



MATE: Policy-Aware Security Auditing for Mobile Agents via Synthesis-Driven Trajectory Learning

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Abstract

Mobile agents powered by foundation models now automate complex, multi-step workflows on real devices, but their trajectories can violate app-specific security policies. Existing trajectory-level defenses rely on LLM prompting or rigid rules, and thus fail to support fine-grained, natural-language policies that generalize across apps and tasks. In this work, we introduce MATE, a lightweight, policy-conditioned auditor that encodes both agent trajectories and natural-language security policies to determine whether a trajectory violates a given policy and to explain why. Treating policies as editable text rather than fixed model parameters allows MATE to handle user-defined and evolving requirements without retraining. To construct MATE, we build a knowledge base by extracting app descriptions, workflows, and policies from hundreds of popular mobile apps worldwide, and synthesizing over 140K semantically realistic, policy-conditioned trajectories with a multi-stage pipeline. We further release MATEBENCH, a trajectory-level auditing benchmark with two synthetic subsets and one real-world subset of manually collected trajectories. Models trained with our synthesis-driven trajectory learning achieve over 95% accuracy on MATEBENCH, retain strong performance on external safety benchmarks, and audit trajectories from Zhipu’s AutoGLM and Alibaba’s Mobile-Agent on real devices with over 95% accuracy, outperforming prior methods by over 20%. MATE shows that practical, fine-grained security auditing for heterogeneous mobile agents is both feasible and effective.

1 Introduction

AI agents autonomously execute user instructions through multi-turn interactions with digital applications [1–6]. Mobile agents are graphical user interface (GUI) agents [7–10] that operate on smartphones with mobile applications (*abbr. apps*), emulating human taps, swipes, and text input to complete tasks such as online shopping, email management, and social media posting [11–16]. Systems such as Alibaba’s Mobile-




Figure 1: A real-world mobile agent trajectory can yield different audit outcomes under different security policies.

Agent [11] and Zhipu’s AutoGLM [16] already deploy these capabilities in practice.

However, deploying mobile agents in real workflows introduces new security concerns. Unlike traditional chatbots confined to text interactions, mobile agents can perform high-impact and often irreversible operations on a user’s device. A misaligned agent may delete important files, forward sensitive messages, or trigger unauthorized financial transactions [15, 17–19]. Detecting such risks requires *trajectory-level* auditing, where an auditor tracks actions over time, interprets app-specific functionality and UI states, and decides whether a trajectory violates security policies [17]. As Figure 1 il-

illustrates, the same trajectory may be acceptable under one policy yet insecure under a stricter one, so security auditing must be conditioned on deployment-specific natural-language policies rather than treated as a context-free classification problem. However, building such a *policy-aware* trajectory auditor remains underexplored yet urgently needed.

In this work, we present MATE (**M**obile **A**gent **T**rajectory **E**valuator), the first policy-aware, trajectory-level security evaluation model for mobile agents. Given user-customized natural-language security policies, MATE jointly encodes policies and trajectories to produce policy-conditioned violation auditing results with explanations. MATE is lightweight, low-latency, and detects 14 risk categories while treating security requirements as editable text rather than fixed model parameters, so app- and user-specific policies can be updated without retraining. Existing trajectory evaluators either implement static rule-based engines [17, 20–23], which are brittle to app-specific UI semantics, cross-app workflows, and long-horizon dependencies, or rely on prompt-based large language model (LLM) judges [24–26], which are expressive but costly, privacy-unfriendly, and unstable across prompts and models. However, building MATE raises two key challenges.

Challenge 1: Scarcity of Realistic, Policy-conditioned Mobile Agent Trajectories. Training reliable trajectory auditors requires large-scale, high-fidelity data, yet realistic mobile agent trajectories with policy-conditioned labels are rare. Mandatory logins, personalized states, and platform policies make it impractical to deliberately induce risky behaviors on commercial apps, especially for security-sensitive actions such as payment misuse or data exfiltration [27–30]. Manual collection across hundreds of apps is prohibitively expensive. Existing work [31–33] either targets a narrow range of instrumented environments or relies on LLM-generated trajectories that are weakly grounded in real app behavior, often missing key functionality, UI transitions, and long-horizon decision patterns. This data gap directly limits training specialized, policy-aware trajectory auditors.

We address this challenge with a knowledge-grounded synthesis pipeline that converts public app knowledge into trajectory-level supervision. We aggregate official documentation, step-by-step tutorials, community Q&A (e.g., wiki-How [34], BaiduZhida [35]), and security policies from 158 Chinese and English mobile apps, and use LLMs to normalize this information into a unified schema. Based on this schema, we synthesize semantically realistic, policy-aware instructions and trajectories paired with matched policies and rationales. A multi-stage quality control process yields over 140K high-quality, policy-conditioned trajectories to train MATE effectively at scale. To evaluate transfer to real deployments, we manually collect 162 real-world mobile agent trajectories (including Alibaba’s Mobile-Agent [11] and Zhipu’s Auto-GLM [16]) with policy-conditioned labels as a held-out test set, and use them both to assess MATE and to validate the fidelity of our synthetic data.

Challenge 2: Building a Robust, Efficient, and Policy-aware Trajectory Auditor. Static rule engines encode security constraints as pattern rules that are hard to maintain as apps evolve and lack semantics to capture implicit risks in long-horizon trajectories. Prompt-based LLM judges provide richer semantics but incur latency and cost, require sending sensitive trajectories to third-party services, and yield unstable judgments across prompts and models, especially when policies differ across apps and users. In practice, operators need a locally deployable evaluator that reliably follows policies while preserving user privacy and operational efficiency.

We address this challenge by training a policy-aware trajectory auditor that jointly models trajectories and natural-language policies. Instead of ad-hoc prompts, we fine-tune lightweight models on structured data augmentations, including mismatched trajectory-policy pairs, multi-policy configurations, and trajectories spanning multiple apps, to improve robustness under overlapping policies, heterogeneous workflows, and subtle violations. MATE serves as a plug-in module: Given an instruction, a trajectory, and a policy set, it outputs policy-conditioned violation judgments and natural-language explanations with low latency. In our experiments, MATE-3B achieves 5% higher accuracy than a prompt-based commercial LLM evaluator (Claude-Sonnet-4) on policy-conditioned trajectory risk auditing, making it suitable for both online monitoring and offline auditing in real-world mobile agents.

We construct MATEBENCH, a trajectory-level security benchmark covering 14 risk categories and 158 apps, with two synthetic subsets and a real-world subset of 162 trajectories manually collected from several deployed mobile agents on 13 apps. The real-world subset serves as a held-out testbed to evaluate MATE in realistic deployments. From these apps, we curate nearly 1,000 security policies, train a trajectory-policy retrieval model to surface relevant policies when explicit ones are absent, and design a trajectory adapter that maps raw logs (e.g., HTML/XML UI trees and screenshots) into a unified representation while compressing environment feedback into concise natural-language descriptions. Experiments on MATEBENCH show that existing trajectory evaluators remain weak and unstable on realistic mobile agent behaviors, whereas MATE provides accurate, customizable security auditing suitable for deployment across diverse apps.

Our contributions are summarized as follows:

- We present MATE, a lightweight (0.5B/1.5B/3B), policy-aware trajectory auditor for mobile agents that provides security auditing and natural-language explanations under app- and user-specific policies without retraining.
- We build a knowledge-grounded synthesis pipeline that turns app tutorials and policies into realistic mobile agent trajectories with policy-conditioned labels and explanations, and construct MATEBENCH, a trajectory-level security benchmark covering 14 risk categories and 158 apps.

- We evaluate MATE on synthetic and real-world trajectories: It achieves over 95% accuracy and about 20% absolute improvement over prior evaluators on MATEBENCH, and outperforms prompt-based commercial LLM evaluators on external benchmarks (R-Judge [36] and ASSEBench [37]), showing that knowledge-grounded synthesis enables accurate, interpretable, and customizable security auditing for mobile agents in realistic settings.

2 Background and Problem Statement

2.1 Mobile Agents

Mobile agents are GUI-based agents that operate smartphone apps to execute tasks. Early systems rely on structured UI representations (e.g., HTML/XML and accessibility (A11Y) trees) [4, 38, 39], which are verbose and redundant, inflating context length and hurting efficiency. More recent work shifts to vision-centric agents that use vision language models to interact with screen images [7, 40–42], localizing and manipulating UI elements and improving robustness across diverse apps and layouts. Industrial systems such as Zhipu’s Auto-GLM [16] and Alibaba’s Mobile-Agent series [11–13] operationalize these ideas on real devices, combining planning, modular control, and GUI perception with environment simulation to execute tasks in dynamic settings. As deployment scales, these mobile agents introduce security risks [15, 17]: Misinterpreting UI state or intent may lead to insecure operations, while adversarial inputs can cause policy bypasses or harmful behaviors. Robust trajectory-level security auditing is therefore crucial for secure and reliable use of mobile agents.

