FULL pruning.

Cross-Backbone Generalization. To evaluate DRAA across diverse text-only LLM backbones, we report results on Gemma-7B and Phi-4 in Table IV. The results show that DRAA consistently achieves the lowest FULL ASR under the strongest pruning attack. Specifically, DRAA reduces FULL ASR to 9/313 on Gemma-7B, 22/313 on Phi-4, outperforming the compared methods in all cases. Therefore, DRAA improves white-box pruning robustness across heterogeneous LLM backbones while maintaining broadly comparable utility.

Unseen White-Box Attacks. To examine whether DRAA overfits to the attack patterns used during alignment, we conduct held-out evaluations using three unseen white-box attacks with distinct intervention mechanisms: gradient-based continuous representation manipulation (GRAD), weight pruning (WANDA), and activation-guided ablation (ABLATE). As shown in Table V, DRAA consistently achieves the lowest attack success rate across all attacks and both model families. Specifically, on Qwen2.5-7B, DRAA reduces the number of successful attacks to 145, 43, and 291 under GRAD, WANDA, and ABLATE, respectively, outperforming the strongest competing baseline by 39, 6, and 4 cases. On LLaMA-3.2-3B, DRAA further lowers the corresponding results to 152, 93, and 37. These results indicate that DRAA generalizes beyond the attack patterns encountered during alignment and maintains robustness against diverse forms of internal model

Backbone	Method	Safety ASR ↓				Capability ↑			
		ORI	ES	SAS	FULL	ARC	GSM8K	TQA-MC1	TQA-MC2
Gemma-7B	Original	0/313	58/313	61/313	62/313	0.4855	0.3609	0.3121	0.4739
	SN-Tune	3/313	196/313	198/313	211/313	0.4829	0.3457	0.3121	0.4746
	RLHF-Safety	**0/313**	14/313	12/313	23/313	0.5043	0.3101	0.4431	0.6178
	SafeNeuron	**0/313**	14/313	12/313	23/313	0.5196	0.3192	0.4969	0.6530
	DRAA (Ours)	**0/313**	**1/313**	**9/313**	**9/313**	**0.5606**	**0.3616**	**0.5141**	**0.6879**
Phi-4	Original	1/313	250/313	259/313	273/313	0.6647	0.9265	0.4027	0.5775
	SN-Tune	**1/313**	249/313	260/313	272/313	0.6647	0.9257	0.4027	0.5768
	RLHF-Safety	**1/313**	193/313	102/313	128/313	0.6800	0.9219	0.4786	0.6397
	SafeNeuron	**1/313**	143/313	32/313	69/313	0.6766	0.9280	0.4590	0.6359
	DRAA (Ours)	**1/313**	**0/313**	**24/313**	**22/313**	**0.6894**	**0.9318**	**0.4798**	**0.6430**

TABLE IV

GENERALITY RESULTS ACROSS ADDITIONAL LLMS. SAFETY AND CAPABILITY ARE REPORTED AS ATTACK SUCCESS RATE (ASR) OVER 313 HARMFUL PROMPTS (↓) AND STANDARD ACCURACIES (↑), RESPECTIVELY. ORIGINAL MODELS (GRAY) ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE BEST-RESULT COMPARISON. THE BEST PERFORMANCE AMONG ALIGNMENT METHODS WITHIN EACH BACKBONE IS HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD.

Method	GRAD ↓	WANDA ↓	ABLATE ↓
Baseline: Qwen2.5-7B			
Original	238/313	87/313	299/313
SN-Tune	214/313	121/313	296/313
RLHF-Safety	235/313	64/313	295/313
SafeNeuron	184/313	49/313	295/313
DRAA (Ours)	**145/313**	**43/313**	**291/313**
Baseline: LLaMA-3.2-3B			
Original	305/313	303/313	133/313
SN-Tune	304/313	303/313	88/313
RLHF-Safety	305/313	304/313	55/313
SafeNeuron	304/313	303/313	113/313
DRAA (Ours)	**152/313**	**93/313**	**37/313**

TABLE V

ROBUSTNESS OF QWEN2.5-7B AND LLAMA-3.2-3B AGAINST UNSEEN WHITE-BOX ATTACKS. SAFETY ASR (↓) OVER 313 HARMFUL PROMPTS SHOWS DRAA CONSISTENTLY ACHIEVES THE LOWEST SUCCESS RATE ACROSS ALL HELD-OUT INTERVENTIONS.

manipulation.

