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SPEAR: Five Principles for Interactive Human-Agent Alignment
Tao Long, Lydia B. Chilton
Intelligence
Status: succeeded | Model: Gemma-4-26B-A4B | Prompt: intel-v1 | Confidence: 96%
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Summary
This position paper proposes SPEAR, a framework for interactive human-agent alignment consisting of five principles: Specification, Process, Evaluation, Adaptation, and Recalibration. It argues that alignment is not just a pre-deployment optimization problem but an ongoing interaction design process where humans and agents continuously negotiate shared understanding, agency, and trust in situated, long-term contexts.
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Tao Long â affiliatedwith â Columbia University
confidence 99% ¡ Tao Long long@cs.columbia.edu Columbia University
Lydia B. Chilton â affiliatedwith â Columbia University
confidence 99% ¡ Lydia B. Chilton chilton@cs.columbia.edu Columbia University
SPEAR â includesprinciple â Evaluation
confidence 99% ¡ We propose SPEAR, five pillars of interactive alignment: ... Evaluation ...
SPEAR â includesprinciple â Adaptation
confidence 99% ¡ We propose SPEAR, five pillars of interactive alignment: ... Adaptation ...
SPEAR â includesprinciple â Recalibration
confidence 99% ¡ We propose SPEAR, five pillars of interactive alignment: ... and Recalibration.
SPEAR â includesprinciple â Specification
confidence 99% ¡ We propose SPEAR, five pillars of interactive alignment: Specification...
SPEAR â includesprinciple â Process
confidence 99% ¡ We propose SPEAR, five pillars of interactive alignment: ... Process ...
Human-Agent Alignment â reframedas â Interactive Design Problem
confidence 95% ¡ This position paper reframes human-agent alignment as an ongoing interaction design problem.
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Abstract
Abstract:Recent AI alignment work often frames alignment as a pre-deployment optimization problem: collect human feedback, learn preferences or principles, finetune the model, and deploy an aligned system. This framing has produced major progress, but it under-specifies what happens once AI systems act as agents on users' behalf in situated, long-term, and social contexts. This position paper reframes human-agent alignment as an ongoing interaction design problem. We propose SPEAR, five pillars of interactive alignment: Specification (how people express intent and establish shared understanding), Process (how agents decide when to act, ask, defer, or pause), Evaluation (how people judge whether agents succeeded), Adaptation (how agents adapt to users over repeated use), and Recalibration (how people adapt their trust, expectations, and behavior in response to agents).
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SPEAR: Five Principles for Interactive Human-Agent Alignment Tao Long long@cs.columbia.edu Columbia University New York City, New York, USA Lydia B. Chilton chilton@cs.columbia.edu Columbia University New York City, New York, USA Abstract Recent AI alignment work often frames alignment as a pre-deployment optimization problem: collect human feedback, learn preferences or principles, fine-tune the model, and deploy an aligned system. This framing has produced major progress, but it under-specifies what happens once AI systems act as agents on usersâ behalf in situated, long-term, and social contexts. This position paper re- frames human-agent alignment as an ongoing interaction design problem. We propose SPEAR, five pillars of interactive alignment: Specification (how people express intent and establish shared un- derstanding),Process (how agents decide when to act, ask, defer, or pause),Evaluation (how people judge whether agents succeeded), Adaptation (how agents adapt to users over repeated use), and Recalibration (how people adapt their trust, expectations, and be- havior in response to agents). CCS Concepts ⢠Human-centered computingâHCI design and evaluation methods; HCI theory, concepts and models; concepts and paradigms. 1 Introduction AI alignment is often defined in machine learning as the problem of training models to act in accordance with human intentions [24]. This framing has produced a powerful family of pre-deployment alignment methods. Reinforcement learning from human feedback uses human preference comparisons to train reward models [6]; instruction tuning combines human demonstrations and preference data to improve helpfulness and instruction following [24]; and constitutional AI encodes explicit normative principles into model behavior [2]. Alignment is therefore commonly operationalized as a linear pipeline: collect human feedback, learn or encode an objective, fine-tune the model, and deploy an aligned system. This model-centered framing is necessary, but increasingly insuf- ficient for interactive AI systems, and especially for AI agents that plan, use tools, and act on usersâ behalf. In deployed use, human intentions are rarely complete, stable, or fully specifiable in advance. Users may not know exactly what they want until they see what the system produces. They may refine goals across turns, discover new uses, change preferences, or develop new expectations as they appropriate the system into everyday work. In this setting, align- ment cannot be understood only as a property encoded into model weights before deployment. Instead, alignment emerges through interaction after deployment. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. HCOMP 2026, Alexandria, VA, USA Š 2026 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Recent HCI work makes this shift explicit. Terry et al. [29] argue that AI alignment should be understood as an ongoing, multi-stage interactive process consisting of specification alignment, process alignment, and evaluation alignment. Specification alignment con- cerns how humans and AI systems establish a shared understanding of the desired goal. Process alignment concerns how humans and AI systems coordinate the actions and procedures used to achieve that goal. Evaluation alignment concerns how users determine whether the AIâs behavior or output actually succeeded. This framework reframes alignment from a question of output correctness alone to a question of interaction design: how should systems communi- cate, coordinate, and support user judgment throughout use? Chen et al. and Shen et al. extend this view by arguing that human-AI alignment is iterative and bidirectional [5,27]. AI systems adapt to humans, but humans also adapt to AI. Users update their men- tal models, calibrate or miscalibrate trust, change behaviors, form social expectations, and sometimes become over-reliant on AI sys- tems. Thus, alignment does not only concern whether AI follows human intent. It also concerns how interaction with AI reshapes human judgment, agency, and social behavior over time. Building on these perspectives, this position paper synthesizes an HCI definition of interactive human-AI alignment: Alignment is the ongoing, interactive process through which humans and AI systems develop, maintain, and repair shared understanding, appropriate agency, and calibrated reliance over time. This definition reframes alignment as an interaction-design prob- lem. Rather than asking only how to train a model to satisfy human preferences, it asks how humans and AI systems continuously com- municate, coordinate, evaluate, adapt, and co-adapt in situated use. These questions become sharper for agents, which act rather than only respond; we therefore focus on human-agent alignment and ask five interactive alignment questions as SPEAR: ⢠S pecification alignment: How do people express intent, and how do people and agents reach a shared understanding? ⢠Process alignment: How does an agent decide when to act, ask, defer, or pause in ways that match what the user would want? ⢠Evaluation alignment: How do people and agents agree on what counts as success? ⢠Adaptation alignment: What should an agent carry forward from past interactions, and what should it leave behind, so that it becomes more aligned with a user? ⢠Recalibration alignment: How do people update their trust, expectation, and behavior as they learn what agents can(not) do? The first three pillars,S,P, andE, adopted from Terry et al. [29], form the core loop of interactive alignment; the last two,AandR, extend this loop over time, capturing how agents adapt to people and how people recalibrate to agents [5, 27]. arXiv:2610.07204v1 [cs.HC] 5 Oct 2026 HCOMP 2026, September 27â30, 2026, Alexandria, VA, USALong and Chilton We argue that these questions are not entirely new. HCI has stud- ied closely related problems for decades under the names of ground- ing, activity theory, gulfs of execution and evaluation, distributed cognition, mixed-initiative interaction, adaptation, appropriation, social interaction, and groupware. What is new is the scale, opac- ity, agency, and adaptivity of contemporary AI systems, especially agents. This creates an opportunity to translate HCI theories and interaction mechanisms into the language of AI alignment. 2 SPEAR: Pricinples for Interactive Human-Agent Alignment The five alignment questions above provide a bridge between the alignment frameworks and older foundations in HCI and related fields (asunderlined). In this section, we map each question to a corresponding HCI theoretical foundation and a set of interaction mechanisms that can support alignment in deployed agents. Specification Alignment: Intent Grounding. User goals are of- ten partial, ambiguous, or context-dependent.Grounding and repair provide a foundation here: communication requires participants to establish common ground through clarification, acknowledg- ment, evidence, and repair [3,7]. Applied to agents, this suggests that alignment requires more than instruction following. Systems need mechanisms for asking clarifying questions, surfacing assump- tions, confirming interpretations, and repairing misunderstandings. Grounding further distinguishes acknowledging a request from establishing evidence of understanding [7]. For example, a user at Columbia University asks for an âaffordable and convenientâ flight to the Washington, DC, area for HCOMP 2026 in Alexandria, Virginia. A travel-booking agent could ask, âWould an LGAâDCA flight under $400, departing between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m., work for you? LaGuardia is relatively close to Columbia than JFK or EWR, while DCA is closer to Alexandria than IAD.â The user can then repair this interpreta- tion by responding, âJFK is fine if it saves at least $100,â prompting the agent to revise its proposed airport-selection criteria and seek confirmation. Such provisional interpretations make assumptions about price, timing, and airport choice inspectable, allowing users to correct the specification before the agent commits to action. Process Alignment: Agency Coordination. As agents act on usersâ behalf, alignment failures may occur even when the final task is completed successfully. For example, a user asks, âBook my flight for the HCOMP conference.â The agent finds a suitable flight and attempts to use the company payment account, but discovers that the account has expired. It then finds a connected account on the booking page: the userâs saved personal card. Without asking for confirmation, the agent uses the personal card to complete the booking and reports only, âYour flight is booked. All set.â The task is completed, but the user remains unaware of the payment sub- stitution. The agent has implicitly treated authorization to book the flight as authorization to choose how to pay for it. HCI work ondistributed cognitionandmixed-initiative interactionprovides foundations for distributed cognitive work and the coordination of initiative [14â16]. AI agents allow users to offload parts of planning and decision-making, distributing cognitive work across people, models, tools, and external representations. However, offloading cognitive work does not by itself determine which decisions an agent is authorized to make. Complementing this account, the activity theoryforegrounds how tool-mediated activity is orga- nized through purposes, rules, community, and a division of la- bor [11,21]. It adds a question of legitimate delegation to the dis- tribution of cognitive work: which decisions may an agent make, under whose authority, and with what responsibilities? Initiative is thus an alignment decision: acting, asking, deferring, or paus- ing should reflect not only task uncertainty but also authoriza- tion boundaries. Recent work on proactive agents and ambiguity- sensitive pausing illustrates how interaction mechanisms can sup- port user control while enabling automation [25, 31]. Evaluation Alignment: Success Inspectability. Users evaluate agents through the evidence available to them, yet agents often obscure their capabilities, limitations, action histories, and result- ing effects. Normanâsgulfs of evaluation and executionclarify why making this evidence visible must support both judgment and inter- vention [17]. For example, after booking the flight, the agent may report, âYour flight is confirmed.