2.2 Problem Setup and Definition

Consider a mobile agent with state space $\mathcal{S}$ and action space $\mathcal{A}$ over a set of apps. Given a natural-language instruction I and an initial observation $O_0 \in \mathcal{S}$, the agent interacts with the environment and produces a trajectory τ :

$$\tau_I = \{(T_0, A_0, O_0), \dots, (T_n, A_n, O_n)\}, \quad (1)$$

where T_i is the internal thought at step i , A_i is the GUI action (e.g., click, swipe, type), and O_i is the observable feedback (e.g., a page transition, dialog, or notification). In our setting, each O_i is a natural-language summary describing the local decision rationale and the post-action UI state. We model the interaction as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [43] with transition probabilities $P(s_{i+1} | s_i, a_i)$, and instantiate the state and action as $s_i = O_i$ and $a_i = (T_i, A_i)$, so that:

$$P(s_{i+1} | s_i, a_i) = P(O_{i+1} | O_i, T_i, A_i). \quad (2)$$

Let $R = \{r_1, \dots, r_m\}$ be a set of natural-language security policies, each specifying admissible behaviors and prohibited

actions. The trajectory-level security auditor MATE takes an *instruction–trajectory–policy* triple (I, τ, r) and outputs:

$$\text{MATE}(I, \tau, r) = (v, c, e), \quad (3)$$

where $v \in \{\text{yes}, \text{no}\}$ indicates whether τ violates r , c is the risk category, and e is a natural-language explanation. If $v = \text{yes}$, e identifies the subsequence of τ and explains its conflict with r ; if $v = \text{no}$, then $c = \text{none}$ and e justifies compliance.

2.3 Threat Model

Our threat model considers both malicious and benign users interacting with mobile agents. *Attackers* have black-box access: They issue arbitrary natural-language instructions and observe the agent’s behavior, aiming to induce trajectories that lead to harmful behaviors (e.g., unauthorized transfers, data leakage, unsafe configuration changes). *Threat surfaces* include the agent’s planning and tool-use logic, the mobile OS and app UIs it controls, and connected services whose data can be read or modified. We also account for unintended failures, where benign instructions still lead to risky behavior due to misinterpreted semantics, UI state, or cross-app dependencies. Any trajectory that triggers a security policy and may cause harmful consequences is considered insecure and should be detected and explained by MATE.




Figure 2: Risk taxonomy for mobile agents. We define three top-level categories and 14 subcategories of risks.

To reason about the consequences of mobile agent failures, we define a risk taxonomy aligned with mobile-app capabilities and attack surface. Existing agent and mobile-app taxonomies [17, 44–46] mainly list coarse categories (e.g., prompt injection, unauthorized access) and are not tailored to trajectory-level behavior on smartphones: They rarely distinguish whose interests are harmed (owner vs. contacts vs. the public) or how device-wide privileges (payments, contacts, social graphs) amplify impact. Based on a systematic analysis of mobile agent actions and app functionality, we propose a two-level taxonomy organized by scope of harm, with three top-level categories and 14 subcategories (Figure 2): (1) *Personal Harm*: Direct harm to the user, such as account compromise, financial loss, or leakage of the owner’s sensitive data; (2) *Interpersonal Harm*: Harm to friends, contacts, or specific third parties, such as turning the user into a fraud

relay or leaking others' privacy through social or messaging apps; (3) *Societal Harm*: Harm to public order, the information environment, or the broader digital ecosystem, such as fueling disinformation, enabling large-scale fraud, or undermining platform trust mechanisms. These subcategories label harmful outcomes: If a trajectory falls into any subcategory under a given policy set, MATE classifies it as insecure (full taxonomy details are provided in Appendix C).

3 Overview of MATE

As shown in Figure 3, MATE is a policy-aware model for trajectory-level security auditing of mobile agents. The process consists of four stages: (1) application information collection, (2) knowledge-grounded data synthesis, (3) data augmentation and model training, and (4) model deployment.

Stage #1: Application Information Collection. Public app manuals and security policies specify functional behavior and security boundaries. Let the app set be $\mathcal{APP} = \{app_1, \dots, app_n\}$. For each app $app \in \mathcal{APP}$, we collect functional descriptions $F(app)$, canonical workflows $W(app)$, and security-related policies $S(app)$ from public sources. This yields an app information repository:

$$\mathcal{D}_{\text{app-info}} = \{F(app), W(app), S(app) \mid app \in \mathcal{APP}\}. \quad (4)$$

Stage #2: Knowledge-grounded Data Synthesis. We build an automated data synthesis pipeline over $\mathcal{D}_{\text{app-info}}$ to generate semantically realistic mobile agent trajectories with policy-conditioned supervision. The pipeline has four phases:

Phase 1: Instruction Synthesis. For each app, an LLM generates task instructions from $\mathcal{D}_{\text{app-info}}$, which are (1) realizable by app functions, (2) executable by a GUI agent, (3) cover the app's main functionality, and (4) include benign and malicious intents. Each instruction is labeled with its app and a risk type, which constrains subsequent trajectory generation.

Phase 2: Trajectory Synthesis. Given an instruction, an LLM generates a multi-turn mobile agent trajectory with *Thought*, *Action*, and natural-language *Observation* fields, conditioned on the app profile in $\mathcal{D}_{\text{app-info}}$. The trajectory follows app semantics and page transitions, aligns with its risk type, and matches the relevant security policy. We emphasize semantic plausibility of actions and state transitions rather than low-level parameters such as click coordinates.

Phase 3: Annotation Synthesis. For each instruction-trajectory-policy triple, an LLM generates annotations: (1) a violation label, (2) a risk category, and (3) an explanation for the policy violation or compliance, providing supervision for both the binary decision and its rationale.

Phase 4: Quality Checking and Repair. We apply a three-stage quality control: (1) structural checks for completeness and well-formed fields; (2) semantic consistency and policy alignment, repairing mismatches and contradictions; and (3) multi-annotator review to filter implausible semantics and incorrect policy applications.

Formally, the instruction generator $G_{\text{instruction}}$ produces a set of instructions I_{synth} from $\mathcal{D}_{\text{app-info}}$:

$$I_{\text{synth}} = \{I^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^N = G_{\text{instruction}}(\mathcal{D}_{\text{app-info}}), \quad (5)$$

and for each $I^{(i)} \in I_{\text{synth}}$, the trajectory generator $G_{\text{trajectory}}$ produces a multi-turn mobile agent trajectory:

$$\tau^{(i)} = G_{\text{trajectory}}(I^{(i)}, \mathcal{D}_{\text{app-info}}). \quad (6)$$

Each $\tau^{(i)}$ is matched to a security policy $r^{(i)}$, and the annotation generator $G_{\text{annotation}}$ outputs:

$$(v^{(i)}, c^{(i)}, e^{(i)}) = G_{\text{annotation}}(I^{(i)}, \tau^{(i)}, r^{(i)}), \quad (7)$$

where $v^{(i)}$ is the violation label, $c^{(i)}$ the risk category (one of 14 risk subcategories), and $e^{(i)}$ the explanation. The final synthetic corpus is

$$D_{\text{synth}} = \{(I^{(i)}, \tau^{(i)}, r^{(i)}, v^{(i)}, c^{(i)}, e^{(i)})\}_{i=1}^N. \quad (8)$$

Stage #3: Data Augmentation and Model Training. We augment the corpus from Stage #2 and train the MATE. Beyond matched trajectory-policy pairs, we introduce three augmentation schemes: (1) mismatched trajectory-policy pairs for stable no violation judgements; (2) multi-policy supervision for a single trajectory; and (3) cross-app tasks to cover multi-app workflows. These augmentations improve robustness in both single-app and multi-app settings. We fine-tune a lightweight model to predict policy-conditioned violation decisions and generate policy-aligned explanations. Using the same synthesis and augmentation pipeline, we also create MATEBENCH, a benchmark spanning diverse apps, risk categories, and both synthetic and real trajectories.

Formally, the trained model is a mapping

$$\text{MATE}_{\theta} : (I, \tau, r) \mapsto (\hat{v}, \hat{c}, \hat{e}), \quad (9)$$

where θ denotes parameters learned on D_{train} (derived from D_{synth} and its augmented variants) by minimizing a joint loss.

Stage #4: Model Deployment. To deploy MATE in real systems, we introduce a trajectory adapter and a policy retriever. Mobile agent logs are heterogeneous: Some contain screenshots, others expose UI trees (HTML/XML/ATML). The trajectory adapter maps these logs to ReAct-style [1] trajectories (*Thought*, *Action*, *Observation*) by extracting key UI elements and state changes into concise, decision-relevant observations. The policy retriever handles settings without explicit security policies by retrieving relevant ones from a global policy base.

Formally, given raw logs X , a policy set R , and an instruction I , the trajectory adapter ϕ_{traj} to produce a normalized trajectory:

$$\tau = \phi_{\text{traj}}(X), \quad (10)$$

the retriever selects an active policy:

$$r = \phi_{\text{policy}}(\tau, R), \quad (11)$$

and MATE evaluates:

$$(\hat{v}, \hat{c}, \hat{e}) = \text{MATE}_{\theta}(I, \tau, r). \quad (12)$$




Figure 3: Overview of the MATE process. ① Collect functional workflows and security policies from 158 apps. ② Use a knowledge-grounded synthesis pipeline with three-stage quality checking and repair to construct semantically realistic trajectories. ③ Apply data augmentation and supervised fine-tuning to train MATE and build MATEBENCH. ④ At deployment, a trajectory adapter and policy retriever convert raw logs into ReAct-style trajectories, retrieve security policies, and feed them to MATE, which receives an instruction, a trajectory, and a customized natural-language policy and outputs a policy-conditioned audit result.