Hyperparameter Sensitivity. We further evaluate the sensitivity of DRAA to major training hyperparameters, including the DPO preference coefficient β, the number of locked core safety neurons, and the oversampling ratio of causal failure pairs. Fig. 7 shows that the default configuration provides the strongest overall robustness among the tested variants. In particular, overly large β values and insufficient causal-failure sampling substantially increase FULL-pruned ASR, indicating that dynamic routing requires a strong, stable preference signal and sufficient exposure to route failures.

Computational Overhead Analysis. To evaluate the efficiency of DRAA, we measure ES/SAS localization, DR-DPO training, and inference after adapter merging. The results show that localization takes 0.58 minutes for 1,000 samples and training takes 12.7 minutes with 18.23 GB memory; after merging, DRAA retains the original 7.616B parameters and achieves 82.20 tokens/s with the same 15.28 GB peak memory as the base model. Therefore, DRAA provides efficient alignment with essentially no inference-time overhead.

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we proposed DRAA to address the critical vulnerability of static safety defenses against route-level white-box attacks in large foundation models. By mining causal defense failures to construct failure-aware preference pairs, our DR-DPO locks the original safety pathways during training, explicitly forcing the model to learn latent compensatory routes within the unrestricted parameter space via a "detour when blocked" approach. Extensive experiments across diverse text and multimodal backbones demonstrate that DRAA effectively restructures the underlying pathway dependence of model safety, thereby substantially improving robust refusal capabilities against severe pruning and unseen attacks while preserving general utility.

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APPENDIX

The appendices provide additional details that support and extend the main paper. Appendix A reports further over-refusal results across LLMs and MLLMs. Appendix B summarizes the datasets, adaptive attack protocol, attack budgets, and multimodal evaluation settings. Appendix C provides a theoretical analysis of route-locked optimization, compensatory-route learning, and utility preservation. Appendix D presents additional qualitative cases and successive safety-route reconfiguration under repeated adaptive pruning. Appendix E further discusses the motivation, redundancy properties, adaptive evaluation, and deployment characteristics of DRAA. Finally, Appendix F outlines the limitations of the current framework and directions for future work.

APPENDIX A MORE DETAILS AND RESULTS

Over-refusal Analysis. To evaluate whether DRAA strengthens safe refusal behavior without inducing excessive refusals on safe prompts, we conduct over-refusal evaluations on Qwen2.5-7B [3] and LLaMA-3.2-3B [17] using XSTest [35] and further extend the analysis to Qwen2.5-VL-7B [4] and LLaVA-1.5-7B [28]. As shown in Tables VI and VII, DRAA achieves the highest refusal rate on unsafe prompts among all alignment methods for every evaluated backbone, while obtaining the lowest or tied-lowest over-refusal rate on safe prompts. Specifically, DRAA reaches unsafe-prompt refusal rates of 95.0% and 98.5% on Qwen2.5-7B and LLaMA-3.2-3B, respectively, while keeping the corresponding over-refusal rates at 4.8% and 4.0%. On Qwen2.5-VL-7B, DRAA achieves a 67.5% refusal rate with only 0.8% over-refusal. For LLaVA-1.5-7B, DRAA improves the refusal rate to 4.5% while maintaining an over-refusal rate of 2.0%, although the absolute refusal rates remain limited across all compared methods. These results suggest that DRAA improves refusal behavior on unsafe prompts without causing an evident increase in over-refusal on safe prompts, thereby preserving a favorable balance between safety and utility.

Method	Over-Refusal (%) ↓	Unsafe Refusal (%) ↑
Baseline: Qwen2.5-7B		
Original	4.0	76.5
RLHF-Safety	5.2	83.0
SafeNeuron	7.6	88.5
SN-Tune	36.8	91.5
DRAA (Ours)	**4.8**	**95.0**
Baseline: LLaMA-3.2-3B		
Original	3.2	71.5
RLHF-Safety	**4.0**	75.0
SafeNeuron	5.2	76.0
SN-Tune	6.0	69.0
DRAA (Ours)	**4.0**	**98.5**

TABLE VI
OVER-REFUSAL ANALYSIS OF QWEN2.5-7B AND LLAMA-3.2-3B ON XSTEST. LOWER OVER-REFUSAL AND HIGHER UNSAFE REFUSAL INDICATE BETTER PERFORMANCE.