â This confirms task completion but does not establish whether the booking meets the userâs constraints. More useful feedback would state, âYour LGAâDCA flight costs $350 and arrives at 12:30 p.m., 30 minutes later than your requested arrival deadline.â Connecting the outcome to the userâs budget and timing constraints helps bridge the gulf of evaluation. Clearly labeled op- tions such as âFind an earlier flightâ and âView cancellation termsâ help bridge the gulf of execution by making corrective actions dis- coverable. These gulfs provide a theoretical foundation for work on HAI interaction guidelines, explainability, and agent visibility, em- phasizing the need for helping users understand system capabilities, ongoing actions, and opportunities for correction [1,4,30]. Visi- bility into agent state, action traces, goal representations, and side effects is therefore an alignment mechanism when it enables users to compare outcomes with their intentions and respond to mis- matches, rather than merely exposing more information. Adaptation Alignment: Over Time. Alignment must remain revisable as users change their goals and incorporate agents into everyday work. HCI work onadaptation and appropriationshows how users repurpose technologies and develop new practices through use [9,10,20].Structuration theorydescribes rules and resources as both shaping action and being reproduced or transformed through it [12,28]. Orlikowskiâs practice lens applies this relationship to recurring technology use [23]. For example, while planning travel to HCOMP 2026, a user says, âJFK is fine if it saves at least $100.â If saved and repeatedly accepted, this situational trade-off may be- come a default for future trips, even when shorter ground travel becomes more important. Similarly, when a company payment ac- count is unavailable, the user may authorize a temporary workaround: âUse my personal card this time; I will request reimbursement.â If the agent subsequently proposes that card and the user repeatedly accepts it for convenience, the workaround may become routine, leaving the user responsible for advancing funds and requesting reimbursement. In both cases, system defaults shape subsequent actions, while repeated acceptance reinforces those defaults with- out necessarily establishing their continued appropriateness. This lens motivates editable alignment artifactsâpreferences, policies, permissions, and historiesâand opportunities to reconsider their SPEAR: Five Principles for Interactive Human-Agent AlignmentHCOMP 2026, September 27â30, 2026, Alexandria, VA, USA persistence: âKeep the $100 airport trade-off for future trips? â or âThe company account is available again. Switch back? â Longitudinal evaluation should examine how such arrangements become rou- tine, how users appropriate agents into different roles, and whether earlier choices remain open to revision [19, 26]. Recalibration Alignment: Human-to-Agent Alignment. Align- ment does not only shape agent behavior; interaction also changes how people understand, use, and rely on agents. This bidirec- tional view treats human adaptation not as alignment in itself, but as a process through which people develop more appropri- ate ways of interpreting and collaborating with agents. Works on computers as social actors,groupware and social interactionhigh- lights how people respond socially to computers and adapt their coordination practices to technology-mediated work [13,22]. Den- nettâsintentional stancedescribes predicting a systemâs behavior by attributing beliefs and desires to it, without requiring that it possess human-like mental states [8]. For example, after several successful travel bookings, a user may reason, âIt knows my prefer- ences and wants to find what works best for me.â Such interactions can reshape: ⢠expectations (âIt should check baggage fees without being askedâ), ⢠trust (âIts previous recommendations were good, so I trust thisâ), â˘mental models (âIt will now remember my $100 airport trade-off â), â˘practices (âI now check only the summary, not the full itineraryâ), â˘delegation boundaries (âBook flights under $400 without asking me each timeâ). These adaptations do not necessarily constitute improved align- ment. Alignment concerns whether usersâ evolving expectations, mental models, and reliance become calibrated to the systemâs ac- tual capabilities, behavior, and limitations. A user who comes to expect persistent memory when the system cannot reliably retain preferences has adapted to the system, but in a way that creates a mismatch between their mental model and the agent. Capability demonstrations and expectation-setting mechanisms [18], includ- ing explicit memory boundaries such as âYour airport preference applies to this booking only; it has not been saved for future trips,â can help users calibrate their interpretations and reliance. Human- to-agent alignment should therefore support informed and revisable calibration, rather than assume that greater trust, less checking, or broader delegation is necessarily beneficial. 3 Summary: Interaction Mechanisms as Alignment Mechanisms Across these five questions, we argue that interaction design mech- anisms can be understood as alignment mechanisms. Clarification, pausing, visibility, onboarding, correction, explanation, customiza- tion, and expectation-setting are not merely interface details; they are the means by which alignment is negotiated, maintained, and repaired after deployment. We see our work contributes a bridge between AI alignment, human computation, and human-AI interaction. 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