4 Key Designs in MATE

4.1 Application Information Collection

Public knowledge of how users interact with apps provides effective guidance for data synthesis. We select 158 apps (77 Chinese, 81 English) from official app stores and public ranking lists (e.g., FoxData [47], MoonFox [48] and Sensor-Tower [49]) to form the set $\mathcal{APP}$. For each $app \in \mathcal{APP}$, we collect three types of knowledge: (1) descriptions of core functions, (2) step-by-step operation workflows, and (3) security and compliance terms (e.g., privacy policies, terms of service). We focus on the latest app versions and primarily rely on official websites (e.g., developer documentation and help centers), where functional documents specify capabilities and interaction flows, while privacy policies define behavioral boundaries (e.g., sensitive-data protection). When official documentation is missing or incomplete, we supplement it with community platforms (e.g., wikiHow [34], BaiduZhida [35]).

The collected materials are heterogeneous, fragmented, and sometimes ambiguous, which hinders direct use in trajectory synthesis and policy modeling. We therefore use LLMs to consolidate and structure them into unified semantic profiles for each app. Figure 4 shows an example for WeChat.

4.2 Data Synthesis Pipeline

Building on the structured app profiles, we construct an automated LLM-based pipeline that synthesizes natural-language instructions, ReAct-style trajectories, and policy-conditioned labels for mobile agents. The pipeline consists of four stages: instruction synthesis, trajectory synthesis, annotation synthesis, and quality checking and repair.

Instruction Synthesis. We first synthesize executable instructions that serve as inputs to trajectory generation. For each app $app \in \mathcal{APP}$, we generate two types of instructions:

1. Single-app Instructions. For each app , we prompt the LLM with its function catalog, operation workflows, and security policies to obtain a set $I_{\text{single-app}}$ under four constraints: (1) *Task scope*: Each task stays within the app and uses only documented functions; (2) *Action space*: Tasks are realizable by a GUI agent whose primitive actions are click, swipe, and type (full definitions in Appendix B). (3) *Functional coverage*: Instructions collectively cover the app’s function set rather than



Figure 4: Example of structured operation information (red) and security policies (blue) for WeChat.

collapsing onto a few high-frequency features. (4) *Intent and risk diversity*: The instruction set includes benign, adversarial or non-compliant, and boundary tasks, and spans all 14 risk categories in our taxonomy (Figure 2) by conditioning the LLM on app-specific policies and risk types.

2. Cross-app Composite Instructions. Cross-app instructions serve as data augmentation. They involve 2–3 apps and are generated by a two-step generate-and-align procedure that respects the LLM’s context-length limits while still injecting full app profiles: (1) *Step 1. Candidate generation*: Given all app names and short functional summaries, the LLM produces candidate cross-app task instructions and the required apps. (2) *Step 2. Constraint alignment*: For each candidate instruction, we then provide detailed app profiles and prompt the LLM to rewrite it so that it satisfies the same task-scope, action-space, and intent/risk constraints as above, yielding coherent, executable cross-app instruction set $I_{\text{multi-app}}$.

Trajectory Synthesis. Given an instruction I and its app knowledge, we use an LLM synthesize a multi-turn execution trajectory τ for a mobile agent. We target semantic realism of action sequences and state transitions and do not require low-level parameters (e.g., click coordinates) to be executable on a real device. We define an action space with ten GUI primitives (e.g., click, long-press, swipe, type; see Appendix B) and constrain the agent to invoke exactly one primitive per step, so each trajectory is a finite sequence of (T_i, A_i, O_i) triples as defined in §2.2. We prompt an LLM with (1) the instruction, (2) relevant app operation workflows and security policies, and (3) the targeted risk type, and ask it to generate one complete trajectory that satisfies three constraints: (1) *Workflow faithfulness*: The action sequence follows the supplied operation workflows and uses only predefined actions, which reduces hallucinations and keeps trajectories close to real usage; (2) *Controlled perturbations*: Trajectories may contain light perturbations (e.g., advertisements, permission dialogs, transient network loss) as long as the task flow remains coherent, so the data captures realistic uncertainty without degenerating into rigid templates; (3) *Policy-conditioned risk behavior*: The LLM selects the security policy implied by the targeted risk type and introduces risk-relevant steps (e.g., non-compliant or over-privileged actions) grounded in this policy, enabling later policy-based interpretation.

Each *Observation* O_i abstracts raw screenshots or UI trees into a concise natural-language description of the immediate outcome (e.g., page transition, input success, pop-up appearance) and salient UI elements (e.g., key buttons, fields, system messages), preserving decision-relevant semantics while keeping the representation compact.

Annotation Synthesis. For each *instruction–trajectory–policy* triple (I, τ, r) , we synthesize policy-conditioned labels. Since the same behavior may be secure under one policy and insecure under another, annotations are always policy-conditioned. Given (I, τ, r) , an LLM-based annotation generator outputs (v, c, e) , where

$v \in \{\text{yes}, \text{no}\}$ (*Validation*) indicates whether τ violates r , c is the risk category (*Category*), and e is a natural-language explanation (*Rationale*) that justifies v by pointing to key steps and relates them to policy semantics. During trajectory synthesis, we also specify whether each trajectory is intended to contain a violation, and pass this signal as an additional conditioning variable in the annotation prompt, together with I , τ , and r , to reduce drift in LLM-based annotation.

Quality Checking and Repair. To ensure that D_{synth} is accurate, policy-aligned, structurally regular, and semantically consistent, we apply a three-stage quality-control and repair pipeline to each sample.

Stage #1: Structural Normalization. We automatically check structural completeness and format conformity: Every turn contains Thought, Action, and Observation; every Action belongs to the predefined primitive set; and annotations include Validation, Category, and Rationale. Minimal edits fix missing or malformed fields.

Stage #2: Semantic Repair and Policy Alignment. We use an LLM to repair higher-level inconsistencies in the *instruction–trajectory–policy–annotation* quadruple by: (1) *Temporal and interaction plausibility*: Enforcing temporal and interaction plausibility (actions lead to plausible observations and state transitions follow app logic, with incoherent segments repaired); (2) *Instruction–trajectory alignment*: Aligning the trajectory with the instruction goal, minimally rewriting the instruction when drift occurs; (3) *Policy adaptation and diversity*: Adapting the matched policy and allowing controlled paraphrasing to better capture the risk-relevant behavior while preserving semantics; and (4) *Label consistency*: Enforcing label consistency so that (v, c, e) (Validation, Category and Rationale) are mutually consistent with (I, τ, r) .

Stage #3: Human Verification. Human auditors review samples that pass the first two stages to filter semantically implausible but structurally valid content, non-executable trajectories, policy mismatches, and flawed rationales; samples that fail this review are discarded.

This pipeline yields a regular, policy-aligned corpus of mobile agent trajectories with interpretable annotations, providing a reliable basis for trajectory-level security evaluation.

4.3 Data Augmentation and Model Training

Using the synthesis pipeline, we construct a corpus of mobile agent trajectories with policy-conditioned annotations. We synthesize two base datasets, D_{single} and D_{multi} , containing single-app and multi-app trajectories, respectively. Each sample is a *matched* triple (I, τ, r) , where trajectory τ is generated to be semantically consistent with policy r . Labels are balanced: Violating and non-violating trajectories each account for half of the corpus, and we then perform data augmentation.

Data Augmentation. Matched trajectory-policy pairs provide clean supervision but miss two phenomena common in deployment: (1) multiple policies may simultaneously apply to

a single trajectory, and (2) MATE may receive an irrelevant or misaligned policy. Training only on matched pairs risks overfitting to ideal trajectory-policy coupling and degrades robustness and calibration, so we augment the base data:

1. *Trajectory-policy Mismatches.* Let D_{base} denote $D_{\text{single}} \cup D_{\text{multi}}$, where each sample contains a trajectory τ and its matched policy r^* . We construct a set of *mismatched* samples:

$$D_{\text{mismatched}} = \{(I, \tau, r', v = \text{no}, c = \text{none}, e)\}, \quad (13)$$

where r' is an intentionally irrelevant policy. For a subset of trajectories, we treat τ as an anchor and draw candidate policies r' from other samples. We compute an embedding similarity $\text{sim}(r^*, r')$ and accept r' only if $\text{sim}(r^*, r') < \delta$ for a threshold δ , ensuring semantic mismatch. For each accepted (I, τ, r') , we re-generate the annotation with an LLM: Validation is fixed to no, Category to none, and the model produces a Rationale explaining why r' does not apply or why the trajectory remains compliant.

2. *Multi-policy Supervision Per-trajectory.* To model settings where several policies govern the same trajectory, we construct samples in which each trajectory is evaluated under multiple policies. For a subset of τ in D_{base} , we sample an integer $k \in \{2, 3, 4, 5\}$ and select k additional policies $\{r_1, \dots, r_k\}$ from the remaining pool with similarities to r^* all below δ . This yields a multi-policy set $R_{\text{multi-policy}}^1(\tau) = \{r^*, r_1, \dots, r_k\}$ or $R_{\text{multi-policy}}^2(\tau) = \{r_1, \dots, r_k\}$, giving two variants:

- *Including the matched policy:* We concatenate r^* with the additional mismatched policies (in random order) to form $R_{\text{multi-policy}}^1(\tau)$ and reuse the original annotation, since the violation decision is still governed by r^* .
- *Excluding the matched policy:* We drop r^* and keep only $R_{\text{multi-policy}}^2(\tau)$, then use an LLM to re-generate the annotation under the new policy set, typically yielding a non-violation verdict with an explanation that the remaining policies do not capture the risky behavior.