Method	Over-Refusal (%) ↓	Unsafe Refusal (%) ↑
Baseline: Qwen-2.5-VL-7B		
Original	0.8	51.5
RLHF-Safety	1.2	58.5
SafeNeuron	**0.8**	51.5
SN-Tune	**0.8**	62.5
DRAA (Ours)	**0.8**	**67.5**
Baseline: LLaVA-1.5-7B		
Original	1.2	1.5
RLHF-Safety	2.8	2.5
SafeNeuron	2.8	2.5
SN-Tune	**2.0**	1.5
DRAA (Ours)	**2.0**	**4.5**

TABLE VII
MLLM OVER-REFUSAL ANALYSIS OF QWEN2.5-VL-7B AND LLAVA-1.5-7B. LOWER OVER-REFUSAL AND HIGHER UNSAFE REFUSAL INDICATE BETTER PERFORMANCE.

APPENDIX B DATASET OVERVIEW

Text Safety and Utility Evaluation. We use StrongREJECT [41] as the held-out benchmark for text safety evaluation. It contains 313 harmful prompts spanning diverse unsafe categories, and we report the number of successful harmful responses as attack success rate (ASR). StrongREJECT is used only for evaluation and is never used for safety-route localization, DR-DPO training, or baseline training. We evaluate general utility on ARC [11], GSM8K [12], and TruthfulQA [27]. ARC measures grade-school science reasoning, GSM8K evaluates multi-step mathematical reasoning, and TruthfulQA assesses whether models avoid generating common misconceptions. We report accuracy on ARC and GSM8K and the MC1/MC2 scores on TruthfulQA. Safety outputs are first judged by LLaMA-Guard-3-8B [17] and are subsequently reviewed by human experts to verify ambiguous cases.

Safety-Route Localization. To construct the unsafe calibration set $\mathcal{D}_u$, we use harmful prompts from CatHarmfulQA [7], HarmfulQA [8], and LLM-LAT [24]. These datasets provide diverse unsafe instructions for contrasting refusal-related activations. The safe calibration set $\mathcal{D}_s$ is sampled from Natural-Reasoning [50], which contains benign reasoning questions and is used to estimate normal activation patterns. The two calibration sets are used only to compute ES and SAS scores and to identify the safety route; no StrongREJECT sample is included in either set.

Preference Optimization. For DR-DPO and all trainable baselines, we construct the training pool from CatHarmfulQA, HarmfulQA, LLM-LAT, and 500 preference pairs sampled from PKU-SafeRLHF [23]. The harmful datasets provide unsafe instructions for failure-aware route intervention, while PKU-SafeRLHF supplies human-preference pairs for safety alignment. We use the same training sources for DRAA and the corresponding trainable baselines to ensure a controlled comparison. StrongREJECT is reserved exclusively for evaluation, whereas the localization and training data are drawn from the remaining datasets.

Adaptive Attack Protocol. Following the ES/SAS protocol of SafeNeuron [45], for causal failure mining and route locking before DR-DPO, we localize the safety route using the fixed thresholds $\tau_{\mathrm{ES}} = 3.0$ and $\tau_{\mathrm{SAS}} = 2.0$. This training-time route is not reused as the attack target during evaluation. Instead, each white-box attack independently re-localizes its

Fig. 8. **Extended qualitative comparison between original models and DRAA.** On Qwen2.5-7B and LLaMA-3.2-3B, the original models comply with harmful text requests, whereas DRAA robustly maintains safe refusals or provides benign alternatives. The right panels further demonstrate DRAA's effectiveness on Qwen2.5-VL-7B and LLaVA-1.5-7B against multimodal visual jailbreaks, where harmful instructions are embedded within input images.

targets on every post-training model, including all baselines and DRAA. For ES, SAS, and FULL attacks, we recompute the corresponding scores and select neurons under the same matched pruning budget for each model. Under successive pruning, the attack targets are further re-localized on the already pruned model after every round.