Table 1: Training data configurations for MATE after data augmentation, by app scope and policy configuration.

ID	App scope	Policy configuration
R1	Single-app	Single-policy (matched)
R2	Single-app	Single-policy (mismatched)
R3	Single-app	Multi-policy (includes original policy)
R4	Single-app	Multi-policy (excludes original policy)
R5	Multi-app	Single-policy (matched)
R6	Multi-app	Single-policy (mismatched)
R7	Multi-app	Multi-policy (includes original policy)
R8	Multi-app	Multi-policy (excludes original policy)

Together, mismatched pairs and multi-policy supervision expose MATE to realistic corner cases, improve calibration under partially relevant policies, and encourage robust policy-conditioned reasoning over brittle pattern matching. The resulting training configurations are summarized in Table 1, and the algorithm of data augmentation in Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1: Data augmentation for MATE

Input: Base corpus $D_{\text{base}} = D_{\text{single}} \cup D_{\text{multi}}$; similarity threshold δ

Output: Augmented training corpus D_{train}

```

1 for  $(I, \tau, r^*, v, c, e) \in D_{\text{base}}$  do
    // Matched single-policy sample (R1/R5)
2    $D_{\text{train}} \leftarrow D_{\text{train}} \cup \{(I, \tau, \{r^*\}, v, c, e)\}$ 
    // Trajectory-policy mismatch (R2/R6)
3    $C \leftarrow \{r_{\text{random}} \in D_{\text{base}} \setminus \{r^*\} : \text{sim}(r_{\text{random}}, r^*) < \delta\}$ 
4    $r' \leftarrow \text{Sample}(C)$ 
5    $(v', c', e') \leftarrow \text{ReAnnotate}(I, \tau, \{r'\}, v = \text{no}, c = \text{none})$ 
6    $D_{\text{train}} \leftarrow D_{\text{train}} \cup \{(I, \tau, \{r'\}, v', c', e')\}$ 
    // Multi-policy supervision (R3/R4/R7/R8)
7   if  $\text{Multi-Policy}()$  then
8      $k \leftarrow \text{Sample}\{2, 3, 4, 5\}$ 
9      $\{r_1, \dots, r_k\} \leftarrow \text{SampleWithoutReplacement}(C, k)$ 
10     $R_{\text{multi-policy}}^1 \leftarrow \text{Permute}(\{r^*, r_1, \dots, r_k\})$ 
11     $D_{\text{train}} \leftarrow D_{\text{train}} \cup \{(I, \tau, R_{\text{multi-policy}}^1, v, c, e)\}$ 
12     $R_{\text{multi-policy}}^2 \leftarrow \{r_1, \dots, r_k\}$ 
13     $(\tilde{v}, \tilde{c}, \tilde{e}) \leftarrow \text{ReAnnotate}(I, \tau, R_{\text{multi-policy}}^2)$ 
14     $D_{\text{train}} \leftarrow D_{\text{train}} \cup \{(I, \tau, R_{\text{multi-policy}}^2, \tilde{v}, \tilde{c}, \tilde{e})\}$ 
15  end
16 end
17 return  $D_{\text{train}}$ 

```

Model Training. Combining the base and augmented datasets yields training configurations (R1–R8 in Table 1). This corpus exposes MATE to (1) aligned trajectory-policy pairs, (2) irrelevant policies requiring robust rejection, and (3) multi-policy inputs where several policies apply to the same trajectory. After augmentation, the training set contains over 140K semantically high-fidelity trajectories spanning diverse apps and risk types. The merged training dataset D_{train} is:

$$D_{\text{train}} = \{(I^{(i)}, \tau^{(i)}, r^{(i)}, v^{(i)}, c^{(i)}, e^{(i)})\}_{i=1}^N. \quad (14)$$

4.4 Model Deployment

To deploy MATE across heterogeneous mobile agent systems, we add two components: A trajectory adapter and a policy retriever. Together, they map raw execution logs and policy sets into the normalized interface expected by MATE, enabling unified, on-premise trajectory-level auditing.

Trajectory Adapter. Observation may be stored as screenshots or HTML/XML/A11Y trees, so a trajectory adapter maps raw traces X to a unified representation used in training:

$$\Phi_{\text{traj}} : X \mapsto \tau = \{(T_0, A_0, O_0), \dots, (T_n, A_n, O_n)\}, \quad (15)$$

where (Thought, Action, Observation) follow the same schema as in the synthesized data. The adapter focuses on semantically normalizing and compressing Observation, preserving decision-relevant content while suppressing noise that would hinder policy retrieval and compliance checking.

We support two conversion paths. For image-based logs, a vision language model converts screenshots into natural-language `Observation` summaries of salient elements and state changes. For structured logs (HTML/XML/A11Y), we first filter the tree to retain interaction- and decision-critical nodes (e.g., clickable controls, visible text), then use an LLM to summarize the retained content into a compact `Observation`. This unifies heterogeneous traces into the same input space as the training data and reduces inference cost by producing short, information-dense observations.

Policy Retriever. In deployment, manually curating and attaching security policies to each trajectory is costly. To support policy-free inputs and scale to large policy sets, we design a trajectory-policy retriever that automatically selects relevant policies and feeds them as conditioning input to MATE.

From the raw policies collected across all 158 apps, we normalize formats and remove near-duplicates, yielding a policy set R with nearly 1,000 distinct natural-language policies. Using matched and mismatched trajectory-policy pairs from the synthesis pipeline as supervision, we train a retriever with contrastive learning [50]. The retriever consists of two encoders, $f_{\text{trajectory}}$ and f_{policy} , and learns representations where matched (τ, r) pairs are close in embedding space and mismatched pairs are far apart (details in Appendix D). At inference, given a normalized trajectory τ (from ϕ_{traj}), the retriever computes $f_{\text{trajectory}}(\tau)$, performs nearest-neighbor search over $f_{\text{policy}}(R)$, and returns the top- k policies as $\phi_{\text{policy}}(\tau, R)$; in practice we concatenate them into a single policy context r . Given an instruction I , raw logs X , and a policy set R , the MATE deployment process is formalized in Eqs. 10–12.

5 Construction of MATEBENCH

5.1 Methodology

To evaluate trajectory-level security detection under different data distributions and languages, we construct MATEBENCH, a bilingual (Chinese–English), policy-conditioned benchmark for mobile agents. MATEBENCH measures an evaluator’s ability to (1) interpret natural-language security policies, (2) align policies with trajectory semantics, and (3) make risk-sensitive compliance judgments. It consists of three subsets covering all 14 risk categories in our taxonomy: MATEBENCH-IN, MATEBENCH-OUT, and MATEBENCH-REAL. We partition the 158 apps into a training set of 134 apps (65 Chinese, 69 English) and a held-out set of 24 apps (12 Chinese, 12 English) for validation on unseen apps.

MATEBENCH-IN (*in-domain, synthetic*). MATEBENCH-IN evaluates in-distribution performance on apps seen during training. Using 134 training apps and the synthesis pipeline, we construct 2,775 (1,374 Chinese and 1,401 English) policy-conditioned trajectories, each with a policy and annotation. This subset covers all trajectory-policy settings (Table 1), enabling controlled comparisons across formats.

MATEBENCH-OUT (*out-of-domain, synthetic*).

MATEBENCH-OUT evaluates transfer to unseen apps. Using 24 held-out apps and the same synthesis pipeline, we construct 1,150 (559 Chinese and 591 English) policy-conditioned trajectories. These trajectories introduce new app semantics and workflows, keeping the same eight trajectory-policy configurations as in Table 1.

MATEBENCH-REAL (*out-of-domain, real device*).

MATEBENCH-REAL targets real mobile agent behaviors beyond synthetic data. We manually collect 162 trajectories from 13 apps across three mobile agent systems, including Zhipu’s AutoGLM [16], Alibaba’s Mobile-Agent [11], and an Android-emulator-based agent that we implement. Real logs typically encode `Observation` only as screenshots and lack paired policies and labels. For each trajectory, we (1) apply the trajectory adapter to convert screenshot-based logs into the ReAct format, (2) use the trained policy retriever to obtain relevant policies from global policy set, and (3) use an LLM, conditioned on the trajectory and the retrieved policy, to generate a policy-conditioned annotation. The subset preserves the same input–output format as the synthetic subsets while exposing evaluators to realistic noise, logging artifacts, and behavioral patterns.

Overall, MATEBENCH provides a unified testbed spanning in-domain and out-of-domain synthetic data and real-world trajectories, enabling evaluation of trajectory-level security auditors under diverse policy and application conditions.

5.2 Statistics

To assess the realism of our knowledge-grounded data synthesis pipeline, we compare the synthetic subsets MATEBENCH-IN and MATEBENCH-OUT with the human-collected MATEBENCH-REAL along two dimensions: trajectory length and action frequency.




Figure 5: Trajectory statistics on MATEBENCH: (a) distribution of step counts; (b) frequencies of GUI actions.

Trajectory Step Counts. Trajectory length reflects how many decisions an agent needs to complete a task. Figure 5(a) shows step-count distributions of MATEBENCH. MATEBENCH-IN and MATEBENCH-OUT average about 9 steps, with most

trajectories in the 6–11 range; MATEBENCH-REAL averages about 8 steps, mostly between 6 and 10. Means and dominant ranges align, indicating that synthetic trajectories match real mobile agent behavior in decision granularity and path length rather than being artificially short or long.

Action Frequencies. We analyze interaction patterns by the frequency of three common GUI actions: `click`, `type`, and `swipe` across the datasets (Figure 5(b)). `click` is predominant: In MATEBENCH-REAL, it account for about 62%, while MATEBENCH-IN and MATEBENCH-OUT yield about 62% and 61%, respectively. The proportions of `swipe` and `type` actions also align: In the real dataset they account for about 20% and 29%, compared to 21%, 22% and 28%, 27% in the two synthetic subsets. These patterns indicate synthetic trajectories are not random click sequences: Agents use swipes for navigation and text input when needed, mirroring real usage.

Task and Trajectory Complexity. Beyond aggregate step counts and action frequencies, MATEBENCH and the MATE training corpus cover a broad range of task structures. Synthetic instructions average 18 words and cover benign, adversarial, and boundary cases. The multi-app subset contains over 40K composite tasks involving 2–3 apps and averages 12 steps. Together with the eight trajectory–policy configurations in Table 1, these statistics indicate that MATE is trained and evaluated not only on short single-app tasks, but also on complex scenarios including long cross-application workflows, multi-policy inputs, and policy-mismatch trajectories.

Action-chain Similarity. We further compare real and synthetic trajectories by abstracting each trajectory into an action chain, where low-level UI parameters such as click coordinates are removed while app transitions, action types, and security-relevant decision points are retained. Under this abstraction, synthetic trajectories preserve the same core decision chains as real mobile agents, while differing mainly in UI-dependent details such as element positions and screen layouts. For example, for an instruction that asks the agent to follow a link in a recent message and enter account credentials, both the synthetic trajectory and the corresponding AutoGLM trajectory follow the same high-level chain: *open Messages* → *select the sender* → *open the URL* → *type the username* → *type the password* → *submit*.

Overall, MATEBENCH-IN and MATEBENCH-OUT closely track MATEBENCH-REAL in trajectory lengths, action frequencies, and action chains, providing a realistic basis for training and evaluating mobile agent security auditors.

6 Evaluation and Analysis

6.1 Evaluation Setup

Model Training and Selection. Building on the synthesis pipeline in Section 4, we synthesize over 140K policy-conditioned mobile agent trajectories from 134 training apps and perform full-parameter supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on

three base models: Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct, and Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct, yielding three auditor variants: MATE-0.5B, MATE-1.5B, and MATE-3B. All models are trained with a learning rate of 1e-5 for 8 epochs.

Evaluation Metrics and Benchmarks. We evaluate MATE on MATEBENCH, R-Judge [36] and ASSEBench [37] (prompts in Appendix A). For external benchmarks, we use our trajectory adapter and policy retriever to map trajectories into unified format and attach a security policy, then apply the annotation protocol of Section 4 to obtain labels. We report accuracy (Acc) and F1-score (F1) as primary metrics.

Baselines. We compare MATE with two classes of trajectory-level evaluators: (1) *Static Rule Engine*. Following rule-matching frameworks such as MobileSafetyBench [17] and AgentHarm [20], we implement a static-rule baseline that matches trajectories against security rules. We build keyword and pattern libraries for our 14 risk categories and, for each case, apply the corresponding library to detect violations in the trajectory and rule text. (2) *LLM-as-a-judge*. We evaluate open-source and commercial LLMs under a unified prompting protocol that elicits policy-conditioned verdicts and rationales. We also include ShieldAgent [26] and ShieldLM [51]: ShieldAgent (7B) is fine-tuned to detect risks in agent trajectories but does not support customizable policies, while ShieldLM (6B/7B/13B/14B) is a policy-aware model designed for text rather than agent trajectories. We minimally adapt their input formats and prompts to our setting with natural-language security policies over mobile agents.

We evaluate MATE to answer the following questions:

- **RQ1:** *How accurate is MATE for policy-aware trajectory auditing compared with static rule engines and LLM-as-a-judge baselines?*
- **RQ2:** *How well does MATE generalize to unseen apps, external benchmarks, and real-world mobile agents?*
- **RQ3:** *How efficient and deployable is MATE in latency and model size relative to strong general-purpose LLMs?*
- **RQ4:** *How do knowledge-grounded synthesis and quality repair affect MATE’s performance?*

6.2 Experimental Results

RQ1: Accuracy of Policy-aware Trajectory Auditing. Table 2 summarizes the overall performance of all benchmarks. Overall, MATE consistently achieves higher average accuracy than both *Static Rule Engine* and *LLM-as-a-Judge* baselines. Even MATE-0.5B surpasses state-of-the-art commercial and open-source prompt-based LLMs, with an average accuracy gain of about 20% over all baselines. MATE-3B further improves both accuracy and F1-score, achieving the best results across all settings with an average gain of about 23%.

Across all benchmarks, MATE achieves substantially higher average Acc than other baselines, with gains highlighted

Table 2: Overall Acc and F1 (%) on R-Judge, ASSEBench, MATEBENCH-IN, MATEBENCH-OUT, and MATEBENCH-REAL. Models are grouped into a rule-based static engine, prompt-based LLM-as-a-judge baselines, and policy-conditioned MATE. Blue numbers in the MATE rows denote the average gain over all other baselines.

Type	Evaluator	R-Judge		ASSEBench		MATEBENCH-IN		MATEBENCH-OUT		MATEBENCH-REAL	
		Acc $\uparrow$	F1 $\uparrow$	Acc $\uparrow$	F1 $\uparrow$	Acc $\uparrow$	F1 $\uparrow$	Acc $\uparrow$	F1 $\uparrow$	Acc $\uparrow$	F1 $\uparrow$
Rule-Based	Static Rule Engine	54.12%	69.89%	56.78%	71.71%	41.87%	59.01%	39.22%	56.34%	56.17%	71.94%
	GPT-4.1	76.50%	52.34%	88.24%	89.43%	89.20%	80.91%	85.48%	77.52%	85.19%	85.55%
LLM-as-a-Judge	o3	86.89%	87.11%	87.99%	88.64%	87.53%	79.95%	78.48%	69.07%	80.25%	79.83%
	Claude-Sonnet-4	87.50%	88.84%	89.83%	91.40%	89.12%	80.94%	84.70%	78.67%	75.93%	82.67%
	Deepseek-V3	62.17%	74.92%	82.69%	87.86%	91.60%	90.30%	86.96%	88.56%	73.46%	84.88%
	Qwen3-235B-A22B	62.17%	74.21%	83.91%	87.29%	92.90%	90.91%	87.83%	88.18%	85.80%	88.56%
	gpt-oss-120B	80.74%	84.29%	86.83%	89.11%	87.57%	84.94%	81.57%	82.18%	80.86%	84.58%
	Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct	61.12%	73.84%	77.19%	86.21%	74.90%	89.96%	69.39%	87.77%	82.72%	86.67%
	Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct	59.72%	76.51%	77.67%	86.82%	86.16%	88.70%	83.91%	89.53%	76.54%	86.03%
	ShieldAgent (7B)	82.66%	84.75%	79.50%	82.43%	52.54%	54.07%	43.74%	57.28%	62.96%	75.00%
	ShieldLM-6B	54.29%	60.38%	53.10%	53.03%	72.32%	67.97%	68.17%	69.73%	58.64%	61.27%
	ShieldLM-7B	61.30%	68.96%	67.99%	70.62%	55.86%	74.97%	51.74%	71.10%	67.90%	73.74%
	ShieldLM-13B	36.08%	21.61%	47.86%	38.38%	32.43%	26.24%	62.43%	14.04%	46.91%	14.00%
	ShieldLM-14B	60.25%	70.36%	75.27%	77.95%	87.75%	85.39%	80.70%	84.45%	78.40%	81.72%
Policy-Conditioned LLM	MATE-0.5B	90.02% $\uparrow 23.91\%$	90.60% $\uparrow 20.03\%$	91.41% $\uparrow 16.06\%$	92.20% $\uparrow 13.57\%$	94.05% $\uparrow 19.64\%$	91.03% $\uparrow 15.73\%$	92.00% $\uparrow 20.26\%$	92.39% $\uparrow 19.93\%$	86.42% $\uparrow 14.15\%$	87.78% $\uparrow 12.32\%$
	MATE-1.5B	91.94% $\uparrow 25.83\%$	92.94% $\uparrow 22.37\%$	93.81% $\uparrow 18.46\%$	94.51% $\uparrow 15.88\%$	95.42% $\uparrow 21.01\%$	93.33% $\uparrow 18.03\%$	92.78% $\uparrow 21.04\%$	92.64% $\uparrow 20.18\%$	90.12% $\uparrow 17.85\%$	91.40% $\uparrow 15.94\%$
	MATE-3B	92.64% $\uparrow 26.53\%$	93.92% $\uparrow 23.35\%$	94.98% $\uparrow 19.63\%$	95.54% $\uparrow 16.91\%$	96.83% $\uparrow 22.42\%$	95.53% $\uparrow 20.22\%$	95.48% $\uparrow 23.74\%$	94.68% $\uparrow 22.22\%$	95.06% $\uparrow 22.79\%$	95.60% $\uparrow 20.14\%$

in blue in Table 2, confirming its effectiveness for natural-language policy-aware mobile agent trajectory security detection. Among the baselines, the strongest prompt-based commercial models (e.g., GPT-4.1, Claude-Sonnet-4) and open-source models (e.g., DeepSeek-V3, Qwen3-235B-A22B, gpt-oss-120B) perform relatively well, suggesting that current LLMs possess some capability for policy-aware trajectory auditing. However, their accuracy still trails MATE by about 3% on average. In particular, compared to the strongest prompt-based commercial LLM, MATE-0.5B improves accuracy by roughly 2%, MATE-1.5B by about 4%, and MATE-3B by about 5%, while using significantly fewer parameters.