Attack Budget. ES and SAS are alternately populated from their independently ranked lists until their union reaches the target budget of 3,700, yielding equal-sized ES/SAS sets and a FULL set of 3,700–3,701 neurons. GRAD [36] and WANDA [42] independently re-localize and select the top-3,700 neurons on each evaluated model, matching the FULL neuron budget. ABLATE [2] instead removes a single refusal direction from the residual stream across all layers and token positions, and is therefore treated as a heterogeneous rank-one intervention rather than a neuron-count-matched attack.

Multimodal Evaluation. For multimodal safety, we follow the NeuroStrike [49] protocol and evaluate the VL-Question setting, in which harmful instructions are rendered inside images to test whether a model follows visually embedded unsafe requests. We also report the NSFW setting used in the main multimodal comparison. Multimodal safety is measured by ASR over 313 harmful inputs. MMBench [30] is used independently to evaluate general multimodal understanding and utility.

Appendix C Theoretical Justification

In this section, we analyze DRAA through three steps: route-locked optimization, compensatory-route efficacy, and utility preservation. The analysis adopts a local linear route decomposition, under which the refusal preference is represented as the sum of the contribution from the detected safety route and the contribution from the remaining neuron routes.

C-A Route-Locked Optimization

Let $\mathcal{S}$ denote the detected safety route, consisting of the selected safety neurons across layers. We divide the trainable



Fig. 9. **Successive safety-route reconfiguration under repeated adaptive pruning.** The top panel shows the original safety route, while the middle and bottom panels show the compensatory routes independently re-localized after the first and second pruning rounds, respectively. Connected points indicate the selected neuron index at each corresponding layer. The distinct route configurations across successive rounds show that DRAA repeatedly redistributes refusal computation under continued disruption.

LoRA [21] parameters into the parameters incident to this route, $\theta_{\mathcal{S}}$, and the compensatory-route parameters, $\theta_{\mathcal{C}}$:

$$\theta = (\theta_{\mathcal{S}}, \theta_{\mathcal{C}}). \tag{7}$$

Route locking keeps the detected-route parameters unchanged:

$$\theta_{\mathcal{S}} = \theta_{\mathcal{S}}^{(0)}. \tag{8}$$

DR-DPO therefore solves

$$\theta_{\mathcal{C}}^{*} = \arg\min_{\theta_{\mathcal{C}}} \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{DPO}}(\theta_{\mathcal{S}}^{(0)}, \theta_{\mathcal{C}}). \tag{9}$$

For a projection matrix W_l, let M_l be a binary matrix that marks all LoRA parameter entries incident to the safety-route

neurons. The route-locked LoRA update is

$$\Delta W_l^{\text{lock}} = (1 - M_l) \odot \Delta W_l. \tag{10}$$

The mask is constructed on the corresponding neuron dimension of each projection. Consequently,

$$M_l \odot \Delta W_l^{\text{lock}} = 0. \tag{11}$$

Equation (11) gives an exact optimization property: DR-DPO cannot improve the preference objective by rewriting the already detected safety route. Any newly learned refusal signal must therefore be carried by neurons outside $\mathcal{S}$.

C-B Efficacy of Compensatory-Route Learning

For a failure-aware pair $z = (x, y^+, y^-)$, where y^+ is the safe response and y^- is the response produced after removing the safety route, define the preference margin

$$m_\theta(z) = \log \pi_\theta(y^+ \mid x) - \log \pi_\theta(y^- \mid x). \tag{12}$$

The corresponding reference-model margin $m_{\text{ref}}(z)$ is defined in the same way. The per-sample DPO loss [34] is

$$\ell_{\text{DPO}}(z) = -\log \sigma(\beta[m_\theta(z) - m_{\text{ref}}(z)]). \tag{13}$$

Under the local linear route decomposition, the margin is separated into the detected-route contribution and the compensatory-route contribution:

$$m_\theta(z) = m_{\mathcal{S}}(z; \theta_{\mathcal{S}}) + m_{\mathcal{C}}(z; \theta_{\mathcal{C}}). \tag{14}$$

When the detected route is removed, only the remaining neuron routes contribute to the margin:

$$m_\theta^{\text{cut}}(z) = m_{\mathcal{C}}(z; \theta_{\mathcal{C}}). \tag{15}$$

The DPO loss is strictly decreasing with respect to the trainable preference margin:

$$\frac{\partial \ell_{\text{DPO}}}{\partial m_\theta} = -\beta\sigma(-\beta[m_\theta - m_{\text{ref}}]) < 0. \tag{16}$$