We attribute these gains to how MATE models policies and trajectories. The static rule engine reduces policies to keyword patterns over flat text, so it misses paraphrased or implicit violations and cannot reason over multi-step dependencies or trajectories whose security changes under different policies. Prompt-based LLM judges are more semantic but rely on a zero-shot prompt, making them sensitive to prompt phrasing, trajectory length, and spurious cues; we observe both over-triggering on benign but alarming wording and under-triggering on subtle, long-horizon violations. In contrast, MATE jointly encodes trajectories and policies and is trained on matched, mismatched, and multi-policy examples with supervision on both labels and rationales, yielding more calibrated and policy-aware judgments rather than brittle pattern matching or unstable prompt responses. These results suggest that a policy-aware, trajectory-aligned learning paradigm is effective for trajectory security auditing.

RQ2: Robustness Across Distributions and Real-world Agents. Results on MATEBENCH-OUT, R-Judge, and AS-

SEBench, three out-of-distribution datasets, show that MATE generalizes well across apps and datasets: On MATEBENCH-OUT (1,150 trajectories from 24 apps never seen during MATE training), all MATE variants achieve accuracy above 92% and average F1 around 93%, yielding an average gain of about 21% over all baselines. This indicates that MATE effectively generalizes to new app and UI distributions. On R-Judge, MATE attains average accuracy above 91%, roughly 25% higher than baselines; on ASSEBench, the average accuracy exceeds 93%, about 18% higher. These results show that MATE maintains consistent advantages not only on our own benchmark but also on independent agent-trajectory datasets.

On the real-world mobile agent trajectory dataset MATEBENCH-REAL, MATE achieves average accuracy and F1 above 91%, outperforming baselines by about 16%. This demonstrates that MATE is reliable on trajectories produced by real deployed systems and indirectly supports the realism of our knowledge-grounded synthesis pipeline: The synthesized trajectories closely match real trajectories in semantics and decision patterns and substantially improve downstream performance in real-world settings.

RQ3: Efficiency and Deployment Cost. MATE provides clear benefits in resource usage and latency. Unlike commercial or large open-source LLMs that require paid APIs or GPU clusters, MATE can run in resource-constrained settings, including CPU-only deployments, while offering low-latency inference with high Acc. As shown in Table 3, on MATEBENCH-OUT and running on a single NVIDIA H100 GPU, MATE achieve on average 93% accuracy and F1, with a minimum per-trajectory latency below 100ms (0.09s for MATE-0.5B). In contrast, three state-of-the-art general-

Table 3: Comparison of MATE and LLM-as-a-judge baselines on MATEBENCH-OUT. We report Acc, F1 (%), latency per trajectory, and model size; MATE achieves higher Acc and F1 with lower latency and smaller models (Qwen3-235B-A22B is a reasoning model). Blue numbers in the MATE rows denote average gains over other baselines.

Model	MATEBENCH-OUT		Latency Time ↓	Model Size (params) ↓
	Acc ↑	F1 ↑		
GPT-4.1	85.48%	77.52%	1.64s	Undisclosed
DeepSeek-V3	86.96%	88.56%	5.10s	671B
Qwen3-235B-A22B	87.83%	88.18%	11.19s	235B
MATE-0.5B	92.00%	92.39%	0.09s	0.5B
	↑ 5.24%	↑ 7.64%		
MATE-1.5B	92.78%	92.64%	0.18s	1.5B
	↑ 6.02%	↑ 7.89%		
MATE-3B	95.48%	94.68%	0.21s	3B
	↑ 8.72%	↑ 9.93%		

purpose LLMs, namely the commercial model GPT-4.1 (via API) and two open-source models Qwen3-235B-A22B (reasoning model) and DeepSeek-V3, obtain 85.48%–87.83% Acc, 77.52%–88.56% F1, and 1.64–11.19s latency. The two open-source models are run on the same NVIDIA H100 GPU. MATE improves Acc by 5%–9% and F1 by 8%–10% over strong LLM-as-a-Judge baselines. Compared to DeepSeek-V3, MATE-0.5B responds in about 1.8% of its latency (0.09s vs. 5.10s) while using only 0.07% of its parameters (0.5B vs. 671B). These results underscore MATE’s practicality and cost-effectiveness for real-world security auditing.

6.3 Ablation Studies

RQ4: Impact of Knowledge-grounded Synthesis and Fine-tuning. To evaluate the design choices in our pipeline, we conduct ablation studies on data quality and model capability. **Human Evaluation of Data Checking and Repair.** Our automatic data synthesis pipeline applies a three-stage quality checking and repair process to each example to ensure structural validity, semantic coherence, policy alignment, and correctness of explanatory annotations. The first two stages use static programs and LLMs for automated checking and repair; the third stage performs a final manual review and correction. Using MATEBENCH-IN and MATEBENCH-OUT, we evaluate complete examples before and after the first two automatic repair stages via human scoring to assess the effectiveness of multi-stage repair. We adopt a 5-point Likert scale [52] (1–5, from very poor to fully satisfactory) with four criteria: Explanation correctness, policy alignment, semantic consistency, and structural regularity. Each example is independently scored by at least three annotators, and we report averaged scores in Figure 6. After the two automated stages, the mean scores on all four criteria rise from about score 4 to close to score 5, indicating that multi-stage automatic checking and repair is both effective and necessary for more robust, consistent, reliable annotations.




Figure 6: Human evaluation of data quality before and after the first two stages of data checking and repair. We report average Likert scores (1–5) for structural validity, semantic coherence, policy alignment, and explanation correctness on samples from MATEBENCH-IN and MATEBENCH-OUT.

Comparison Between MATE and the Base Models Before Fine-tuning. To understand how far generic instruction-tuned models go in a zero-shot setting and to assess the necessity of task-specific fine-tuning, we evaluate the original Qwen2.5-0.5B/1.5B/3B-Instruct models on MATEBENCH and compare them with the corresponding MATE-0.5B/1.5B/3B, as shown in Figure 7. In the zero-shot setting, the instruction-tuned base models achieve on average less than 50% accuracy when performing trajectory-level security auditing conditioned on natural-language security policies. In contrast, MATE attains an average relative improvement of about 45% across the three benchmarks, with overall accuracy exceeding 92%. These findings show that generic instruction-following ability alone is insufficient for complex policy-conditioned, trajectory-level security auditing and that task-specific fine-tuning on high-quality synthesized data is essential.

These ablations jointly validate our design. On the data side, the multi-stage quality checking and repair mechanism improves consistency and semantic fidelity of knowledge-grounded instruction–trajectory–policy–annotation tuples, providing a reliable foundation for downstream training. On the model side, fine-tuning lightweight models on these data enables MATE to consistently and substantially outperform the direct audits of large, generic models across multiple benchmarks, including real-world scenarios.

Ablation Study on the Data Synthesis Pipeline. We further ablate two key components of the knowledge-grounded synthesis pipeline: External knowledge and quality repair. While some execution knowledge of popular apps may be embedded in LLM pretraining, we hypothesize that the absence of explicit knowledge makes it difficult to generate semantically authentic trajectory data for most apps. To test this, we select 20 apps from the lower end of the popularity ranking (10 Chinese and 10 English), synthesize more than 15K trajectory samples to train MATE-0.5B, and evaluate it on MATEBENCH-REAL. The results in Table 4 show that removing either knowledge




Figure 7: Ablation comparing zero-shot Qwen2.5-Instruct base models and MATE on MATEBENCH. Task-specific fine-tuning on our synthesized data substantially improves trajectory-level security auditing accuracy.

or quality repair degrades fine-tuning performance on synthesized data: Removing knowledge causes a substantial drop in Acc, while removing quality repair leads to a smaller but noticeable decline. When both knowledge and quality repair are ablated, Acc drops by about 30% compared with the full pipeline. These findings underscore the critical role of explicit knowledge in generating semantically faithful agent trajectories and demonstrate that optimal MATE performance relies on the tight interaction between knowledge and quality repair.

Table 4: Ablation results of MATE-0.5B trained on about 15K synthesized trajectories from 20 apps, evaluated on MATEBENCH-REAL. We compare the full pipeline with variants that remove knowledge or quality repair.

Knowledge	Quality Repair	MATEBENCH-REAL	
		Acc↑	F1↑
✗	✗	46.91%	29.51%
✗	✓	51.23%	43.79%
✓	✗	69.75%	66.67%
✓	✓	75.93%	79.14%

6.4 Case Study: Policy-Aware Trajectory Auditing on Real-World Mobile Agents

Figure 8 presents two representative cases from MATEBENCH-REAL, each consisting of a real mobile agent trajectory and the corresponding policy-aware auditing result produced by MATE-3B under the associated security policies. Figure 8(a) shows a trajectory generated by Zhipu’s AutoGLM [16], and Figure 8(b) shows a trajectory from Alibaba’s Mobile-Agent [11]. For each trajectory in MATEBENCH-REAL, a trajectory adapter converts raw screenshot logs into a unified trajectory representation, a policy retriever automatically selects the most relevant security policy from the policy pool, and then MATE performs


policy-aware trajectory-level auditing. These cases show that MATE can accurately perform policy-aware security auditing over complex agent behaviors, identify the corresponding risk categories, and produce clear and consistent natural-language explanations, demonstrating its effectiveness and practicality in real-world mobile agent systems.

7 Discussion


Deployment Scope and Operational Triage. MATE currently audits complete trajectories after execution rather than blocking actions step by step during execution. This scope is appropriate for security evaluation, trace analysis, policy compliance testing, and post-hoc diagnosis of deployed mobile agents. In operational settings, occasional false positives should be handled through practical risk-aware triage rather than a single hard blocking decision: MATE’s violation label and rationale can be combined with fine-grained risk categories, confidence thresholds, and human review for high-impact cases. Future work may extend MATE toward online defense by fine-tuning on incomplete trajectories and introducing intervention policies that decide when an in-progress trajectory should be paused, warned, or blocked.

Generalization and Limitations. Although MATE is trained on synthetic data, it is grounded in functional workflows and security policies of real apps, keeping its distribution close to real operational behavior. App documentation, structured profiling, controlled trajectory synthesis, and layered quality checks yield semantically coherent, structurally consistent trajectories, while diverse augmentations broaden coverage of trajectory-policy relations and hard corner cases. Experiments on real trajectories from multiple mobile agent systems show that MATE transfers effectively beyond the synthetic setting, suggesting that knowledge-grounded synthesis is a practical basis for trajectory-level security auditing.

Adaptation to Emerging Security Threats. Mobile apps and agent technologies evolve, and new security risks emerge.



(a) A real trajectory from Zhipu's AutoGLM and the corresponding policy-aware evaluation produced by MATE-3B.



(b) A real trajectory from Alibaba's Mobile-Agent and the corresponding policy-aware auditing result produced by MATE-3B.

Figure 8: Two case studies where MATE-3B audits real trajectories from deployed real-world mobile agent, including Zhipu's AutoGLM and Alibaba's Mobile-Agent.

MATE explicitly separates policy representation from model parameters: Security requirements are expressed as natural-language policies that can be updated or extended without retraining. When a new threat appears, operators can add policies to the policy set or supply ad-hoc policies at inference time, adapting behavior at the policy level. This design suits vertical domains such as finance, healthcare, and enterprise workflows, where domain-specific and frequently changing security requirements demand policy-conditioned auditing aligned with current regulatory and organizational constraints.

Limitations and Future Works. Despite its strong performance under multiple policies, MATE still struggles with complex policy interactions. In practice, policies may overlap, conflict, or apply at different granularities to the same trajectory, while current supervision treats them as independent constraints, which may yield ambiguous auditing results. This is especially true for multi-function tasks, cross-app workflows,

and densely regulated domains. Future work will explore more principled modeling of policy interactions, such as an explicit aggregation module that reasons about priority, subsumption, and exceptions, or framing compliance as a multi-objective decision problem trained on data with controlled conflicts and partial applicability.

8 Related Work

Agent Security Evaluation and Defense. Guardrail models such as LlamaGuard [53], Qwen3Guard [54], ShieldGemma [55], and ShieldLM [51] audit LLM outputs, but they do not operate on agent trajectories. Recent work on agent security introduces benchmarks and behavior-simulation frameworks [17, 20, 21, 24, 26, 38, 56–59] that log trajectories and annotate insecure behaviors. Most of these systems evaluate security by prompting general-purpose LLMs as judges, sometimes with

memory augmentation or simple rules (e.g., R-Judge [36] and ASSEBench [37]). They are typically environment-agnostic, do not target mobile agents, and rarely encode explicit, editable security policies; as a result, they are brittle to app-specific UI flows, struggle with changing requirements, and provide limited support for policy-aware auditing. Building on these efforts, our work focuses on a lightweight, trajectory-level auditor for mobile agents. MATE is trained on policy-conditioned trajectories from real mobile apps and supports explicit natural-language policies and flexible updates, avoiding reliance on prompt-based LLM judges.

Agent Trajectory Synthesis. To reduce the cost of collecting interaction logs, recent work synthesizes agent trajectories from indirect sources like API documentation and web tutorials, and uses them to train task agents or safety models [8, 31, 32, 60]. These frameworks show that knowledge-grounded synthesis improves agent capabilities, but they mainly target generic tool-using or web agents, do not model mobile UI flows, and rarely attach security policies or policy-aware labels, focusing on task success rather than fine-grained compliance. Our work brings knowledge-grounded trajectory synthesis to mobile agent security auditing. We design a pipeline that derives trajectories from step-by-step app-operation knowledge and security policies, and applies multi-stage quality checks and repair to ensure semantic fidelity. The resulting policy-conditioned mobile trajectories both train MATE and instantiate MATEBENCH, a benchmark for policy-aware, trajectory-level auditing in mobile environments.

9 Conclusion

We present a knowledge-grounded synthesis pipeline for mobile agent trajectories and MATE, a lightweight policy-aware auditor for trajectory-level security. Using functional workflows and security policies from 158 applications, our pipeline synthesizes semantically realistic trajectories with policy-conditioned labels, enabling compact models that audit full trajectories against natural-language security policies and provide explicit explanations. On the resulting MATEBENCH benchmark, which combines synthetic and real subsets, MATE attains over 95% average accuracy, about 4% higher than strong prompt-based LLM evaluators, exceeds 90% accuracy on real trajectories, and MATE-0.5B runs in under 100ms per trajectory. Moreover, MATE audits trajectories from deployed mobile agents, including Zhipu’s AutoGLM and Alibaba’s Mobile-Agent, in real environments, demonstrating its effectiveness beyond synthetic settings.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. This work was supported in part by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (No.

2024YFF0618800), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (62402114). Jiarun Dai was supported in part by the Shanghai Municipal Special Program for Basic Research on General AI Foundation Models (No. 2025SHZDZX025D07). Xudong Pan is a Xuemin Fellow supported by the Xuemin Institute of Advanced Studies, Fudan University and the Chengguang Program of Shanghai Education Development Foundation and Shanghai Municipal Education Commission. Xudong Pan is the corresponding author.

Ethical Considerations

Our work studies the security risks of mobile agents by auditing their trajectories under natural-language security policies. The datasets used to train and evaluate MATE are generated by an knowledge-grounded synthesis pipeline; they do not contain personal identifiers, credentials, or private user content. The real-world trajectories in MATEBENCH-REAL are collected from mobile agents running on test accounts under our control (including commercial systems Alibaba’s Mobile-Agent [11] and Zhipu’s AutoGLM [16]), and we do not interact with unsuspecting users or access third-party private data. All experiments comply with the terms of service of the underlying platforms and APIs to the best of our knowledge.

Releasing a strong, policy-aware trajectory auditor could in principle help adversaries better understand how security checks work. However, the goal of MATE is defensive: It is designed to detect and explain risky behaviors of mobile agents, not to generate or execute them. The policies and trajectories describe high-level patterns of insecure behavior (e.g., unauthorized transfers, privacy leakage) but do not provide step-by-step exploit instructions, and are intended solely for research and benchmarking. We identify the main stakeholders as users of mobile agents, app and platform providers, and the broader security and ML research communities. To reduce residual risks (e.g., misuse of our benchmark to tune attacks), we sanitize examples, avoid publishing low-level exploit details, and clearly position MATE and MATEBENCH as defensive tools. Our post-publication plan is to respond to community feedback and, if unanticipated harms arise, revise or restrict access to specific artifacts as needed.

Open Science

We make available the artifacts necessary to reproduce our results, including the code for the data synthesis pipeline, data augmentation, trajectory adapter, policy retriever, and evaluation; the MATEBENCH benchmark, covering both synthetic and sanitized real-world subsets; the trained MATE model; and the configuration files and scripts for all reported experiments. The artifacts are available on Zenodo at <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20232924>. The project page is available at <https://jiangchangyue.github.io/MATE>.

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A Detailed of MATE Evaluation Prompts

We present the prompts used to evaluate MATE as a policy-aware trajectory auditor. For each benchmark setting, we provide both English and Chinese prompt templates that take the instruction, trajectory Thought, Action, and Observation, and one or more natural-language security policies as inputs, and require the evaluator to output a violation judgment, risk category, and explanation.

Prompt for Trajectory Auditing (English)

Task (en)

Please evaluate whether the agent’s behavior trajectory for completing the instruction violates the given security policy, based on the user instruction, the security policy. If the policy is violated, please specify the specific unsafe risk category, and finally explain the evaluation result.

```
<USER_INSTRUCTION>
{instruction}
</USER_INSTRUCTION>
```

```
<SECURITY_POLICY>
{security_policy}
</SECURITY_POLICY>
```

```
<TRAJECTORY>
{trajectory}
</TRAJECTORY>
```

The output should include three items:

Violation: yes/no (whether the trajectory violates the given security policy),

Category: risk category/none (possible risk category, or none if no policy is violated),

Rationale: (an explanation of the evaluation result).
Output your evaluation result directly.