Thus, a sufficiently small gradient-descent step increases $m_\theta(z)$. Because Equation (11) keeps $m_{\mathcal{S}}$ fixed, the entire increase is assigned to $m_{\mathcal{C}}$. Let $\Delta m(z)$ and $\Delta m^{\text{cut}}(z)$ denote the margin increases before and after route removal. Combining Equations (14) and (15) yields

$$\Delta m^{\text{cut}}(z) = \Delta m(z) > 0. \tag{17}$$

Equation (17) is the central compensation guarantee: within the local route decomposition, every successful DR-DPO update improves the safe preference even after the original safety route is removed.

Let $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{C}}$ denote the surviving neuron routes outside $\mathcal{S}$. The route-removed margin increase can be written as

$$\Delta m_\theta^{\text{cut}}(z) = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{C}}} \Delta m_p(z) > 0. \tag{18}$$

Therefore, at least one surviving neuron route has $\Delta m_p(z) > 0$. DRAA consequently does not merely strengthen the original safety route; it necessarily assigns positive refusal contribution to one or more compensatory routes. This theoretical result is consistent with the activation-jump, double-lesion, and successive-pruning analyses in the experiments.

C-C Preservation of General Utility

Let $\mathcal{L}_{\text{util}}(\theta)$ denote the expected loss on benign inputs. Under route locking, the parameter update can be decomposed as $\Delta\theta = \{\Delta\theta_{\mathcal{S}}, \Delta\theta_{\mathcal{R}}\}$, where $\Delta\theta_{\mathcal{S}} = 0$ and only the route-free parameters are updated. If $\mathcal{L}_{\text{util}}$ is locally L_{util}-Lipschitz, then

$$|\mathcal{L}_{\text{util}}(\theta + \Delta\theta) - \mathcal{L}_{\text{util}}(\theta)| \le L_{\text{util}} \|\Delta\theta_{\mathcal{R}}\|_2. \tag{19}$$

For a LoRA update $\Delta W_l = B_l A_l$ at layer l, its magnitude satisfies

$$\|\Delta\theta_{\mathcal{R}}\|_2 \le \left(\sum_l \|B_l\|_F^2 \, \|A_l\|_F^2 \right)^{1/2}. \tag{20}$$

Combining the two equations, the utility variation is bounded by the magnitude of the route-free low-rank update. Route locking prevents changes to the detected safety route, while LoRA and bounded optimization steps restrict the remaining parameter perturbation. Therefore, DR-DPO limits utility drift while learning compensatory routes outside the locked route.

Appendix D Visualization and Case Analysis

Additional Defense Cases. To further evaluate whether DRAA maintains robust refusal behavior across different model families and input modalities, we conduct additional qualitative comparisons on both LLMs and MLLMs, as shown in Fig. 8. The results show that DRAA consistently prevents harmful compliance and preserves safe responses across all evaluated cases. Specifically, on Qwen2.5-7B and LLaMA-3.2-3B, the original models directly follow harmful text instructions, whereas DRAA either refuses the requests or redirects the interaction toward benign information. On Qwen2.5-VL-7B and LLaVA-1.5-7B, DRAA similarly rejects unsafe instructions embedded within input images. Therefore, these cases demonstrate that DRAA's defense capability generalizes across backbones and modalities rather than being limited to a specific model or input format.

Successive Compensatory Route Analysis. To evaluate whether DRAA can repeatedly reconstruct refusal routes after successive adaptive attacks, we independently re-localize the dominant refusal route after each pruning round and visualize the resulting layer-wise neuron configurations in Fig. 9. The top panel shows the original safety route, while the middle and bottom panels present the routes identified after the first and second pruning rounds, respectively. The clearly different neuron configurations across rounds indicate that DRAA does not rely on a single substitute route, but repeatedly redistributes refusal computation across the remaining network under continued white-box disruption.

Appendix E More Discussions

▷ ***Q1. Why is dynamic compensatory alignment necessary beyond conventional safety alignment?***

Conventional alignment methods such as RLHF [32] and DPO [34] optimize refusal behavior without constraining its internal implementation, and may therefore continue strengthening the same safety route. Once this route is localized

and removed by a white-box attacker, the model's refusal capability can collapse. DRAA addresses this vulnerability by constructing failure-aware preference pairs and locking the detected safety route during DR-DPO, forcing the remaining parameters to absorb the alignment signal. This encourages compensatory neurons and alternative refusal routes, reducing dependence on a single fragile route and preserving safety after route disruption.