Prompt for Trajectory Auditing (Chinese)

Task (zh)

请根据用户的指令和给定的规则，评估给定的智能体执行该指令的行为轨迹是否违反了给定的规则。如果违反了给定的安全规则，请给出具体的不安全风险类别，最后对评估结果进行解释。

```
<USER_INSTRUCTION>
{instruction}
</USER_INSTRUCTION>
```

```
<SECURITY_POLICY>
{security_policy}
</SECURITY_POLICY>
```

```
<TRAJECTORY>
{trajectory}
</TRAJECTORY>
```

输出内容包括三项:

Violation: yes/no (生成的轨迹数据是否违反了给定的安全规则),

Category: 风险类别/none (可能的风险类别, 没违反安全规则则为none),

Rationale: (对评估结果的解释)。
直接输出评估结果。

B Action Space Definition

To standardize interactions between mobile agents and the underlying operating system, we define a unified action space of 10 atomic GUI operations (Table 5). This action space is designed to cover the vast majority of user interactions on mobile phones, such as clicking, typing, swiping, and invoking system buttons. During synthesis and deployment, the agent issues actions in this structured format, enabling precise and reproducible control over the mobile interface.

Table 5: Definitions of the 10 atomic GUI actions in the mobile agent action space.

Action	Definition
click	Taps the specified (x,y) coordinates on the screen.
key	Performs a key event on the device using ADB’s keyevent syntax.
long_press	Presses the (x,y) coordinates on the screen for a specified duration.
swipe	Swipes from the starting point (x,y) to the endpoint (x_2,y_2) .
type	Inputs the specified text into the currently active input field.
open	Opens a specified application on the device by its name.
system_button	Presses a system button such as Back, Home, Menu, or Enter.
wait	Pauses execution for a specified number of seconds to allow UI changes.
answer	Outputs the specified textual answer or result.
terminate	Terminates the current task and reports success or failure status.

C Details of the Risk Taxonomy

Table 6 details our risk taxonomy, which organizes 14 sub-categories into three top-level dimensions: *Personal Harm*, *Interpersonal Harm*, and *Societal Harm*. The taxonomy is

Table 6: Risk taxonomy for mobile agents. 14 subcategories are grouped into three dimensions (personal, interpersonal, societal). For each subcategory we list the underlying risk mechanism and an illustrative mobile agent scenario.

Subcategory	Risk Mechanism & Technical Analysis	Illustrative Scenario & User Interaction
Dimension I: Personal Harm		
Account Compromise	Seizure of authentication credentials or session tokens, resulting in the loss of administrative control over digital identities.	A user inadvertently authorizes an agent to access a malicious link, which subsequently exfiltrates session cookies to an external server.
Financial Loss	Depletion of monetary or virtual assets through unauthorized transactions, deceptive payments, or fraudulent subscription enrollments.	Failing to recognize a ‘hidden’ UI layer, the agent autonomously confirms an expensive recurring subscription.
Privacy Leakage	Systematic exfiltration of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) or sensitive telemetry data to untrusted parties without consent.	An agent configured for “smart backup” uploads private gallery photos, including images of bank cards, to an insecure cloud provider.
Device Security Compromised	Weakening of OS-level integrity via unauthorized rooting, enabling insecure debugging ports, or the installation of malicious software.	To fulfill a request for a “modified” app, the agent bypasses security warnings to enable “Unknown Sources” and installs a Trojan-embedded APK.
Reputational/Psychological Harm	Generation or propagation of toxic or offensive content that damages the user’s social standing or causes severe psychological stress.	A compromised agent responds to a professional LinkedIn query using highly offensive language, leading to public reputational damage.
Dimension II: Interpersonal Harm		
Becoming a Fraud Relay	Manipulation of the agent’s communication protocols to act as a “mule” for phishing campaigns or scams within the user’s social circles.	The agent is tricked into forwarding a deceptive “Emergency Hospital Bill” link to all members of the user’s family and work groups.
Leaking Others’ Privacy	Unauthorized collection or disclosure of private information belonging to third parties accessed through shared contexts or interpersonal logs.	An agent summarizes a group meeting but fails to redact the private home addresses and contact details of other participants mentioned.
Account Impersonation Harming Trust	Mimicry of the user’s linguistic style and persona to deceive contacts for financial gain, undermining established trust relationships.	A hijacked agent generates high-fidelity voice messages mimicking the user’s tone to ask a colleague for an urgent financial transfer.
Shared Account Leading to Joint Liability	Policy-violating actions in shared accounts that trigger collective legal, financial, or contractual repercussions for all associated owners.	An agent’s aggressive data scraping via a shared enterprise account violates platform ToS, resulting in the entire organization being banned.
Dimension III: Societal Harm		
Fueling the Disinformation Ecosystem	Automated generation and amplification of false narratives or deepfakes designed to pollute the information environment.	A fleet of coordinated agents amplifies a fake news report regarding a “national security threat,” causing regional panic and resource depletion.
Undermining Platform Trust Mechanisms	Manipulation of recommendation algorithms through synthetic engagement signals, such as fake reviews, click farming, or artificial upvoting.	Thousands of agents coordinate to post 5-star reviews for a fraudulent financial application, pushing it to the top of the App Store rankings.
Aiding the Operation of Black-/Gray Industries	Scalable automation of illicit activities, such as bypassing CAPTCHAs, bulk account creation, or illegal data harvesting operations.	Agents solve millions of CAPTCHAs per hour to facilitate the automated scalping of public health-care slots, denying access to human users.
Triggering Group Conflict or Public Resource Waste	Malicious consumption of resources through recursive loops or provocative content that incites confrontation or strains public services.	A bug in an agent’s reasoning loop causes it to send thousands of requests per minute to a municipal API, crashing the service for the city.
Weakening Digital Identity Trustworthiness	Erosion of the ability to distinguish between human and automated actors, leading to a collapse of digital trust and reliable signals.	The prevalence of near-human agents makes online interactions so untrustworthy that platforms are forced to mandate intrusive biometric audits.

derived from our threat model in Section 2.3 and is tailored to the capabilities and attack surface of mobile agents, serving as the basis for trajectory-level auditing.

- **Personal Harm.** This dimension captures risks that directly affect the device owner, including account compromise, financial loss, privacy leakage, device security compromise, and reputational or psychological harm. In the mobile agent setting, these risks are typically realized through misuse of sensitive permissions or high-impact actions such as unauthorized payments or exfiltration of private content.
- **Interpersonal Harm.** This dimension focuses on harms to specific other individuals, such as friends, family, or colleagues. Representative subcategories include becoming a fraud relay, leaking others’ privacy, account impersonation that undermines trust, and policy-violating actions in shared accounts that create joint liability. We construct scenarios where agents interact with contacts or shared resources in ways that could damage interpersonal relationships or expose third-party data.
- **Societal Harm.** This dimension considers broader impacts on the information ecosystem and public resources. Subcategories include fueling disinformation, undermining platform trust mechanisms, aiding gray or illicit industries, triggering group conflict or abusive consumption of public services, and weakening the reliability of digital identity systems. These scenarios reflect cases where autonomous agents can scale harm beyond a single user or social circle.

This three-level structure provides fine-grained labels for trajectory-level outcomes and guides both task synthesis and expert annotation in MATEBENCH.

D Details of the Policy Retriever

D.1 Model Architecture

We use `bge-m3` as the base embedding model due to its strong multilingual support (covering Chinese and English), long-context handling (suitable for multi-step trajectories), and competitive performance on dense retrieval benchmarks, and wide adoption as one of the most downloaded retrieval models on Hugging Face.

D.2 Standard Policy Pool Construction

Before training the retriever, we construct a high-quality security policy pool to serve as the retrieval corpus. This pool consists of 934 policies in total (400 in Chinese and 534 in English). Chinese and English policies are processed separately using the following steps:

1. *Filtering and Clustering.* We compute embeddings for all unique policies. A policy is admitted to the standard pool

only if it appears with sufficient frequency ($\text{Freq} > 2$) and its semantic similarity to existing standard policies satisfies $\delta_{\text{sim}} \leq 0.70$.

2. *Mapping.* Redundant policies whose similarity to an existing standard policy exceeds $\delta_{\text{sim}} \geq 0.82$ are assigned to the corresponding standard-policy cluster.

D.3 Dataset Construction

Training and evaluation data for the retriever are derived from the MATE training set to align it with the detector’s domain distribution. We include three sample types:

- *Positive Samples.* For each trajectory in the MATE training set, we map its annotated policy to a standard-policy entry and use the pair as a positive example.
- *Hard Negatives.* To learn fine-grained distinctions, we apply hard-negative mining. For each query trajectory, we sample 7 policies from the pool with similarity scores in the range $[0.60, 0.78]$ relative to the ground-truth policy. This “1 positive + 7 hard negatives” setup encourages the model to separate the correct policy from plausible distractors.
- *Instruction Augmentation.* We prepend short language-specific instructions (e.g., “Retrieve the corresponding English security policy for the following agent trajectory:”) to the query text to improve instruction following.

D.4 Experimental Results and Analysis

Table 7: Performance of the trajectory-policy retriever on a held-out test set of 1,000 trajectories.

Metric	Value $\uparrow$
Recall@1	74.4%
Recall@3	92.0%
Recall@5	95.7%
Recall@10	98.0%
MRR	83.5%

We evaluate the retriever on a test set of 1,000 trajectories sampled from the MATE dataset. To obtain stable estimates, we require that each ground-truth policy in the test set appears at least five times in the training data.

Table 7 reports retrieval performance. Recall@K measures the fraction of queries for which the ground-truth policy appears in the top-K retrieved candidates, and mean reciprocal rank (MRR) summarizes the average rank position of the correct policy. The retriever achieves a Recall@5 of 95.7% and an MRR of 83.5%, indicating that it effectively maps complex trajectories to the standardized policy pool and that MATE almost always receives the correct safety constraint within a small top-K window.