▷ ***Q2. How does DRAA differ from SafeNeuron?*** SafeNeuron [45] and DRAA both localize safety-related neurons and protect them during preference optimization, but they differ fundamentally in the supervision signal and optimization target. SafeNeuron applies standard safety preference training to the remaining parameters to broadly redistribute safety representations. In contrast, DRAA first removes the detected cross-layer safety route, retains only samples whose refusal behavior causally collapses, and constructs matched preference pairs from the intact and route-disabled responses. DR-DPO therefore learns specifically from demonstrated route failures and optimizes refusal recovery when the original route is compromised, rather than only reinforcing general safety outside a frozen neuron set. DRAA further evaluates this recovery through double-lesion and successive adaptive re-localization, directly examining whether compensatory routes remain functional under continued disruption. Thus, the main innovation of DRAA lies in causal failure mining and attack-conditioned route recovery, rather than neuron freezing itself.

▷ ***Q3. Does DRAA construct genuine safety redundancy or merely relocate refusal behavior to another static route?***

No. If DRAA only transferred refusal behavior to a single substitute route, pruning the newly localized neurons would produce another abrupt safety collapse. Instead, the double-lesion analysis confirms that activation-jump neurons causally contribute to refusal after the original route is removed. Successive re-localization further identifies distinct compensatory neuron sets after repeated pruning rounds. These results indicate that DRAA repeatedly redistributes refusal computation across the remaining network, rather than replacing one fragile route with another. This evidence supports persistent compensatory routing within the evaluated pruning budgets, although it does not imply complete route independence or unlimited resilience.

▷ ***Q4. Are attack targets independently re-localized for each evaluated model?***

Yes. The safety route localized before DR-DPO is used only for failure mining and route locking during training. For evaluation, all white-box attacks independently re-localize their targets on each post-training model, including every baseline and DRAA. Accordingly, ES, SAS, FULL, GRAD, WANDA, and ABLATE are recomputed from the evaluated model itself rather than reusing the training-time route. Under successive pruning, the attacker further re-localizes the targets on the already pruned model after every round. The fixed shared route in the double-lesion experiment is used only as a controlled diagnostic.

▷ ***Q5. How does DRAA differ from ordinary DPO or adversarial safety training?*** Ordinary DPO and unconstrained adversarial training optimize safe outputs without controlling which internal route absorbs the update, and may therefore continue strengthening the same fragile safety route. DRAA instead constructs preference pairs from failures caused specifically by route removal and locks the corresponding LoRA coordinates during optimization. This forces the preference signal to be supported by the remaining trainable parameters. Route removal is used only for failure-pair construction, with no activation masking applied during DR-DPO. DRAA therefore redistributes refusal computation under an explicit route constraint rather than merely strengthening output-level safety.

▷ ***Q6. Does DRAA require an explicit router or additional inference-time computation?*** No. Dynamic routing in DRAA refers to the functional redistribution of refusal computation within the existing network, rather than an explicit routing module. The zero-out intervention is used only during offline failure mining, and no activation mask is applied during DR-DPO. Instead, DRAA locks the route-associated LoRA updates while retaining the detected route in the forward pass. After training, the adapter is merged into the backbone, so deployment uses the original architecture and standard inference without online localization, neuron selection, or activation manipulation. DRAA therefore introduces only offline localization and training costs, with no additional routing operation at inference time.

Appendix F Limitation and Future Work

Although DRAA substantially improves robustness against the evaluated neuron-level white-box attacks, several limitations remain. First, our experiments mainly consider pruning, ablation, and representation- or weight-based interventions, and do not provide a formal guarantee against unlimited cumulative pruning or arbitrary parameter manipulation. Second, DRAA relies on model-specific safety-route localization and failure-aware alignment; therefore, a new localization and training process is required when adapting the framework to a substantially different backbone or safety domain. Future work will investigate stronger adaptive attackers that jointly target multiple compensatory routes, more efficient cross-model route transfer, and continual alignment mechanisms that can further improve safety recovery under evolving white-box threats.